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Abstract 
 
International statebuilding projects are characterized by a sovereignty paradox: external 
actors compromise crucial aspects of sovereignty in order to rehabilitate domestic political 
authorities in the full exercise of their legitimate governing prerogatives. Scholars also posit 
that an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility provides this paradox with a 
justification and an ethic. Reflecting on the statebuilding experience in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), with all of its contradictions and inconsistencies, two questions emerge. 
Is the sovereignty paradox valid in all statebuilding projects? Do the ideas of sovereignty as 
a capacity and a responsibility genuinely inform international policy-makers? 
In the case of BiH, the EU complicates the sovereignty paradox. As a post-nation state 
organization that ‘educates’ prospective members, Brussels promotes institutional 
reorganization in a state that is still ‘in-the-making’ with a view to its integration into 
supranational structures. While containing dispersions of sovereignty and suppressing 
centripetal forces with the prospect of membership and the activities of its field offices, the 
EU seeks to prepare autochthon elites to relinquish sovereign prerogatives and join the 
supra-national Union. Acknowledging this qualitative difference between international 
statebuilding projects and EU member-statebuilding initiatives, this thesis explores how 
Brussels both ‘thinks and operates’. Building on the literature on sovereignty and 
statebuilding, the empirical analysis examines two aspects of the current Bosnian reform 
agenda: the constitution-making process and police reform.  
By looking at the specific attitude of EU policy-makers towards the reform process of the 
Bosnian constitution, this thesis sheds light on a peculiar ‘EU hands-up statebuilding’ 
approach. The ambiguity of throwing its hands up when called upon to take direct 
responsibility for political reconciliation and constitutional reform conceals the inherent 
difficulties for Brussels in resolving two crucial operational dilemmas: bottom-up vs. top-
down statebuilding, and technical presence vs. complex post-war stabilization.  
The account of the reform of the Bosnian police shows that the tendency to throw the hands 
up in a denial of responsibility for complex political undertakings is combined, to use another 
powerful metaphor, with a ‘hands-off modus operandi’. The EU promotes its own 
statebuilding policies by insisting on technical adjustments, attempting a process of 
statebuilding by induction. Moreover, the EU-sponsored police reform is a case of 
mismanaged conditionality. This reform was identified in Brussels as an essential pre-
requisite for the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), but it ended 
up provoking Bosnia’s most severe crises in its post-Dayton history. With the credibility of 
the whole European integration project for BiH at risk, the EU refrained from further 
confrontation and diluted its most critical demands, allowing local politicians to perform a 
‘conquest’ of the reform agenda. 
This thesis demonstrates that the institutional reconstruction of BiH has been pursued by the 
EU with a risk-avoidance mentality. Brussels has procrastinated in facilitating a solution to 
the internal sovereignty struggle and has distanced itself from sharing key political 
responsibilities in the Bosnian stabilization process, revealing a tendency to ‘technify’ the 
relationship with local elites. Furthermore, this detached position has allowed the EU to 
avoid a more open confrontation with the residual influence of the United States in the 
Bosnian statebuilding project. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
At the Council of Feira in Portugal in June 2000, the EU announced for the first 
time its commitment to guarantee the ‘fullest possible integration’ of the countries 
of the Western Balkans region (European Council 2000). Exactly three years later, 
that statement was followed by another solemn promise. Building on the 
momentum of the imminent enlargement to Eastern European countries, in 
Thessaloniki it was acknowledged that also ‘the future of the Balkans is within the 
EU’ (European Council 2003: emphasis added). EU leaders thus chose to present 
the next enlargement of the Union to the Western Balkans as an inevitable and 
necessary development; three years later, they again confirmed that the future of 
the whole region certainly ‘lies’ in the Union (European Council 2006b). 
The challenge of the next EU enlargement to South-East Europe has 
nevertheless been qualitatively different from the process between 1993 and 2007 
that led to the integration of the states formerly belonging to the USSR’s sphere of 
influence. Amongst other structural and socio-economic differences, most of the 
countries of the Western Balkans – with the exception of Croatia and Serbia – can 
still be described as ‘states in-the-making’, which remain subject to internal 
sovereignty struggles among competing ethno-religious elites, face complex 
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issues related to the integration of national minorities, and have not been fully 
rehabilitated in the independent exercise of their governing prerogatives. 
Focusing on the challenge of integrating new members into its 
supranational structures, the EU’s stabilizing influence in the region differs in 
approach, rationale, and ethics from ‘ordinary’ internationally-driven statebuilding 
projects. The emphasis on the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, and 
socio-economic recovery – which is also a characteristic of UN-led initiatives for 
the reorganization of weak or failed states – should not obscure the fact that from 
the Brussels’ perspective, stabilization in the Western Balkans can only be 
achieved by creating domesticated member-states instead of restoring full 
sovereignty and allowing local elites to exercise it in complete independence. The 
rehabilitation of international and domestic sovereign capacities has not been the 
main objective of the peculiar EU’s ‘member-statebuilding’ in the region. Rather, 
the transfer of critical sovereign prerogatives from candidate countries to the post-
nation state Union removes the key object of controversy from local elites. 
 
 
1. The Bosnian case and statebuilding 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a prime case for understanding the EU’s 
stabilization strategy for the Western Balkans. This country represents a complex 
multiethnic polity, where political reconciliation has never been achieved and 
where there is a constant ‘multilevel’ sovereignty struggle, ranging from central 
state institutions down to the municipal level. BiH has not yet consolidated its 
sovereign independence and remains exposed to domestic tensions between three 
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competing ethno-religious groups: Bosniak Muslims, Catholic Croats, and 
Orthodox Serbs. 
Fifteen years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA),1 which 
brought to an end the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World-War II, renewed 
attention has been devoted to the stabilization of BiH. International concern about 
the fate of this young and troubled multiethnic state waiting on the EU’s doorstep 
has grown due to a combination of two factors. On the one hand, scholars have 
developed new interest in BiH because of the political dynamics of the whole 
Western Balkans. In recent times, there has been a new series of ‘territorial re-
adjustments’ in the region: Croatia is trying to speed up its efforts to join Slovenia 
in the EU, Montenegro has formalized its peaceful separation from Serbia, and 
Pristina has opted for a unilateral secession from Belgrade and started its own path 
towards EU integration. Given its complex multiethnic and religious mosaic, 
which makes the country resemble Yugoslavia on a smaller scale, BiH is the key 
to regional territorial stabilization, both geographically and strategically.  
On the other hand, beyond the dynamics that are specific to the Western 
Balkans, the growing interest in the future of BiH is part of a global trend. 
Numerous intra-state upheavals are threatening the stability of governments and, 
consequently, of entire regions of the world. Weak or undemocratic regimes and 
the increased number of failing and failed states have provided fertile ground for 
the expansion of international terrorist networks and the consolidation of other 
global security threats, such as those created by transnational criminal groups, 
narco-terrorist clans, and even pirates (as the case of Somalia has dramatically 
shown). In the words of Stephen Krasner (2004: 86) ‘the consequences of failed 
and inadequate governance have not been limited to the societies directly affected. 
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Poorly governed societies can generate conflicts that spill across international 
borders. Transnational criminal and terrorist networks can operate in territories 
not controlled by the internationally recognized government’.  
The international arena is thus confronted with a series of unprecedented 
destabilizing challenges. Most, if not all of these challenges have developed a 
transnational dimension; however, their emergence has been possible in specific 
weak institutional contexts. As a consequence, the topic of internationally-driven 
statebuilding is again relevant for academics, policy analysts, and practitioners. It 
is worth noting that in August 2004, in line with this trend, the US administration 
decided to create ex novo a specific unit for peacebuilding and statebuilding 
initiatives within the Department of State, which was inaugurated as the Office of 
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.2  
This increased interest coincides with the fact that statebuilding has 
become ‘a corollary of anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation’ (Chalmers 2005: 
iv). In line with this assessment, Francis Fukuyama has emphasized that, prior to 
the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, the Western world had been 
reluctant to tackle the internal crises of weak and failing states with substantial 
and rapidly-deployed missions. However, ‘September 11 proved that state 
weaknesses constituted a huge strategic challenge’ (Fukuyama 2004: xix), 
especially when the institutional weaknesses undermining the stability of a 
country are so dramatic that the state ends up being ‘hijacked’ by a terrorist 
organization, as happened in Kabul under Taliban domination.  
The problematic stabilizations of Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, Liberia, 
Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan – just to cite the most striking examples – have re-
opened the debate on both the concrete operational modalities and the theoretical 
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pillars upon which a foreign intervention in weak, collapsed, or failing states 
should be built. With a history and characteristics that fall at the intersection of 
these two points of debate, BiH represents a unique source of empirical data for 
scholars and policy analysts, as well as lessons learned for practitioners. In other 
words, if an ideal ‘learning curve’ of the international community3 on 
statebuilding could be drawn, this would inevitably start ‘with the comprehensive 
institutionalisation and proportionalisation of ethnicity in Bosnia’ (van Meurs 
2004: 6).  
Western governmental organizations have invested heavily in the whole 
Western Balkans, turning the region into a ‘laboratory for European policies, 
transatlantic solidarity and western values’ (Eichberg 2004a: 1). However, BiH 
has thus far represented the most crucial test case of this laboratory, ‘a template 
for new experiments in international administration and external assistance in 
state reconstruction and post-conflict reconciliation’ (Chandler 2005c: 308). In a 
recent assessment made by two American scholars, ‘$14 billion in international 
aid’ turned BiH into ‘the most extensive and innovative democratization 
experiment in history’ (McMahon and Western 2009: 69). In similar terms, 
Sumantra Bose (2002: 3) has stressed that BiH has been ‘since the beginning of 
1996 … the site of internationally sponsored political engineering on a remarkable 
scale’. For many years now, the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO, and the EU – 
as well as a myriad of international NGOs – have committed an extraordinary 
amount of human and material resources to the reconstruction of BiH, achieving 
unexpected successes but also experiencing striking failures. 
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2. Research questions 
Several studies have assessed the international experience in BiH and elaborated 
guiding principles and praxes that could potentially be applied to other 
statebuilding cases. The analysis thus far produced by both scholars and policy 
analysts has addressed a wide range of items – ranging, for instance, from security 
sector reform (King 2001; Orsini 2003; Heinz 2006; Perdan 2006; Muehlmann 
2007) to democratization-related issues (Chandler 2000; Galen Carpenter 2000; 
Domm 2007) – as well as the broader strategic discourse on the foreign presence 
in a post-conflict environment (Cox 2001; Okuizumi 2002; Chandler 2004a; 
Weller 2006; Belloni 2007). 
Beyond technical and context-specific debates, this thesis addresses the 
Bosnian case with a view to shedding light on the gaps in the literature on the 
paradox of sovereignty and statebuilding and emphasizing the contradiction 
inherent in the EU’s performance as a statebuilder. Scholars committed to 
reconstructing the ethics and rationale of current externally-driven statebuilding 
efforts generally agree that such initiatives inevitably entail a ‘sovereignty 
paradox’: international missions compromise domestic sovereign prerogatives to 
foster the institutional reorganization of a failing or failed state, democratize it, 
and establish stable authorities and well-functioning institutions that at the end of 
the process will independently exercise full sovereignty again, both domestically 
and internationally. The goal of creating fully independent states justifies 
intervention and prolonged interferences in the domestic jurisdiction of the target 
countries. Moreover, the ethics of statebuilding – as identified by the sovereignty 
paradox literature – is based on the hypothesis that a new vision of sovereignty is 
genuinely informing external statebuilders. 
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An understanding of sovereignty as an internationally shared 
responsibility has been identified as the normative ground on which statebuilding 
initiatives can be justified. This discourse was inaugurated by Francis M. Deng (et 
al 1996: 70), who focused on the various issues related to conflict management 
and peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. Based on a neo-communitarian 
understanding of International Relations, Amitai Etzioni (2006) has claimed that 
this vision contains in nuce the pillars that constitute the ‘ethics’ of contemporary 
post-conflict peace and statebuilding. Moreover, it has been argued that the ideal 
of a shared responsibility has been internalized by the personnel serving in 
international institutions and the members of the Western diplomatic club. One 
optimistic point of view by Dominik Zaum (2007: 237) suggested that this 
concept has already influenced ‘statebuilding policies by providing a blueprint for 
the institutions to be built, and by serving as a justification for the continued 
governance of post-conflict territories by international administrations’.  
Reflecting on this assessment in light of the statebuilding efforts in BiH, 
with all of its contradictions and inconsistencies, two important questions can be 
identified. Does the normative principle of sovereignty as responsibility inform 
the various strategic efforts of current statebuilding missions worldwide, 
including the EU’s member-statebuilding in the Western Balkans? If it is accepted 
that the ideas of sovereignty as a capacity and a responsibility provide a 
‘comfortable’ basis to justify peacekeeping and post-conflict statebuilding 
interventions, have these principles also generated a new forma mentis amongst 
statebuilders and a ‘blueprint’ that is generally complied with in the field?  
Providing answers to these questions, this dissertation examines the 
policies of the EU for the stabilization of BiH with a focus on the issue of 
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responsibility. The starting point of the analysis is that the ‘EU commitment to 
BiH’ is characterized by additional complexity if compared with ‘ordinary’ 
international administrations and statebuilding missions working under the UN 
umbrella. This additional complexity cannot be overlooked and minimized for the 
sake of theoretical generalizations. Interestingly, Robert Keohane (1988: 379-380) 
has cautioned against making overly ambitious generalizations: since ‘no general 
theory of international politics may be feasible [it might be appropriate] to seek to 
develop cumulative verifiable knowledge, but we must understand that we can 
aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations, rather than 
to discover universal laws’. 
Inquiring into the normative vision of sovereignty and the understanding 
of post-conflict stabilization at the heart of EU initiatives to reorganize the 
Bosnian state reveals a further element of interest in comparison with UN-led 
operations. This project assesses how the current EU-driven statebuilding in BiH 
is creating a ‘paradox within the paradox’ of sovereignty and statebuilding. When 
the highly-intrusive statebuilding project was initially launched, the external 
actors deployed in Sarajevo compromised Bosnian self-governing prerogatives in 
order to foster a reorganization of domestic sovereign powers. However, a further 
paradox has resulted from having a post-nation state organization, the EU, take 
the lead in the Bosnian multiethnic experiment. While helping the reorganization 
of the state by containing the dispersions and the asymmetries of sovereignty 
produced by the implementation of the DPA, the EU actually prepares this state to 
be part of a system of pooled sovereignty; in other words, Brussels educates 
domestic elites to give up certain sovereign prerogatives when the appropriate 
time to join the Union arrives.  
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EU-driven statebuilding ‘complicates’ the trajectory of sovereignty 
rehabilitation in a post-conflict environment. The EU is a ‘post-nation state 
organization’ that is based on the concentration of certain sovereign prerogatives 
originally attributed to its member states (Della Sala 2006: 221). The whole 
European experience has indeed been based on the idea of containing the excesses 
of national governments through delegating to a supranational level decision-
making prerogatives on certain issues. During the early stages in the life of the 
European Community, this philosophy was given such priority that efforts to find 
a solution for the most critical problems concerning the democratic character of 
the supranational integration process had to be delayed.  
Recognizing the qualitative difference between EU member-statebuilding 
and internationally-driven statebuilding, this thesis examines the strategies 
elaborated in Brussels for the stabilization of BiH in order to understand whether 
the EU has been able to overcome the operational limitations that normally affect 
statebuilding missions. Inter alia, these include: excessive technocratism, a 
disproportionate focus on institution-building rather than nation-building, scarce 
attention to grass-roots reconciliation strategies, and bottom-up policies. In 
addition to examining operational and strategic aspects, this thesis focuses on the 
specific attitude that the EU has developed vis-à-vis the ideal moral imperative to 
share with domestic elites the responsibilities related to stabilization in BiH.  
As this thesis demonstrates, however, the strategic thinking taking place in 
the ‘capital of Europe’ does not seem to be genuinely grounded in the sovereignty 
as responsibility ideal. The institutional reconstruction of BiH is pursued with a 
risk-averse mentality, which also allows the EU to preserve its own ‘no mistake 
policy’ on the field. On the basis of this approach, the EU has been operating 
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predominantly through a set of technical and economic instruments that are 
operationalized mostly by the European Commission (EC) – such as those falling 
within the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) – and through the 
deployment of ESDP4 field missions and the offices of an EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) that exercise various degrees of interference with the self-
governance of the host state. Moreover, Brussels relies on the membership 
perspective as an indirect stabilization tool, which should enable, at minimum 
cost, the domestication of local elites and the containment of their potential 
nationalist and extremist drifts. 
The ultimate goal of this unique combination of bargaining processes, 
membership perspective, economic aid, incentives, technical assistance, 
conditionality, and field presence is to prepare the elites of target states to 
relinquish some crucial sovereign prerogatives and educate them to become active 
members of the Union. In comparative perspective, the trajectory of sovereignty 
in EU-driven statebuilding is thus different from that determined by UN-led 
operations of a similar kind. The EU does not interfere with the self-governance 
of the target state with the aim of fully restoring the empirical statehood of the 
fragile South-Eastern European states; rather, it approaches its mission with a 
more sophisticated mindset and a self-serving goal: to prepare political elites and 
bureaucrats from the target states for membership. Nevertheless, the analysis 
developed in this thesis clarifies how the EU modus operandi repeats the most 
recurrent shortcomings of all international missions in crisis areas. 
The EU accession process locks new members into a construction that is 
qualitatively different if compared with ‘ordinary’ intergovernmental settings. The 
EU indeed can be defined as being the aliquid novi (that something new) in the 
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complex firmament of multilateral organizations. The system that rotates around 
the main Brussels-based institutions and the European Court of Justice (as well as 
on the several executive agencies that have been created to strengthen the 
integration and harmonization processes in the most diverse policy areas) has been 
consolidated thanks to two unique legal pillars and one main governing principle. 
The latter is the idea of subsidiarity, which regulates the EU’s decision making 
processes. On the basis of this ideal Grundnorm, which constitutes the main 
sociological rule in the communitarian life, the EU legal space is characterized by 
the supremacy of EU law over member state law, and the direct effect (both 
vertical and horizontal) given to whatever EU decision-makers produce as binding 
norms. 
At this stage, it is important to devote more attention to the specific role of 
the EU in carrying out its member-statebuilding initiatives. There are several 
processes that have driven the EU to expand its effort and expertise in the fields of 
statebuilding and promotion of good governance practices, also beyond the range 
of its near abroad. At the same time, it should not be disregarded that ‘if the 
European Union has begun to develop a strategic identity, it is rooted in state-
building [and that] the need to respond to the failure of Yugoslavia has been a 
driving force in the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ 
(Chalmers 2005: iii). Furthermore, from an EU perspective, this research assumes 
even more relevance after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, which provides 
the legislative basis for the creation of a single EU foreign service5 with an 
embassy network, to be led by a single EU Foreign Minister. 
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3. Thesis structure 
This thesis is organized into four main chapters. Chapter I focuses on the concept 
of sovereignty and its evolution in contemporary international relations. Different 
visions of sovereignty are reconstructed by identifying the dominant trends in the 
scholarly literature. The discourse on sovereignty is developed by highlighting the 
major issues concerning both the external and the domestic aspects of state 
sovereignty. By investigating both dimensions of sovereignty, this review 
provides an understanding of the legal dimensions of externally-driven 
statebuilding. Specific attention is devoted to the recent debate on the feasibility 
of stretching the traditional characteristics of sovereignty towards a vision 
encompassing the ideal of shared responsibility and an emphasis on the notion of 
domestic authorities’ capabilities. 
Moving to more policy oriented aspects of intervention, the second part of 
Chapter I addresses the main elements of the statebuilding literature. The aim is to 
show that international actors involved in post-conflict statebuilding efforts are 
destined to face two crucial operational dilemmas. A comprehensive intervention 
for the reconstruction of a failed or collapsing state needs to find a balance 
between bottom-up and top-down policies, and between a technical presence and 
a more complex and socially-oriented post-war stabilization. At the intersection 
between these two ranges of strategic choices – which will be referred to as the 
‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’ dilemmas of statebuilding – lies the grand 
juxtaposition of technical institution-building on the one hand, and nation-
building on the other. 
Chapter II identifies the main features of the Bosnian post-conflict 
stabilization efforts, highlighting how the process of ‘ownership’ in the country 
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has passed from the international community to the EU without a decisive 
involvement of the Bosnian constituent peoples and via the consolidation of a 
strained relationship between autochthon elites and key international actors. The 
transition from international to EU-driven statebuilding has nevertheless remained 
incomplete. Emphasis is thus given to the activities and the position of the Office 
of the High-Representative (OHR) in the complex framework of the multilateral 
organizations operating on the ground in BiH. The OHR – which since 2002 has 
been ‘double-hatted’ with the Office of the EUSR – still constitutes the leading 
international agency in the Bosnian statebuilding project.  
Building on the analysis of the current state of affairs in BiH, Chapter III 
shows that in the parallel implementation of its statebuilding and enlargement 
agendas, the EU reproduces some peculiarities of a neo-medieval empire. The 
interference inherent in EU-driven statebuilding cannot be justified by the goal of 
establishing the Bosnian authorities’ full and legitimate exercise of empirical 
statehood. As emerges from the analysis of official documents and extensive 
interviews with participants and observers to the EU-decision making processes in 
both Brussels and Sarajevo, the EU intervention can be traced back to the 
conviction that the various internal fractures and wounds of the Bosnian 
multiethnic experiment can be healed only when the country’s sovereignty is 
partially diluted within the greater European integration machine. By studying the 
specific attitude of the EU towards the Bosnian constitution-making process, the 
second part of Chapter III sheds light on the EU’s ‘hands-up statebuilding’ 
attitude.  
Beyond the specific field of constitutional reform, Chapter IV examines 
the other issue that has dominated the reform agenda in BiH for the last few years: 
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police reform. In particular, the analysis focuses on the conditionality that was 
attached to this reform process by the EU. The development of such 
conditionality confirms that Brussels has not been able to create a balance 
between its own rigid technocratism and the more ideological elements of its 
enlargement process. In other words, Chapter IV looks at the other side of what 
could be metaphorically referred to as ‘the responsibility coin’ of externally-
driven statebuilding. In parallel with the reconstruction of the EU’s hands-up 
attitude, an analysis of the reform of the Bosnian police shows that the tendency 
to throw the hands up in a denial of responsibility for complex political 
undertakings is combined with a, so to speak, ‘hands-off’ modus operandi. The 
EU promotes its own statebuilding policies by demanding technical adjustments 
and hoping that progress will follow automatically. However, Brussels pursues a 
hands-off statebuilding strategy: partial and procedural adjustments serve the 
purpose of hiding the long term metamorphosis to which the target state will 
actually be subjected to through completion of the integration process.  
Combining the empirical analysis developed in Chapters IV and V it is 
possible to demonstrate that the institutional reconstruction of BiH is pursued by 
the EU with a risk-avoidance mentality. In spite of its apparently dominant 
position in the Bosnian stabilization process, Brussels has thus far refrained from 
facilitating a resolution of the domestic sovereignty struggle and has distanced 
itself from sharing key political responsibilities with local actors. Furthermore, 
this detached position has allowed the EU to avoid a more open confrontation 
with the residual statebuilding influence of the United States in the Bosnian 
project. 
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4. Methods and instruments 
This study has three key analytical aims: first, to provide an account of the 
trajectory of sovereignty in post-Dayton BiH and identify the terms of the 
‘paradox within the paradox’ in EU member-statebuilding; second, to reconstruct 
the understanding of sovereignty and post-conflict stabilization shared by major 
actors at EU level; and third, to highlight the main operational characteristics of 
the EU commitment to BiH, with a specific focus on the problem of shared 
responsibilities. The emphasis on specific reform processes is a methodological 
choice that serves a precise analytical purpose. By analyzing processes in detail, 
explaining their initial conceptual phases and evolution, and reconstructing the 
various diplomatic machinations behind them, it becomes easier to uncover the 
strategies, interests, and ideas of different actors. 
The understanding of sovereignty and post-conflict stabilization informing 
the EU’s initiatives in BiH is reconstructed by combining three types of inquiry. 
EU official documents have been systematically examined to identify the 
development of strategies and key-terminology that has been applied to the 
Bosnian statebuilding experiment. Based on initial research at the EU digital 
archives and in Brussels, particular attention has been devoted to specific terms 
including: sovereignty, institutional reorganization, democratization, 
normalization, post-conflict stabilization, consolidation of authority, ownership, 
and reconciliation.  
The documentation considered for this thesis relies predominantly on the 
records from 2000 to the present. The choice of this start date is connected to 
three key documents published in that year by the EU that formally inaugurated 
the EU membership perspective for the whole Western Balkans region and also 
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clarified the specific EU commitment to BiH. The first document is the previously 
mentioned final declaration of Feira (European Council 2000). The second is the 
final declaration of the Zagreb Summit, which formally launched the SAP for all 
Western Balkan countries (EU 2000). The third is the specific Road Map for BiH 
– adopted in the same year – in which Brussels identified 18 essential steps that 
BiH had to undertake before the work on a Feasibility Study for the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement (SAA) could be formally launched (European 
Commission 2000). These steps represent the formal ‘inauguration acts’ of the 
EU’s commitment to the integration of the Western Balkans and BiH into its 
supranational structures.  
In order to develop a fuller understanding of the normative principles 
informing the EU’s policy-making for BiH official documents are not sufficient. 
Consequently, consideration has also been given to other sources. These have 
mostly included: speeches and other public statements by decision-makers, 
parliamentary debates and hearings (primarily at the European Parliament), policy 
analysis published by independent experts on EU affairs, policy briefs circulated 
by government-contracted experts, as well as media commentaries that have been 
selected from both international and regional sources. 
Finally, considering that important facets of the processes through which 
decisions are made are not recorded in official documents or public statements, 
the inquiry has been complemented by extensive interviews with participants and 
observers of the EU decision-making processes that concern BiH (see Appendix B 
for a detailed list of the interviewees). These have included permanent staff and 
seconded personnel at the Brussels offices of the EU Commission (particularly 
those serving at the Directorate General for Enlargement and that for External 
 17 
 
Relations) and the EU Council (particularly at the Western Balkans Task Force); 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) with a competence on enlargement-
related issues or with a role in the delegations for relations with the countries of 
South-East Europe (SEE); and officials employed at the various EU agencies and 
missions in BiH. Specifically, this last category includes: the Delegation of the 
European Commission in Sarajevo6, the EU Police Mission (EUPM), the Offices 
of the ‘double-hatted’ High Representative and EU Special Representative 
(HR/EUSR), European Force Mission Althea (EUFOR), and the European 
Gendarmerie Force (Eurogendfor).  
A targeted round of interviews has also been undertaken with member 
states diplomats employed at their respective national embassies in Sarajevo, as 
well as at their Permanent Missions to the EU in Brussels. Extensive contacts 
have been established for the most part with those Brussels-based diplomats who 
serve in COWEB.7 The acronym COWEB is used in the EU jargon to refer to the 
group of national diplomats who discuss Western Balkan issues and routinely 
support the work of the Permanent Representatives Committee, also known as 
COREPER II.8 
Each interview was ‘semi-structured’, thus combining both open- and 
closed-ended questions. At first glance, the aim of reconstructing the normative 
vision of sovereignty and post-conflict stabilization informing EU policy-makers 
and the strategies attached to the various EU policies for BiH would have 
suggested conducting unstructured interviews. However, the risk of such a choice 
was seen as twofold. Firstly, totally unstructured interviews might end up 
focusing on issues that are only of marginal interest for the interviewer, especially 
when the interviewee has vast professional competences and deals with several 
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technical or geographical dossiers. Secondly, this might have impeded a 
systematic reconstruction of the normative principles and ideas concerned. In 
order to avoid vagueness and ambiguity, interviews were conducted by respecting 
a predetermined set of criteria (see Appendix A). 
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(Chapter I) 
 
Normative Principles and Operational 
Challenges of Contemporary Statebuilding 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A sequence of dramatic crises – from Afghanistan to Somalia – has reopened the 
debate on both the operational modalities and conceptual pillars upon which 
foreign intervention in weak, collapsed, or failing states should be based. While 
policy analysis has focused on technicalities related to capacity- and institution-
building, the scholarly literature has devoted more attention to the concept of 
sovereignty, in an attempt to consolidate new possible interpretations. This 
chapter reconstructs the main features of both these debates. 
The first part of the chapter is devoted to the idea of sovereignty. The 
recent debate has mostly revolved around the possible reinterpretation of 
sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility. In this regard, two major 
positions have emerged. On the one hand, libertarians and neo-conservatives have 
tried to expand the idea of sovereignty as responsibility to legitimize even 
preventive international action. On the other hand, neo-communitarian scholars 
have tried to contain such interventionist tendencies by emphasizing the idea of 
responsible international action, and by narrowly interpreting the responsibility to 
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intervene by international actors and coalitions of states. The point where these 
contrasting interpretations converge reveals a key challenge of contemporary 
international politics: how to encourage governments to act in a more responsible 
way both internally, towards their constituent people, and internationally, in their 
concerted activities for the promotion of peace and the consolidation of good 
governance practices in crisis areas and post-conflict environments. Apart from 
being crucial for national governments, the issue of responsible intervention is 
relevant also for all international intergovernmental organizations that carry out 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. 
The idea of sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility, which 
has been widely debated over the last decade, represents a powerful concept. This 
innovative interpretation of sovereignty fosters the idea of responsible action, by 
shedding light on the vertical bond between political leaders and their 
constituency, as well as on the horizontal relationships between national 
governments and other relevant multilateral actors that are part of the 
international community. In operational terms, if genuinely internalized and truly 
implemented in practice, this new normative understanding of sovereignty could 
resolve the tension between the residual elements of the Westphalian world and 
the ideal global system of collective security centered on the primacy of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that has never been fully implemented. 
This vision provides a promising moral justification for contemporary 
peacekeeping and post-conflict peace and statebuilding efforts.  
In order to understand all the aspects of the sovereignty as responsibility 
concept, the literature review that follows proposes a reconstruction of 
mainstream theories of sovereignty. Highlighting both the dynamics internal to 
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nation states and international aspects of sovereignty, the analysis shows the main 
evolutions that have characterized this ‘key rule of the game’ in world politics 
through the centuries. Moving from the field of ideas and normative principles 
related to sovereignty into the arena of actual policy-making and intervention, the 
second part of this chapter analyzes the most recent literature on statebuilding 
with a view to identify the key operational dilemmas that characterize the work of 
international missions today.  
 
 
2. The concept of sovereignty in international relations: 
from Westphalia to San Francisco 
Introducing their seminal work on State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Thomas 
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (1996: 2) cautioned that ‘attention to sovereignty 
tends to raise more questions than it answers’. More recently, John Boli (2001: 
54) has recognized that probably ‘where sovereignty is located is [still] an open 
question’. Describing ‘the surrender of sovereignty to governance by international 
actors’, Francis Fukuyama (2004: 132) has depicted East Timor as a reality from 
which sovereignty was removed and ‘located on a ship floating in the harbour 
outside the capital of Dili’. The concerns voiced by such respected scholars 
confirm that sovereignty remains one of the most complex and debated issue in 
international politics; however, they should not discourage. After all, as Jarat 
Chopra and Thomas Weiss (1992: 102) have explained, the complexity and the 
doubts underpinning the concept of sovereignty simply stem from the fact that 
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this concept is ‘a legal fiction that continues to evolve [but remains] the best 
mechanism for organizing human society at the global level’.  
The concept of sovereignty is one that scholars and practitioners have 
defended, contested, updated, analyzed and even denied for over four centuries. 
Nevertheless, the system of sovereign states remains the most accepted way of 
organizing human relations, which has endured for centuries precisely because no 
concrete alternatives have emerged, but also because it continues to enjoy 
generalized bottom-up support. Those who have opposed sovereign states or 
manifested their dissent have mostly been groups promoting a secessionist cause 
and striving to establish a new independent state. Therefore, unless humanity one 
day rejects the system of sovereign states and replaces it with an alternative 
structure, as Jo-Anne Pemberton claims, ‘we may attempt to further civilize this 
system through adding to and thickening the responsibilities of states to each 
other and to humanity in general’ (2008: 215, emphasis added). Recognizing the 
validity of this statement, the issue of shared responsibilities will be put to test in 
the empirical chapters of this thesis. 
 
2.1. Origins of the sovereignty ideal 
The concept of sovereignty virtually did not exist in the realm of political thought 
until the fall of medieval Christendom. At that time, all of the tensions between 
the Papal authority and the emperors were indeed ‘not about sovereignty but 
about political predominance’ (Smelser 2001: 78). Some scholars argue that the 
modern international community actually has its origins in the relations between 
the three sovereign imperial entities that arose in the ninth century: the 
Carolingian, the Islamic, and the Byzantine (Ago 1977). Nevertheless, the 
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majority of theorists acknowledge that only when the Peace of Westphalia was 
agreed upon (at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, 1618-1648) both the concept of 
sovereignty and the configuration of the modern state emerged. The settlement 
provided a series of secular elements, upon which new forms of political power 
could be constructed and the religious basis for authority replaced. Leo Gross 
(1948: 28) defined the 1648 peace agreement as ‘the majestic portal which leads 
from the old world into the new world’. In the old world, kings could indeed 
declare but not create positive law, as they were themselves bound by it; in the 
new world, sovereigns had the right to create law and the duty to enforce it, not as 
if they were necessarily above the law, but as original sources of it. 
The conventional view that depicts the 1648 Peace of Westphalia as the 
origin of the modern system of sovereign states has been contested by part of the 
literature. Amongst other International Relations scholars, Stephen Krasner (1993: 
244) has argued that the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück were actually ‘less 
consistent with modern notions of sovereignty’ than the precedent Augsburg 
Peace of 1555. This critique can be accepted. Indeed, if the Peace of Westphalia 
has always been defined as a watershed in the history of political theory and, 
particularly, in the development of the concept of state sovereignty, it cannot be 
disregarded that the seeds of this institutional revolution had actually been sown 
almost one century earlier. In spite of the unconditional support of all the German 
Catholic Princes, in the first half of the sixteenth century, the attempt by Charles 
V to defeat the Protestant heresy failed. The conflict was ended with the 1555 
Peace of Augsburg. The core concept of this peace agreement can be synthesized 
in the Latin formula cuius regio, eius religio. This expression (which literally 
means ‘whose region, is the religion’) implicitly acknowledged the right of each 
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entity with a defined territory and an established governing authority to develop 
its autonomy from external powers, the Catholic Church in particular (Smelser 
2001: 14706-9).  
An interesting debate on this specific issue has also taken place between 
two eminent American scholars of the last century: Charles Tilly and Joseph 
Strayer. The latter claimed that most of the preconditions that allowed the 
sovereign state to emerge after Westphalia as the dominant form of political 
organization could already be identified during the fourteenth century. In contrast 
with this view, Tilly (1975: 25-31) has counter argued that alternative forms of 
political organization – such as the Papal state, trans-boundary commercial 
federations, and the feudal structure – were not inevitably bound to fail, as it 
might seem from a superficial analysis. 
Proper point of reference or not, as has been made clear in the 
contemporary academic debate (Krasner 1993; Philpott 1999; Osiander 2001), 
Westphalia has nonetheless become an icon for scholars. The Westphalian system 
included relatively large territorial units, which were ruled by a central sovereign 
authority. A core peculiarity of such authorities was that there was no formal 
control binding their freedom. More precisely, sovereign states emerged as 
supreme authorities ruling over a given territory (internal aspect of sovereignty) 
but also as units obliged not to interfere in each others’ internal affairs 
(independency coincides with the external aspect of sovereignty: superiorem non 
recognoscent). In other words, the sovereign power cannot be challenged from the 
inside and it can respond to outside challenges by resorting to the use of force, in 
addition to diplomatic means. 
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The arrangement which emerged at Westphalia can be labeled a European 
system. Based upon the European common heritage, Westphalia gave rise to the 
two key concepts of sovereignty and territoriality, thus further exacerbating the 
divergence between the European world and the rest of the planet. Meanwhile, the 
European powers did not refrain from conducting their ‘international public 
relations’ in terms of – paraphrasing a well-know expression coined by Hobbes – 
homo homini lupus. Following Westphalia, recourse to war remained a clear and 
undisputable foreign policy option. However, war could only occur between units 
(the sovereign states) that had the power to mobilize organized and loyal forces.  
Self-defense became an inextricable prerogative of states. More precisely, 
at the time of Westphalia war was mostly a means to secure boundaries, 
territories, and resources. But after the first industrial revolution and the 
emergence of what eminent historians like Pierre Renouvin called ‘the doctrine of 
colonies’ (1961: 45-60, my translation), war also became a way to defend and 
ensure economic interests and commercial networks established overseas. These 
overseas interests were perceived by European governments as being vital for 
their domestic welfare. However, in addition to being driven by pragmatic 
interests, the idea of a civilizing mission was more or less genuinely shared 
amongst the ruling elites of the Christian-European powers. 
Those who exercise sovereign powers have always been described as 
holding supreme authority, and thus, as having by definition the ‘supremacy in 
respect of power, domination or rank’ in a given community (1970: 489). 
Supremacy is intended as a situation of pre-eminence, which internally should 
coincide with an ‘absolute and perpetual power of both making and unmaking 
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laws’ (Kuper 1996: 835). In Latin, the sovereign was indeed the superānus, the 
one above all others who held the supreme powers (summa potestas). 
Against this backdrop, a straightforward but comprehensive definition of 
sovereignty could sound like ‘supreme authority within a territory’, as most 
recently re-proposed by Daniel Philpott (2001). This short but effective 
formulation has developed a broad consensus. Most scholars actually have no 
doubt that such an expression perfectly describes the system of sovereign states 
that emerged in Europe after 1648 and that has survived with minimal changes for 
almost four centuries: a structure composed of relatively large territorial units 
internally organized under a central sovereign authority. This definition 
encompasses three distinctive elements, which are each equally important in 
identify sovereignty: authority, supremacy, and territoriality. Ideas on each of 
these elements have gone through several evolutions; however, such a 
combination of terms remains optimal to describe state sovereignty and, 
indirectly, to identify the essential peculiarities of both the international 
community and its juridical order.  
 
2.2. Sovereignty in the rationalist accounts of international 
relations 
In the theoretical debate developed by contemporary International Relations 
scholars, the position of sovereignty has traditionally been linked to the 
discussions on the state. This might well be explained – using again the words of 
Thomas Biersteker (2002: 157) – by the fact that ‘state and sovereignty are 
[indeed] mutually constitutive concepts’. A typical example of how sovereignty 
was attached to states as a fixed and exogenous attribute can be found in 
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Morgenthau’s seminal work on the Politics Among Nations. Being concerned 
‘with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they 
actually take place’, Morgenthau (1978: 4) recognized sovereignty as 
synonymous with independence, equality, and unanimity. Moreover, he depicted 
its consolidation as a process that elevated into a legal theory a series of political 
facts. The evolution of sovereignty coincides with the emergence of a doctrine 
mirroring the relations between different political units at the end of the Thirty 
Year’s War. According to Morgenthau (1978: 329), such a doctrine provided 
simple facts with ‘both moral approbation and the appearance of legal necessity’. 
Attaching to sovereignty the role of a key rule of the game, Morgenthau 
minimized the analytical problems related to the theoretical evolutions of the 
concept. Nevertheless, hypothesizing a contrast between the structure of 
international relations (with all its norms, concepts, institutions and procedures) 
and the reality of international politics, he described in very effective terms the 
tension between modern international law and the social dynamics of the state 
system that emerged after Westphalia. Sovereignty is presented as lying exactly at 
the crossroads of laws and anarchy. According to Morgenthau, modern 
international law is based on two core assumptions that cannot escape a subtle but 
substantial logical incongruity: rules (customary or treaty-based that they might 
be) emerge by imposing constraints upon nation states; at the same time, being 
sovereign, these units remain ‘the supreme law-creating and law enforcing 
authorities’ of a decentralized system (Morgenthau 1978: 329). 
Classic realism developed along the idea that sovereign units live in an 
international system characterized by anarchy; this would have always worked as 
a ‘permissive condition’. Viewed this, the complete decentralization of the 
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legislative, the judicial, and the executive functions of the international system 
represent the clearest manifestation of sovereignty.9 The assumptions of classic 
realism were challenged for the first time in the 1970s by Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye (1972) who emphasized the growing interdependence between states, 
transnational relations and non-state actors alike, in particular, multinational 
corporations. The two scholars proposed a vision of states as being immersed in 
an environment based on complex and growing interdependence. Initially, 
‘attacks on the state-centric paradigm implied that state sovereignty was being 
eroded by economic interdependence, global-scale technologies, and democratic 
politics’ (Thomson 1995: 215).  
The challenge to classic realism that was put forward by the advocates of 
liberal interdependence faced a first substantial set of counter arguments in 1979, 
when Kenneth Waltz elaborated his Theory of International Politics. The basic 
assumption of classical realism was that ‘the international system is anarchical, in 
the sense that it lacks central authority to impose order; … in such a system states 
are primarily interested in their own survival’ (Burchill 2005: 190). Waltz 
developed this basic framework by introducing the concept of hierarchy. In order 
to ensure their survival in the anarchical international order, states tend to 
maximize their power, in particular their military power; while doing so, they tend 
to develop a ‘defensive positionalist attitude’. If on the one hand Waltz (1979: 93, 
94) acknowledged that ‘states are not and never have been the only international 
actors’, on the other hand he admitted that ‘so long as the major states are the 
major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them’. 
Confronted with Waltz’s structural realist proposals, the liberal critique to 
classic realism partially rounded off its edges and went back to recognizing 
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sovereign states as the main actors in an inherently anarchical world politics. 
Indeed, in After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) focused on the core challenge of 
explaining cooperation under anarchy. Realists had widely argued that, in the 
chaotic international system, cooperation is only possible under pressure from a 
hegemonic power that imposes institutions that are functional to its own strategic 
concerns. The proposals put forward by neoliberalists tried to go beyond the 
neorealist view. A more detailed account of the neoliberalist arguments is beyond 
the scope of this review. What is relevant is that by accepting some of the basic 
assumptions of the neorealist tradition (e.g. the international system is anarchical, 
and states, which are essentially self-interested actors, are the most important 
units of it) Keohane and other scholars supporting the liberal interdependence 
theory ended up reviving a traditional view of sovereignty. 
This evolution has been traced by Janice Thomson (1995: 215-216) back 
to the empirical and theoretical challenges brought against the original 
formulation of liberal interdependence theory. This thesis can be criticized by 
arguing that the post-World War II growing interdependence was not, both in 
qualitative and quantitative terms, more capable of eroding states’ sovereignty 
and centrality than previous waves of globalization. Amongst other scholars who 
support this critique, Krasner has pointed out that liberal theorists tended to be 
over-focused on the problem of control and consequently overemphasized 
erosions of sovereignty in this sense. Furthermore, he has argued that: first, 
control and authority of government have always been challenged, evidence 
shows that the flow of both international capital and immigrants was more 
overwhelming during the second half of the eighteenth century than it is today 
(Krasner 1999b: 13); second, the problem of control is very different from the one 
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of authority, as a consequence, claims on the erosive effects of globalization on 
states sovereignty are mostly ‘historically myopic’ (Krasner 1999a: 34); third, 
‘interdependence sovereignty, or the lack thereof, is not practically or logically 
related to international legal or Westphalian sovereignty’ (Krasner 1999b: 13).  
Another critique against the liberal interdependence theory can be made 
by arguing that interdependence is a condition that states spontaneously allow in 
the exercise of their power and in reflection of their own interests. This argument, 
which was developed by Robert Gilpin and the scholars following Kenneth 
Waltz’s neorealist path, has been partially re-proposed by Thomas Heller and 
Abraham Sofaer (2001). The majority of globalization studies have insisted on the 
idea that the decline of the centrality of states in a world of growing 
interdependence would inevitably be accompanied by the erosions of sovereignty.  
Is sovereignty substantially fading away? States have increased 
enormously their international commitments and keep delegating to supranational 
organizations (as well as private non-governmental bodies) the responsibility for 
several activities of transnational nature. However, these developments can be 
seen as ‘an expression of the value of sovereignty [rather] than a threat to its 
continuing importance’ (Heller and Sofaer 2001: 31). Moreover, the tendency that 
states have to delegate functions to international agencies or other entities does 
not affect the key attributes of sovereignty; on the contrary, it would ‘enhance the 
capacity of states (and the international system) to cope with complex problems 
requiring transnational or private-sector management or expertise’ (Heller and 
Sofaer 2001: 32).  
Deconstructing authority into two dimensions, Thomson suggests that 
while ‘sovereignty constitutes the state system as the meta-political authority in 
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world politics’, there is also a functional dimension of authority that can vary over 
time in terms of both extensiveness and intrusiveness. And if it is true that the 
market and non-state actors have increased their role in the economic sphere, it is 
equally true that the ‘state’s intrusion into formerly private aspects of people’s life 
is reaching astonishingly high levels’ (Thomson 1995: 224). 
 
2.3. Hypocritical deviations, manipulations, ideational changes, or 
socially constructed developments of sovereignty? 
Analyzing the most critical points of the liberal interdependence literature, it has 
been possible to identify an excessive focus on control as the main weakness of 
this theoretical strand. Sovereignty is indeed not just a matter of mere control; 
rather, it represents a construction simultaneously encompassing authority, 
control, and legitimacy. In his extensive academic output, Krasner has 
emphasized how these three elements can further lead to four different facets that 
do not necessarily co-vary: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. Each of 
these pillars can be differentiated by following two paths: on the one hand, 
differences emerge by looking at the features of authority, control, and legitimacy 
referred to above; on the other hand, different peculiarities emerge by examining 
the logics underpinning them. 
As far as the first set of characteristics is concerned, Krasner clarifies that 
the problem of control is central only to interdependence and domestic 
sovereignty: while the former refers to the capacity of government to control 
flows across national borders, the latter is concerned with exercising power over 
the domestic constituency. Therefore, it is only by looking at international legal 
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and Westphalian sovereignty that it becomes possible ‘to understand what 
sovereign statehood has meant in actual practice’ (Krasner 1999b: 4). Krasner 
seeks to demonstrate that the international environment, like every political or 
social space, is dominated by the conflict between logics of consequences and 
logics of appropriateness; it is such a conflict, and the supposed supremacy of the 
logics of consequences, that makes an organized hypocrisy emerge (Krasner 
1999b: 66). While the idea of appropriateness implies an understanding of 
political actions as the ‘product of rules, roles, and identities that stipulate 
appropriate behavior in given situation’ (Krasner 1999b: 5), consequences instead 
refers to the evaluation that political actors make when they rationally consider 
expected outcomes and their own sets of preferences. In other words: ‘organized 
hypocrisy occurs when states say one thing but do another; they rhetorically 
endorse the normative principles or rules associated with sovereignty but their 
policies and actions violate these rules’ (Krasner as quoted in Kreisler 2003). 
How can we explain the supremacy of the logics of consequences? 
Krasner invites to consider separately rules and rulers. On the one hand, dealing 
with rules, he traces the predominance of the logics of expected consequences 
back to the key peculiarities of the international community: international rules 
can be highly contradictory, thus domestic logics of appropriateness tend to 
overwhelm international ones in the calculations made by political leaders; this 
scheme is further complicated by the power asymmetries that characterize the 
international arena. On the other hand, when focusing on the rulers, Krasner 
(1999b: 7) emphasizes that logics of expected consequences prevail because 
‘rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they want to promote security, 
prosperity, and values of their constituents’. So, for instance, while the logic of 
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appropriateness of Westphalian sovereignty is probably the most recognized by 
policy-makers, it has also been one of the most violated.  
Here, the hypocrisy of rulers becomes evident: given the anarchical 
configuration of international society, actors can breach rules when they start to 
feel that their adherence to a given set of international norms is far from 
maximizing their advantage. Rulers have often pushed Westphalian sovereignty 
aside, abandoning ‘the principle that external actors should be excluded from 
authority structures within the territory of their own or of others’ (Krasner 1999b: 
8). Actually, as Krasner (1999b: 24) further clarifies, ‘neither the Westphalian nor 
international legal sovereignty has ever been a stable equilibrium from which 
rulers had no incentives to deviate’.  
If in Krasner’s eyes sovereignty has offered to political leaders the 
possibility to act in an opportunistic manner, in the vision proposed by Immanuel 
Wallerstein the whole of modern history becomes a tale of manipulated 
sovereignty, in which the stage is dominated by groups of capitalist entrepreneurs 
who substantially pull the strings of political relations. In synthesis, instead of 
depicting state sovereignty as an organized hypocrisy, Wallerstein presented it as 
a manipulated fiction that has perfectly served the interests of dominant 
capitalists, and that actually can be consolidated only in accordance with the 
acquiescence of private interests. Wallerstein did not go as far as Marx did when 
he presented the modern state merely as the instrument that allows the bourgeoisie 
to dominate over the proletariat. Nevertheless, he re-proposed some core ideas 
that had emerged in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. For example, 
Wallerstein (1999: 27) claimed that one of the most evident advantages that 
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capitalists obtain from the state is order and, in particular, ‘order against the 
insurgency of the working classes’.  
Wallerstein’s core thesis was that concepts such as sovereignty, nation-
state, and international environment cannot be fully understood if one does not 
link the debate on inter-state relations with the discussions on the relationship 
between nation-state’s public authorities and the capitalist world, with all its 
actors, institutions, forces, and mechanisms. Wallerstein suggested that these two 
debates are intersected by the idea that the ‘political system of sovereign states 
within an interstate system, of states and an interstates system both having an 
intermediate degree of power, suited perfectly the needs of capitalist 
entrepreneurs’. Based on this understanding, a boost to the consolidation of the 
system of nation states would have been given by the need, shared among early 
capitalists, to have public authorities functioning as diligent and low-cost 
watchdogs. States would have preserved capitalists from losing their accumulated 
capital. Indeed, ‘capital can be stolen; it can be confiscated; it can be taxed’. By 
strengthening the role of the state, capitalists saved on resources otherwise used to 
secure ‘privately’ their accumulated capital. In line with this perspective, taxation 
has emerged as a fair price for two crucial services provided by the state: the 
protection of capital from being stolen, and defense against ‘the illegitimacy of 
confiscation via the establishment not only of property rights but [also] of the rule 
of law’ (Wallerstein 1999: 23-24). 
In addition to those two safeguards that states are able to offer, Wallerstein 
believed that capitalists have happily coexisted with states due to the capacity of 
public authorities to also provide other types of services. In the first place, the 
state was identified by capitalists as an effective structure from which to protect 
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against the uncertainties generated by a truly free market. Wallerstein (1999: 25) 
claimed that ‘the free market is the mortal enemy of capital accumulation’. 
Amongst other ways of interfering with and undermining the fluidity of the free 
market, states could abuse their authority to impose legal constraints, thus 
enabling national entrepreneurs to enjoy a protection that they would not 
otherwise legally have.  
Apparently in line with Krasner’s idea of sovereignty as an organized 
hypocrisy, Biersteker stresses that ‘[s]tates are hypocritical and have always 
intervened in each other affaires’. Nevertheless, he criticizes Krasner’s view for 
being excessively static and thus having the same explanatory power of ‘the 
pioneering work of Carl Schmitt or … Hinsley’ (Biersteker 2002: 162). 
Furthermore, in the seminal volume co-edited with Cynthia Weber, Biersteker 
(1996: 1-2) presents sovereignty as an inherently social concept: ‘States’ claims to 
sovereignty construct a social environment in which they can interact as an 
international society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of 
claims to sovereignty is an important element in the construction of states 
themselves’. 
Moreover, Biersteker and Weber argue that each component of 
sovereignty (e.g. territory, population, recognition, and authority) is socially 
constructed and linked by a normative concept. ‘The modern state system is not 
based on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a 
normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society, nation), 
and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the state)’. The result is 
that ‘the idea of state sovereignty is a product of the action of powerful agents and 
the resistance to those actions by those located at the margins of power’. The 
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peculiarity of Biersteker and Weber’s work is that it has its focal point in the 
social construction of sovereignty as well as ‘by what practices and on whose 
behalf it is constructed’. As they openly admit, they have intentionally placed ‘an 
empirical consideration of the social construction of sovereignty at the center of 
[their] analysis’ (Biersteker and Weber 1996: 3, 8, 4). 
How does Krasner react to such an articulated critique? Firstly, he firmly 
distances himself from any of the constructivist suggestions and stresses that his 
presentation of sovereignty as an organized hypocrisy has its central focus on 
power and material interests, which he presents as the only valuable means by 
which to understand ‘the contested character of Westphalian sovereignty’ 
(Krasner 1999b: 45). In line with such a statement, Krasner’s more meticulous 
defense against constructivist claims stems from his idea that concepts like 
sovereignty emerge from the political reality and become consolidated legal 
expressions only when they are manipulated by dominant actors. In his in-depth 
analysis of the Peace of Westphalia, he challenges two main assertions that, prior 
to his research, scholars had normally taken for granted: firstly, he rejects the 
view that Westphalia is ‘a clear break with the past’ (Krasner 1993: 235); 
secondly, he criticizes the hypothesis that mere ideational developments 
constituted the driving forces that paved the way for the collapse of universal 
institutions such as the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy.  
In addition to these two points, Krasner stresses that sovereignty remains 
one of the most contested ideas; both de facto and theoretically. However, he 
argues that developments in sovereignty mainly stem from the availability of 
material resources. Further expanding on this last observation, he specifies that: 
the interests of leading figures are central; nevertheless, it is material assets that 
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determine who the leading figures are and thus, indirectly, what type of interests 
are going to prevail; having proposed such a scenario, Krasner ends up stating that 
thinkers have done nothing but offer ‘a variegated menu of intellectual ideas from 
which [rulers] could draw to justify their policies’ (Krasner 1993: 263).  
An alternative way of addressing the evolution of the international society 
and of its ordering principle of sovereignty has been proposed by Daniel Philpott 
(2001). Advocating the driving power of ideas in shaping the ‘constitution’ of 
international society, Philpott has identified the Peace of Westphalia and the 
process of decolonization started in the 1960s as the two defining revolutions that 
have shaped the international order in the last four centuries (Philpott 2001: 11-
15). While Westphalia produced a set of norms, rules, and practices that became 
the basis of a new society, decolonization eventually facilitated the extension of 
such a system to the whole planet. 
In contrast with Krasner, Philpott has put central emphasis on the 
assumption that ideas can be so powerful that, sooner or later, they end up 
generating new authority. Expanding on this opinion, Philpott has suggested that 
looking at the international environment one can distinguish three relevant ‘faces’ 
of authority. Each face addresses a precise question: first, what are the legitimate 
polities composing the international society? Second, what rules are disciplining 
membership in such a society? Third, what basic prerogatives are characterizing 
the members of the international community? Having presented these three 
relevant nuances of authority, Philpott has argued that a revolution in the 
constitution of international relations takes place only when the pillars of at least 
one of the faces of authority are substantially altered. Perfectly inscribed in a 
constructivist analytical framework, he has claimed that there can be moments in 
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history in which new ideas and beliefs are so powerful that they might generate 
reaction chains culminating in structural readjustments of the international 
society: ‘ideas convert hearers; these converts amass their ranks; they then 
demand new international orders; they protest and lobby and rebel to bring about 
these orders; there emerges a social dissonance between the iconoclasm and the 
existing order; a new order results’ (Philpott 2001: 4). 
 
 
3. From the humanitarian intervention debate to the 
Responsibility to Protect 
The history of the last century can reveal different types of interpretations if 
examined from the prospective of international law, security studies, or theories 
of international relations. Further insights can be gained by merging these 
approaches. For example, applying a multidisciplinary approach to the historical 
evolutions and the reciprocal conditioning of the forms of war and the forms of 
international cohabitation, Alessandro Colombo (2006) has presented the informal 
Westphalian system and the treaty-based collective security architecture launched 
at the 1945 San Francisco conference as being in conflict with each other. An 
account of the diplomatic negotiations that led to the creation of the UN system is 
far beyond the scope of this literature review. What matters, however, is to briefly 
reconstruct the rationale behind the original configuration of the UN system.  
The idea that people do not have a locus standi in international law 
remained practically unchallenged until the end of World War I. Prior to the 
spreading of ‘the Wilsonian spirit’ through Europe, the community that resided 
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with a territory tended to be seen as a sort of ‘pertinence’ of the sovereign 
authority, thus excluding the legitimacy of any type of external interference: 
quisquis in territorio meo est, meus subditus est / everyone who is in my territory, 
is my subject (Conforti 2002: 199). In 1945, the tragedy of two World Wars and 
the negative experience of the League of Nations provided a clear incentive for 
the establishment of a system that would update the normative basis of the 
Westphalian world and favor the promotion of international peace and security 
through institutionalized multilateral cooperation and the promotion of the 
centrality of the human person. Unfortunately, the full realization of this 
alternative model was hampered by the emergence of a bipolar system and 
negatively affected by the failure to implement those military aspects of the new 
construction that might have enabled the international community to overcome 
Westphalia in a substantial way. For example, the establishment of an 
international military force placed permanently at the disposal of the UNSC, 
ready to intervene to protect the population in crisis areas, as well as the creation 
of a unified military committee, which was set out in articles 43 and 45 of the UN 
Charter, but have never been implemented (UN 1945). As a consequence, and 
similarly to the League of Nations, the UN system was established as another 
multilateral experiment that was not properly equipped to fully replace the pillars, 
practices, and dynamics typical of the Westphalian order. 
With the end of the Cold War, new political conditions paved the way for 
the progressive elimination of the points of friction between the surviving pillars 
of the Westphalian system and those of the collective security structure that could 
not, so to speak, ‘take off’ due to the structural limitations of the UN and the 
political dynamics of the bipolar international environment. The dramatic crises 
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that erupted in every continent in the early 1990s gave impetus to the debate on 
humanitarian intervention10 and, consequently, led to a questioning of the concept 
of domaine réservé. Holzgrefe and Kehoane (2003: 18) define humanitarian 
intervention as ‘the threat or the use of force by a state (or group of states) aimed 
at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental 
human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of 
the state within whose territory force is applied’.  
In retrospect, one of the first concrete proposals that have induced to 
rethink the concept of sovereignty in the context of the need for humanitarian 
intervention dates back to October 1991 and was specifically limited to the pan-
European context. The UN founding act states that, at least on a theoretical level, 
states are all equal because they are all sovereign entities. Art. 2.1 of the UN 
Charter clearly states that ‘the Organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members’ (UN 1945). The emphasis on equality was 
linked to the belief that nothing could dismantle the inviolability of the domestic 
jurisdiction. At the third Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, held 
in Moscow, 38 delegations from the pan-European region (including the United 
States and the USSR, which was experiencing the last stages of the agony that led 
to its dissolution) agreed on a document that represented the first serious 
challenge to the concept of the domestic jurisdiction. CSCE members agreed that 
the inviolability of the internal affairs of the state was no longer a legitimate 
argument for matters falling within the realms of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law. This idea was clearly explained in the 
Moscow document:  
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issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and 
the rule of law are of international concern, as respect for these rights 
and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the international 
order … [T]he commitments undertaken in the field of the human 
dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to 
all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal 
affairs of the State concerned. They express their determination to 
fulfill all of their human dimension commitments and to resolve by 
peaceful means any related issue, individually and collectively, on the 
basis of mutual respect and co-operation. In this context they 
recognize that the active involvement of persons, groups, 
organizations and institutions is essential to ensure continuing 
progress in this direction (CSCE 1991: 2, emphasis added). 
 
This formulation was radically innovative and of great significance, in 
spite of the soft law character of all CSCE/OSCE documents. However, it is the 
emergence of the idea of sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility 
that can be identified as a potential watershed. Indeed, this normative innovation 
represents a powerful tool for practitioners. Grounded in an understanding of 
sovereignty as a capacity, this vision has offered a chance to move beyond the 
status quo that had been the accepted thinking for decades in international 
politics. According to this new formulation, the exercise of national sovereignty is 
recognized as a privilege that governments are entrusted with, but that is 
dependent on the fulfillment of a set of responsibilities. This understanding of 
sovereignty simultaneously emphasizes the international and the domestic 
accountability of national governments. In the eyes of Amitai Etzioni – a scholar 
who supports a neo-communitarian understanding of international relations – with 
this re-characterization of sovereignty, nations could become less and less ‘free 
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agents, [as] they will increasingly be treated as members of one community’ 
(Etzioni 2006: 83). 
The discourse on sovereignty as responsibility was introduced by Francis 
M. Deng (et al. 1996), who focused on the various issues related to conflict 
management and peacekeeping initiatives undertaken under the auspices of the 
international community in several African states. In Deng’s eyes 
 
The locus of responsibility for promoting citizens’ welfare and liberty, 
for organizing cooperation and managing conflict, when not exercised 
by the society itself, remains within the state. Until a replacement is 
found, the notion of sovereignty must be put to work and reaffirmed to 
meet challenges of the times in accordance with accepted standards of 
human dignity (Deng 1996: xi). 
 
Six years later, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) – an initiative promoted by the Canadian government that 
gathered both scholars and practitioners from all over the world – expanded on 
Deng’s farsighted theories. In its final report, building on the idea of responsible 
sovereignty, the ICISS argued for the promotion of a concept with clear 
operational implications, the responsibility to protect (R2P), which in the analysis 
of the ICISS should be accompanied by two corollaries: a commitment to prevent 
and a responsibility to rebuild.11 Developing Deng’s ideas, the ICISS argued the 
following: 
 
Thinking of sovereignty as responsibility, in a way that is being 
increasingly recognized in state practice, has threefold significance. 
First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the 
functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion 
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of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political 
authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the 
international community through the UN. And thirdly, it means that 
the agents of state are responsible for their actions; that is to say, they 
are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. The case 
for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by the ever-
increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the 
increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human 
security (ICISS 2001: 13). 
 
 
3.1. From the responsibility to protect towards a duty to prevent, 
already? 
How did scholars react to these normative developments? Offering classifications 
or generalizations is often a pointless exercise. Nevertheless, one can say that in 
parallel with the conceptual evolution of the principle of sovereignty as 
responsibility two visions of international relations have emerged: a libertarian 
and neoconservative view on the one hand, and a communitarian and idealistic 
view on the other hand. Advocates of the former approach to international 
relations (Feinstein and Slaughter 2004) have emphasized that, other than the 
responsibility to protect, intending sovereignty as a capacity would also ideally 
imply a duty to prevent, which would justify initiatives by single states or groups 
of states seeking to prevent possible sources of insecurity from threatening the 
international environment (this idea will be examined more extensively in the 
following section). Conversely, supporters of the latter idea have argued in favor 
of strong external involvement in failing or collapsed states only in cases where 
serious humanitarian emergences occur. Arguing in favor of this neo-
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communitarian view, but also taking the concept further, Amitai Etzioni (2006: 
82) has stressed that ‘when a state acts irresponsibly, some international body will 
rule that the state has defaulted on its responsibilities and thus call for corrective 
international intervention by an international or regional body’.12  
Seeking to identify what responses to security threats should more 
appropriately form part of a global strategy that ‘maximizes the chances of early 
and effective collective actions’, Feinstein and Slaughter (2004: 136) have tried to 
answer this question in the pages of International Affairs. Their proposal, 
however, ends up going a bit too far and turn the general commitment to prevent 
from responsibility to a duty. The two analysts have argued that the characteristics 
of the idea of sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility allows early 
and preventive action against regimes that collect or trade technologies for the 
development of WMD. Feinstein and Slaughter (2004: 136) suggest that today, 
for the sake of international security and stability, it is necessary to recognize ‘a 
collective duty to prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their 
power from acquiring or using WMD’. Developing further this hypothesis in the 
hope that it would allow and motivate states to become ‘proactive’ rather than 
reactive, Feinstein and Slaughter (2004: 137) identify three elements:  
 
First, [the duty to prevent] seeks to control not only the proliferation 
of WMD but also people who possess them. Second, it emphasizes 
prevention, calling on the international community to act early in 
order to be effective and develop a menu of potential measures aimed 
at particular governments – especially measures that can be taken well 
short of any use of force. Third, the duty to prevent should be 
exercised collectively, through a global or a regional organization. 
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Arguing against the inadequacy of the current regimes against the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, Feinstein and 
Slaughter emphasize that the duty to prevent makes the case for greater 
multilateral control over governments that both lack a credible system of internal 
checks and that try to acquire WMD. The two scholars are in favor of the pre-
emptive use of force, but while they state that this should be legitimately 
authorized by the UNSC, they nevertheless criticize its dangerous tendency 
towards paralysis and they propose, as a second best option, the initiatives of 
‘geographically competent’ regional organizations.  
This proposal however reveals a series of weaknesses. Firstly, will it 
always be easy to identify and activate the geographically responsible 
organization? Secondly, according to article 53 of the UN Charter, if an initiative 
of a regional organization implies the use of force, the UNSC still remains the 
only institution that can legitimately authorize such types of action. The UNSC 
authorization would be unnecessary only if the old definition of ‘enemy state’ 
provided in the UN Charter – against which a regional organization could 
legitimately employ force without any authorization – was updated. For instance, 
a reform of the UN founding treaty could specify that enemies are no longer the 
countries defeated in World War II (who have been ‘rehabilitated’ by joining the 
UN) but those regimes that are based on a system of terror and, as Feinstein and 
Slaughter (2004: 143) argue, whose leaders have ‘terrified, brainwashed, and 
isolated their populations and have either destroyed internal opposition or 
subdued it by closing their societies, restricting information as much as possible’.  
If a reform of the Charter in this direction is inconceivable, the risks that 
derive from it are equally clear. Amongst others skeptics, Gareth Evans has 
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openly criticized the idea of a duty to prevent since it focuses excessively focus on 
a ‘label’ that can be attached to regimes rather than on the actual behavior of 
governments in relation to their inclination to develop WMD, provide support to 
terrorist groups, or tolerate transnational organized criminal networks. The former 
Co-chair of the ICISS has stated that, in principle, ‘the rule of law is always at 
risk when the focus is on what people are rather than what they do’ (Evans 2004). 
 
3.2. The sovereignty as responsibility ideal: consolidated ethics for 
contemporary statebuilding or mirage? 
The debate between neo-communitarians and neoliberists has been characterized 
by an interesting confrontation. However, it started to drift attention away from 
the most crucial issues of intervention today: first, what are the operational 
implications of the sovereignty as responsibility ideal? Second, is this concept 
positively influencing international policy making? 
Stephen Krasner (2004) has provided an interesting reflection on the first 
issue raised above, since he has seen the debate on sovereignty as responsibility as 
a chance to openly argue against the inadequacy of transitional administrations 
and programs of governance assistance. These represent the two policy 
instruments mostly utilized by regional organizations and coalitions-of-the-
willing that are mandated to act in crisis areas under the legitimizing umbrella 
provided by UNSC resolutions. Krasner avails of the wide consensus surrounding 
the idea of sovereignty as responsibility to expand the toolbox of policy 
instruments for international action in failed or failing states by proposing the 
formalization of two mechanisms: de facto trusteeships and partnerships. In 
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particular, formal partnerships imply the reorganization of core domestic 
authorities of weak or failed states on the basis of ‘shared sovereignty’ formulas 
(Krasner 2004: 105-117). 
When it comes to the second question above, it should be noted that there 
have been attempts to show that the idea of sovereignty as responsibility has 
actually become a driving principle for practitioners, especially for those who are 
involved in the work of international peacekeeping missions or take part in the 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies, failing and failed states (Etzioni 2004). 
Reconstructing the normative vision of state sovereignty and post-war stability 
lying behind the activities of UN missions deployed in crisis areas, Dominik 
Zaum (2003; 2007) has argued in favor of the actual consolidation of this new 
understanding of sovereignty in international relations.  
At the same time, criticism against the reinterpretation of sovereignty as a 
shared responsibility has started to emerge. For instance, commentators have 
warned that ‘subordinating the supremacy of state sovereignty to the higher 
authority of the international community undermines the project of making power 
more accountable, and restrains the exercise of political agency in international 
politics’ (Cunliffe 2007: 40). A more articulated critique, equally focused on the 
problem of accountability, has been proposed by David Chandler (2006), 
according to whom the centrality of statebuilding in the current international 
political debate perfectly serves the rationale of an Empire in Denial.  
The main purpose of the analysis developed in this thesis is to make a step 
back from the problem of accountability and question the genuine diffusion 
among international policy-makers of the sovereignty as responsibility ideal. 
Focused on the case of the EU, the pages that follow specifically examine the 
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ability of a complex multilateral organization to genuinely take responsibility for 
its action in crisis areas. The decision to focus on the EU is a conscious choice in 
order to fill a series of gaps in both the scholarly literature and policy analysis.  
The reconstruction of the normative principles informing the strategic 
member-statebuilding undertaken by the EU in its neighborhood has been thus far 
quite overlooked. The recent literature on sovereignty and statebuilding has 
mostly focused on the UN, and it has concerned the identification of the 
ineluctable paradox stemming from statebuilding practice: international missions 
compromise domestic sovereign prerogatives to foster the institutional 
reorganization of a collapsing or collapsed state, democratize it, and re-establish 
stable and well-functioning authorities that will properly exercise sovereignty 
again.  
According to the definition proposed by Krasner (1999b: 20), Westphalian 
sovereignty is not violated while domestic rulers are ‘free to choose the 
institutions and policies regarded as optimal, [whereas] Westphalian sovereignty 
is violated when external actors influence or determine domestic authority 
structures’. However, violations of sovereignty differ from one another, since they 
can be based on invitation or intervention. When the latter occurs, both 
international legal and Westphalian sovereignty are simultaneously breached. But 
when domestic rulers voluntarily renounce their domestic autonomy – as to a 
certain extent happened in the history of the EU integration process – only 
Westphalian sovereignty is breached. 
Analyzing the normative vision of sovereignty at the basis of the EU 
initiatives for the reorganization of its neighboring weak states encompasses a 
further element of interest if compared with the analysis of UN-led initiatives of 
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the same kind, because it enables the exploration of a ‘paradox within the 
paradox’ of sovereignty and external statebuilding. The case of BiH is pivotal in 
this regard. Given its multinational character and the legacy of the civil war, BiH 
offers a unique ground for analysis, which can be useful in understanding the 
broader dynamic of the EU’s commitment to the stabilization and integration of 
its near-abroad, where several units are still states in-the-making but have already 
formally signed up to be part of the EU enlargement process. Moreover, the 
experience of massive international intervention in this country offers a vast 
analytical ground to test another theoretical assumption on intervention. Krasner 
(2004: 87) has highlighted an incongruence between how statebuilding is 
presented and how it is in actually implemented by the external actors once they 
operate on the ground of a failing or failed state: 
 
Nationbuilding or state-building efforts are almost always described in 
terms of empowering local authorities to assume the responsibilities of 
conventional sovereignty. The role of external actors is understood to 
be limited with regard to time, if not scope, in the case of transitional 
administration exercising full executive authority. Even as the rules of 
conventional sovereignty are de facto violated if not de jure 
challenged, and it is evident that in many cases effective autonomous 
national government is far in the future, the language of diplomacy, 
the media, and the street portrays nothing other than a world of fully 
sovereign states. 
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4. Modeling sovereignty and institutions: what is critical in 
contemporary statebuilding? 
With a successful attempt to characterize nation- and statebuilding practices in 
geopolitical terms, Mark Berger has offered a comprehensive definition, which 
sheds light on both the strategic objective and the main instrument that are 
generally employed by internationals in crisis areas. Statebuilding can be referred 
to as: 
  
Externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a 
stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally 
recognised national territory against the backdrop of the establishment 
and consolidation of the UN and the universalisation of a system of 
sovereign nation-states. Nation-building and statebuilding can 
encompass formal military occupation, counterinsurgency, 
peacekeeping, national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of 
stabilisation forces under the auspices of the USA, Britain, France, 
NATO, the UN or another international or regional organisation 
(Berger 2006: 6). 
 
This definition can be complemented with the characterization offered by 
Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk (2009: 1-2), who have labeled statebuilding as ‘a 
particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the recognition that achieving 
security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly depends on 
the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions’. 
From the pages of Politique Internationale, Richard Caplan and Beatrice Pouligny 
(2005a: 124) have acknowledged that the development of a systematic practice 
aimed at containing the failure of states through multilateral intervention has been 
a clear watershed in contemporary international politics, since it implied for the 
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international community to recognize that ‘la guerre (ou la menace contre « la 
paix et […] la sécurité internationale ») ne naît plus de la puissance des États mais 
de leur faiblesse / war (or the threat against international peace and security) does 
not stem from the power of states but from their frailty’. Adopting a similar 
position, Francis Fukuyama (2004: xvii) has warned that ‘statebuilding is one of 
the most important issues for the world community because weak or failed states 
are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems’.  
Actually, the practice of securing troubled territories under international 
tutelage is not a novelty of the last two decades. This tendency can be traced back 
to the mandates issued by the League of Nations right after the end of World War 
I if not, to some extents, also to the aftermath of the Balkans Wars that preceded 
the Great War in the earliest part of the last century. Examples of externally 
regulated and re-organized states, however, can also be found by making a further 
step back in history. For example, the various forms of protection that were 
granted by the Ottoman Empire represent only one amongst many other examples 
that could be brought.  
Today’s statebuilding praxes, however, are different for both qualitative 
and quantitative peculiarities if compared to past experiences of a similar kind. On 
the one hand, there is a ‘legal’ difference. It should not be disregarded that peace- 
and statebuilding projects worldwide are generally covered by the legal umbrella 
agreed upon at the United Nations, the only global organization that is morally 
and legally entitled to provide legitimacy to such initiatives. On the other hand, 
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of sovereignty in weak polities is pursued by 
structured and long term missions that are attributed an unprecedented degree of 
resources, power, and authority, and that develop a degree of institutionalized 
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multilateral intrusiveness in the socio-political life of the target state that has no 
equivalent in contemporary history. 
Throughout the Cold War era, the UN undertook numerous field missions 
for the stabilization of states that either were going through the decolonization 
process or were coming out from both regional and endemic conflicts. In 1992 
two remarkable decisions of the UNSC opened the way for the intensification of 
the debate on humanitarian intervention. Firstly, the eruption of the crisis in 
Somalia induced the UNSC to authorize the use of force within the border of a 
state. In a clear break with the past, such a breach of the domestic jurisdiction was 
not justified by producing evidence on the possible regional impact of the crisis. 
With such a shift, the rigid application of the limit disposed by article 2.7 of the 
UN Charter were overcome and slowly turned into history by the UNSC. 
Secondly, in the same year, a UN Mission was sent to Cambodia (APRONUC) 
inaugurating, even if with dubious results, the season of post-Cold War 
statebuilding initiatives. 
Post-conflict statebuilding missions are complex and articulated projects. 
The externally-driven construction of democratic institutions and the injection of 
good governance practices require substantial human and financial resource from 
like-minded states and multilateral organizations, as well as a long term 
commitment. In the previous sections of this chapter, it has been argued that the 
concept of sovereignty is central to the debate on the justification of statebuilding 
initiatives as well as, more in general, peacebuilding projects. Moving from the 
ground of normative principles to more operational aspects of intervention, the 
following sections address three concrete dilemmas that are connected to the 
reconstruction of failed or failing states. These dilemmas will be applied to the 
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specific Bosnian context in Chapter III. The empirical analysis that will follow in 
Chapters IV and V focuses on the performances of the EU in the stabilization of 
BiH with a view to understand how (in this case EU) policy-makers who 
contribute to a complex multilateral statebuilding project think when they debate 
and design their policies, but also how they end up operating in the field.  
At a first glance, the initial statebuilding dilemma that is going to be 
discussed here seems to resemble a mere diplomatic concern rather than a 
concrete issue. On the contrary, it probably represents a fundamental issue that the 
international community faces in the aftermath of civil wars: is it desirable to 
reassemble states that have collapsed along marked ethnic and/or religious 
fractures and have experienced dramatic domestic violence? This question 
becomes more difficult if civil war has actually resulted into a high number of 
internally displaced people, flows of refuges beyond the national boundaries, and 
cases of mass murders or genocide.  
Beyond the reflections on what can be referred to as the preliminary 
dilemma of statebuilding in post civil-war environments, attention will be then 
switched to the concrete operational and strategic problems that characterize 
statebuilding practices on the field. Looking at the projects for the external 
reconstruction of states that have been undertaken in the last decades it is possible 
to sum up two main operational dilemmas, which are distinct but entrenched 
around the demand for effectiveness. To be precise, these two dilemmas intersect 
around the contraposition between nation-building and technical institution-
building. 
On the one hand, practitioners face the strategic question: should 
statebuilding initiatives privilege a bottom-up or a top-down approach? This 
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question can be metaphorically identified as the ‘vertical’ dilemma of 
statebuilding, since it addresses the strategic direction towards which policies are 
tuned. On the other hand, since resources and time are limited, practitioners have 
to identify systematically the character of their initiatives. In other words, a 
‘horizontal’ dilemma of intervention can be synthesized with the following 
question: is a technical approach to statebuilding preferable to the ambition of 
promoting wider socio-political projects and grass-roots reconciliation policies in 
the reorganization of a fractured polity? If the vertical dilemma focuses on the 
choice of the primary target of international policy-making in statebuilding 
initiatives, the horizontal dilemma refers instead to the definition of the means for 
intervention. From a policy perspective, to provide an answer for these questions 
is of crucial importance. As Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart (2008: 4) have 
warned, ‘the failed state ... is at the heart of a worldwide systemic crisis that 
constitutes the most serious challenge to global stability in the new millennium’. 
 
 
4.1. The statebuilding dilemma I: together again? Reflections on 
the post-civil war reconstruction of collapsed multi-ethnic 
states 
International intervention in civil wars opens up a series of issues, which range 
from the reestablishment of security to the containment of the humanitarian 
emergences produced by the conflict. But once the necessary resources to contain 
such challenges have been successfully employed on the ground, the international 
community faces the initial, crucial dilemma of statebuilding: is it possible (and 
desirable) to recompose all the fracture lines that have led to a civil war and 
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rebuild a unitary state? In his analysis on State Failure and Nation-Building, 
Michael Ignatieff (2003: 309) has pointed out that, from a global perspective, 
multiplying the number of states that follow the rigid Westphalian model may not 
necessarily ‘reduce chaos and … improve domestic governance and stability’. On 
this basis, Ignatieff ends up questioning the opportunity of gluing together again 
(in the name of a supposed ‘Westphalian ideal’) parts of states that have collapsed 
for the presence of serious ethnic fractures within their borders. 
Against this backdrop, one further question can be identified: on what 
basis can we consider the reconstruction of a unitary multiethnic state as an 
appropriate choice? Useful reflections on this issue have been provided by Robert  
Keohane (2003). In his analysis on humanitarian intervention and post-conflict 
statebuilding, he proposes to highlight the key distinction between good and bad 
neighborhoods. It is on the basis of such strategic distinction that decisions shall 
be adopted by international institutions, at least on the very initial phases of the 
post-war reconstruction. Institutional development, evidently, results smoother in 
good rather than in bad neighborhoods (Keohane 2003: 292-297).  
If this vision is accepted, it is possible to say, for example, that the 
installation of the EU prospect of membership on the Western Balkans and the 
approximation process between Brussels and the capitals of the region has served 
the purpose of projecting former Yugoslavia into a broader network. This network 
guarantees to former Yugoslavia the possibility to benefit of a better 
neighborhood. More precisely, integration with Western Europe represents a 
chance to dilute critical intra-regional tensions – within states and between states 
of the region – into a greater area of institutionalized cooperation. The European 
construction is based on the respect of sophisticated procedures and norms, the 
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primauté of the European Community laws over national legislations, as well as 
on multilevel interaction networks that are bound to respect the key principle of 
subsidiarity. As long as the Western Balkans remains an unstable region at the 
periphery of Europe, consolidating a credible stabilizing geopolitical perspective 
thus remains a crucial challenge for the EU.  
To conclude the reconstruction of the first ‘preliminary’ statebuilding 
dilemma, a final methodological remark can be proposed, by making another 
reference to the work of Keohane. Analyzing the unbundling of sovereignty that 
derives from foreign intervention in troubled states, he has pointed out that the 
restoration of unitary sovereignty produces highly dangerous risks in the 
aftermath of a civil war, especially if the conflict was generated from ethnic or 
religious clashes. Providing indirectly an argument for the formalization of shared 
sovereignty arrangements – which, as previously mentioned, have been more 
openly supported by Stephen Krasner (2004) – Keohane (2003: 287) carefully 
stresses that ‘it is foolhardy to grant unconditional, unitary sovereignty to new 
states with severe ethnic divisions’. 
 
4.2. The statebuilding dilemma II: bottom-up vs. top-down 
approach 
If the first dilemma of statebuilding emerges prior to intervention, the remaining 
two dilemmas characterize the choices of international statebuilding missions as 
soon as security on the ground improves and the peacebuilding process enters its 
implementation phase. In one of his most recent works, Francis Fukuyama (2004: 
xvii) has pointed out that ‘while we know a lot about statebuilding, there is a great 
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deal we don’t know, particularly about how to transfer strong institutions to 
developing countries’; indeed, according to the American scholar, ‘well-
functioning public institutions require certain habits of mind and operate in 
complex ways that resist being moved’. As the picture presented by Fukuyama 
suggests, both academics and policy analysts shall renew attention to the 
operational dimension of the discourse on statebuilding, possibly, with two main 
objectives in mind. On the one hand, it is crucial to assess the procedures and 
practices through which new institutions in failing or failed states are established 
and actually put to work (which constitute the technical dimension of 
statebuilding). On the other hand, it is also necessary to examine the modalities in 
which internationals interact with both the elites and constituent people of the 
target state. The empirical chapters of this thesis aim to elaborate exactly on both 
these aspects and fill the current analytical gap by assessing the quality of 
statebuilding policies beyond the debate on, so to speak, the ‘quantity’ of 
intervention. 
The sometimes ‘random’ division of labor between the different external 
actors (often with overlapping competences) that compose the international 
presence in a post-conflict scenario generates an unbalanced approach to the 
overall stabilization process. As the recent two-decade history of post-conflict 
reconstruction demonstrates, international policy-making tends to marginalize the 
tensions characterizing the bottom of the state, and the micro-conflicts 
underpinning it, to focus mostly on the very political surface. The two dimensions 
are indeed dealt with in absence of a coherent planning and with the tendency to 
poor resources mostly into technical initiatives rather than bottom-up policies that 
help stabilizing the civil society and promote its maturation. Actually, it has 
 58 
 
become regularity in peacebuilding processes to leave the social dimension of 
state consolidation mostly to the voluntary and sporadic care of NGOs.  
In other words, there is an operational dilemma between top-down 
institution building initiatives and bottom-up maneuvers (that promote a culture of 
democracy, long-term reconciliation, incentives for participation, and revitalize 
the civil society). The experience of the statebuilding processes undertaken over 
the last twenty year – from BiH to Iraq – demonstrates that international missions 
tend to employ resources predominantly to create institution and inject good 
governance practices. With a very strong but effective expression, Christopher 
Bickerton (2005b: 11, 10) has emphasized that, in consideration of this 
operational tendency, contemporary statebuilding results into an unbalanced 
process, where the international agent ends up ‘stripping states of their soul’ that 
is, in other words, ‘all the intangible and immeasurable concepts such as political 
authority, legitimacy, agency and collective will – in a word, sovereignty’. 
Capacity building and technical assistance programs focused on political 
and bureaucratic elites can be powerful tools to accelerate the reorganization of a 
public administration and, more in general, they represent a way to equip 
domestic authorities with better managerial attitudes. However, when the focus on 
such polices produces a dangerous marginalization of the socio-political 
dimension of intervention, is not sustainable in a long term run. Often, the result 
is indeed that the political environment is overdosed by repeated elections – that 
often are organized also in the very aftermath of conflict – while profound 
fractures continue to undermine the stabilization process under the surface.  
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4.3. The statebuilding dilemma III: technical international 
presence vs. complex post-war stabilization 
Fukuyama’s concise definition of statebuilding as ‘the creation of new 
government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones’ (2004: ix), seems 
to be excessively technocratic. This critique actually finds a further confirmation, 
if we consider the way in which Fukuyama assesses the weaknesses of 
contemporary statebuilding practices. Apparently overlooking the sociological 
aspects and the complexities related to the formation and stabilization of the state, 
Fukuyama seems concerned mostly with the fact that a successful field 
implementation of externally-driven statebuilding initiatives can be seriously 
hindered by organizational ambiguities and scarce policy planning. Indeed, goals 
agreed upon at international level are frequently ‘unclear, contradictory, or 
otherwise poorly specified’ (Fukuyama 2004: 69). 
Other than for lacking clarity of objectives and coordination, statebuilding 
initiatives have also been criticized for being too broad and excessively intrusive. 
For instance, Marina Ottaway (2002: 1008-09) has emphasized that ‘[i]n an 
attempt to remedy early mistakes and avoid future failures, the international 
community has developed a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that is so 
exhaustive that it cannot be possibly followed in practice’. What international 
officials might call ‘creative ambiguity’ is instead (too often) scarce awareness of 
the social context in which intervention takes place and poor understanding of the 
processes that, historically, are at the basis of the social and political structures of 
the recipient state. In this regard, Caplan and Pouligny find statebuilding missions 
guilty for their scarce consideration to ‘the complex processes of interaction 
between the state and the society that allow the constructions of nations’ (2005b: 
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121, my translation). Lacking such a focus, contemporary statebuilding practices 
may end up in undermining rather than strengthening the governance capacities in 
failed or failing states. 
The negative influence of multilateral missions in crisis areas does not 
merely stem from the strategic focus that is given to internationally-led 
institutional reconstruction. The installation of a long-term international presence 
holds in nuce also some structural elements that create distortions in the post-
conflict environment. Among others, distortions are determined on the local 
labour market. For instance, the former director of the OSCE Management and 
Finance section Michael von der Schulenburg has critically emphasized how the 
presence of international missions that hire local people inevitably creates 
distortion on the already weak labour market of the recipient state: ‘[c]ompared to 
local scales, international organisations and agencies pay highly inflated local 
salaries. This creates a local labor market in which a new government has no 
chance to compete’ (von der Schulenburg 2005: 22). Loosing such competition 
forces local administrations to face a sort of internal brain-drain: the most skilled 
locals tend to offer their expertise to international agencies, this ‘unintentionally 
contribute[s] to marginalising the role of local administrations’ (Chalmers 2005: 
22). On this specific regard, with a very strong expression, Michael Ignatieff (as 
quoted in Fukuyama 2004: 139) has claimed that the international community’s 
capacity-building initiatives have often turned out being ‘capacity sucking-out’ 
actions. 
The account above seems to confirm that also scholars, in line with the 
work of practitioners, have approached statebuilding polices mostly by focusing 
on technical issues rather than encompassing societal considerations in their 
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concern. This is only partially true. Even Fukuyama (2004: xvii, 40) has 
recognized that both the efficiency and the stability of public institutions have a 
lot to do with ‘certain habits of mind’ and that ‘the development of formal 
institutions is strongly affected by cultural factors’. Compensating his largely 
technical approach to statebuilding, the American scholar has suggested that 
stateness should be examined by distinguishing ‘four nested aspects’: 
organizational design and management, political system design, basis of 
legitimization, and cultural and structural factors (Fukuyama 2004: 31-41). While 
acknowledging that the first component (institutional capacity stricto sensu) is the 
one that can be more easily exported and resists the influence of societal and 
cultural tensions, the fourth component of stateness introduces a sociological and 
anthropological dimension of statebuilding, which Fukuyama (2004: 43) further 
expands by analyzing the issue of generating a genuine demand for institutions – 
a challenge that state-builders cannot easily overcome and that they largely 
underestimate. 
Another series of key questions on contemporary international policy-
making practices has been brought by David Chandler (2004b; 2005c; 2005b; 
2006), who has emphasized that one of the most crucial concerns for the officials 
involved in contemporary statebuilding is how to avoid accountability. In this 
regard, Chandler criticizes the proposals of the ICISS and the normative debate on 
the sovereignty as responsibility ideal for providing merely a fertile ground of 
useful justification to what has emerged as a complex framework for ‘the 
regulation of and the intervention in non-Western states’ (Chandler 2005b: 2). 
Statebuilding is the operational core of such a framework, which might 
paradoxically weaken states by undermining the crucial relations of power and 
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accountability. The most evident result of states created ‘as administrative centres, 
directed from Brussels or Washington’ is that the crucial connection that should 
sustain the life of the state (the one between the state as organization and the state 
has a societal community) does not have chances to develop; ‘this is particularly 
problematic in situations where states have a weak social basis or their societies 
are particularly divided or fragmented’ (Chandler 2005b: 6). 
Caplan and Pouligny (2005a: 133) have brought two main critiques 
against what they call ‘l’ingénerie du state building à la mode onusienne’ or UN-
driven statebuilding. On the one hand, they have highlighted that there could be 
several long-term problem of institutional stability because statebuilding is too 
often undertaken by simply transplanting into a society the practices, the 
institutions and the laws that have developed in this or that Western state. On the 
other hand, they criticize the tendency of multilateral statebuilding missions to 
focus most exclusively on institutional and legal aspect of reconstruction. 
Transferring practices and rearranging the institutions of a failing or failed state 
turns out to be ineffective when it absorbs the resources of the international 
institutions involved in the statebuilding project up to the point that the ‘societal 
component’ is completely marginalized. Focusing on institutions- rather than 
nation-building cannot be a successful grand strategy: the long term stability of 
national institutions will only be granted if they serve a community that is 
reconciled and wants to continue living together. Referring, among others, to the 
work of Benedict Anderson (1991), Caplan and Pouligny (2005a: 134) have 
emphasized that the vital lymph of a community should originate from 
‘l’adhésion général et toujours renouvelée des citoyens au projet du vivre 
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ensemble / the general, constantly renewed adhesion of the citizens to the project 
of living together’.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Sovereignty, it has been claimed, ‘sprang out from universal morality’ 
(Pemberton 2008: 64-65). As the first part of this chapter shows, the key rule of 
the game in international relations is also one of the most debated ideas in the 
history of political thought. When theoretical confrontation on this concept 
started, the main concern for classical thinkers was to identify the principles that 
could allow stabilizing this normative imperative as a sort of ‘shield’ for the 
domestic consolidation of authority. Later in history, in parallel with the 
emergence of individuals as actors who have relevance and rights in the 
international realm (also beyond the shell of their nation-state authorities), the 
normative efforts of political theorists have been oriented towards the valorization 
of the democratic character of sovereignty. Throughout the last decade, 
elaborations on sovereignty have made another step forward, since the main 
concern for both scholars and policy analysts has been to emphasize the 
connection between legitimate sovereignty on the one hand and good-governance 
capabilities of rulers on the other. 
This last normative ferment has now reached an interesting crossroads. 
There is a widespread consensus that the interpretation of sovereignty as an 
internationally responsibility represents a new powerful normative basis on which 
a substantial renovation of international cooperation could be grounded. However, 
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interest on the general promotion of responsible sovereignty should not distract 
from the concrete operational limitations that still affect long-term missions in 
post-conflict scenarios. As the case of BiH will show, international policy-makers 
are still, so to speak, in a marriage of convenience with the re-conceptualization 
of sovereignty as a capacity and a responsibility. On the one hand, this new 
understanding of sovereignty has provided a comfortable basis to justify 
intervention and the prolonged international intromission in states that the 
international community labels are weak, failed or in the process of failing. On 
the other hand, the moral ideal of sharing responsibilities is not yet fully respected 
by the external actors operating in crisis areas. Statebuilding missions maintain a 
tendency to ‘babe’ local elites, but they nevertheless privilege the ‘technicisation’ 
of the relationships with the representatives from the target state.  
This attitude is quite interesting in the case of the member-statebuilding 
undertaken by the EU in BiH. In spite of the sophisticated ideal underpinning this 
particular exercise of reconstruction – which is to dilute the sovereignty struggle 
of the post-civil war multiethnic state through progressive integration into a 
complex post-nation state union – Brussels nevertheless tends to distance itself 
from political processes and uses, paraphrasing from Krasner, the sovereignty 
issue in a hypocritical way. In this regards, it will be clarified that EU policy-
makers have adopted a ‘hands-up statebuilding’ attitude. The sovereignty as 
responsibility ideal has not become yet a principle that genuinely informs and is 
concretely implemented, even by EU policy-makers. As the analysis of the 
Bosnian case will demonstrate, ‘logics of consequences’ remain still predominant 
amongst statebuilders. 
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The normative ground and the mix of interests that affects a multilateral 
statebuilding missions are not the only focus of this dissertation. The second part 
of this chapter has also reconstructed the main strategic problems that 
statebuilding missions are generally bound to face in their policy planning. The 
challenge for the international community is always greater when states collapse 
due to profound ethno-religious fractures that affect the community within its 
boundaries. In such specific cases, a first critical dilemma emerges even before 
the statebuilding mission is launched. As soon as a cease fire is reached and 
stabilized, and the negotiations for the peace settlement are structured, the 
international community needs to assess the desirability of the reconstruction of a 
multi-ethnic state. Once the pros and cons of this crucial initial decisions are 
overcome and a choice in one direction or the other is taken, two operational 
dilemmas of statebuilding emerge: the dilemma of bottom-up vs. top-down 
statebuilding (which has metaphorically been referred to as the ‘vertical’ 
dilemma), and the conflict between technically oriented assistance and a complex 
post-war stabilization focused, from the earlier stages of the statebuilding project, 
on grass-root reconciliation and the establishment of a definitive socio-political 
peace (which has been instead identified as the ‘horizontal’ dilemma of 
statebuilding).  
As the literature review in this chapter demonstrates, at the intersections 
of these two sets of operational choices lies the subtle contraposition between 
technical institution building and externally-incentivized nation-building. The 
need to create a balance between these two trajectories represents the key to 
success for statebuilding initiatives. When interest in the former is predominant, 
human and financial resources from international agencies are mostly invested 
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for the creation of structures that can guarantee short-term achievements. On the 
contrary, if the latter, but more arduous path is privileged, international 
institutions would be expected to tune their efforts mostly to implement policies 
that respect a long-term vision, while in the medium range they favor the 
consolidation for a stable environment where domestic political forces can play 
the games of democratic confrontation and overcome relative-gain logics of 
cooperation. 
The case of BiH will be analyzed to demonstrate that foreign intervention 
has rarely overcome these dilemmas, even when it has been rationalized in view 
of a highly ideological project like EU integration. It will be clarified that also 
the EU has thus far failed in consolidating an operational balance between the 
horizontal and the vertical dilemmas of statebuilding. In pursuing its peculiar 
member-statebuilding, even the EU is not yet immune from the strategic 
limitations that affect other multilateral settings in their strategic decision-
making. A clear orientation in favor of technical and partial achievement leads to 
overlook, or better, marginalize the civil society component. Short term and 
limited successes remain a privileged objective. Moreover, the need for success-
stories drives international agencies to privilege relationship with a selected 
class of bureaucrats (mostly educated in Western countries) which allows 
procrastinating confrontation with a turbulent political class and the fractured 
and difficult-to-approach constituency. This, so to speak, ‘more comfortable’ 
way of interaction can be traced back to some very basic needs that condition the 
international community when it sets a highly-intrusive field action.  
The recent history of peacebuilding efforts confirms that once a crisis is 
under control and reconstruction can be launched, the continued involvement by 
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the international community is normally fed by two elements: the occurrence of 
small crises that can be easily contained and, equally important, periodic and 
partial successes. The former allow a mission to be kept in place and be justified 
in the eyes of the host country and its population; the latter allows the field effort 
to be justified in the eyes of the domestic constituencies of the countries that 
contribute to the mission by sending their soldiers, personnel, different types of 
material resources, and direct funding.  
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(Chapter II) 
 
The Bosnian Context 
 
 
 
Bosnia is a wonderful country, fascinating,  
with nothing ordinary in the habitat or people.  
And just there are mineral riches under the earth in Bosnia,  
so undoubtedly are Bosnians rich in hidden moral values,  
more rarely found in their compatriots in other Yugoslav lands. 
But, you see, there's one thing that the people of Bosnia,  
at least people of your kind, must realize and never lose sight of. 
Bosnia is a country of hatred and fear.  
 
Ivo Andrić, A Letter from 1920 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This project assesses how the current EU-driven stabilization of BiH has led to a 
‘paradox within the paradox’ of sovereignty and statebuilding. International 
multilateral organizations embarking on statebuilding projects are bound to 
produce a paradox of sovereignty since the outside-in promotion of good 
domestic governance in failed and failing states inevitably imposes constraints on 
sovereignty. When the highly-intrusive statebuilding project was initially 
launched in BiH under the strategic guidance of the UN, the external actors 
operating – to paraphrase a famous expression from the DPA13 – ‘in and around’ 
Sarajevo compromised the self-governance of the target state, albeit with a view 
to restoring the full sovereign prerogatives of domestic political authorities. Prior 
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to the involvement of the EU, this rehabilitation process was designed to stabilize 
the independent multi-ethnic institutions and to rationalize the complex 
constitutional architecture established under the DPA. However, this has resulted 
in a further paradox whereby Brussels overseas the Bosnian multiethnic 
experiment and fosters the creation of a specific ‘EU-feasible’ state. In this 
member-statebuilding exercise, the EU educates national elites to relinquish 
certain sovereign prerogatives when the time comes to join the supranational 
Union.  
Despite of the European perspective, which in principle is supported by all 
members of the domestic political environment regardless of ethnic root or 
religious affiliation, BiH remains a complex reality, in which party leaders 
continue to approach cross-ethnic cooperation with a logic of relative-gain. 
Moreover, the history of the last fifteen years shows that the process of 
‘ownership’ in BiH has passed from the international community to the EU 
without the decisive involvement of the Bosnian people and without lifting the 
protectorate cloak from the politico-institutional life of the country. To be sure, 
establishing a modern form of protectorate carries its own risks. According to 
Susan Woodward (1999; 2001), sacrificing self-governance to restore sovereignty 
through a massive and articulated external presence can lead to highly unstable 
situations, especially in ethnically divided states like BiH that have emerged from 
civil war and still suffer from serious ethnic fractures. Looking at the repeated 
crises that affected political life in Sarajevo only a few years ago, Woodward 
(2001: 258) emphasized that  
 
The only force in favour of Bosnia as a whole is the international 
community. While that does not mean that there are no domestic 
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constituents of a sovereign Bosnia, the way in which this 
international operation is taking place gives free rein to those who 
are opposed. It appears to provide no sanctuary or platform for those 
who are committed to Bosnia. 
 
Against this backdrop, the analysis in this chapter identifies the main 
problems that have so far undermined the emergence of a political class that is 
disposed to operate for the common good beyond ethno-religious divisions and is 
therefore, recalling Woodward’s expression, truly ‘committed to BiH’. The first 
part of the chapter describes the three main factors that make BiH a complex and 
unstable political system. These coincide with the residual discontents of the 
DPA, the negative impact that the protracted technical intrusiveness of the HR has 
had on the political arena, and the dangers of weak democratization. Weak 
democratization refers to the tendency of the international community to promote 
institutional and technical developments, while disregarding the bottom-up 
dimension of democracy. In the second part of the chapter, the main processes and 
outcomes determined by the Bosnian stabilization process are connected to the 
three operational dilemmas of statebuilding previously highlighted. In the third 
section, the concrete and potential effects of the specific EU-driven statebuilding 
in BiH are examined. An analysis of the OHR-EUSR transition will highlight the 
difficulties for Brussels in pursuing its member-statebuilding and definitively 
establishing its leadership role in BiH.  
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2. From international to EU-driven statebuilding: fifteen 
years of international presence in BiH 
Since the EU has become the leading international actor in the Bosnian 
stabilization experiment there is evidence of a further ‘complication’ in the 
paradox of sovereignty and statebuilding identified by academics. Under EU 
direction, it seems that BiH could potentially skip a step in the restoration of its 
sovereign prerogatives. Seduced by the prospect of EU membership, BiH is 
moving towards integration into a greater supranational organization that will 
absorb critical sovereign prerogatives in the name of peace and development, and 
with the repeated promise of prosperity. Sovereignty is thus restored with 
international assistance, but only in the expectation that it will be subsequently 
relinquished by the local government to the European supranational sphere. 
What kind of rehabilitation process is the EU overseeing in BiH? Carl 
Schmitt (1922: 5) wrote that ‘sovereign is he who decides on the exception’. 
Paraphrasing Schmitt’s well-known formulation, it can be argued that, through the 
prospect of membership, the EU is creating an exceptional situation if compared 
to the trajectory of sovereignty in post-conflict statebuilding projects as identified 
by the sovereignty paradox literature. Statebuilding initiatives are complex and 
articulated projects; however, since the EU has taken over responsibility for the 
Bosnian reconstruction, a clear objective has emerged: BiH is to be constructed as 
a state ready to join the EU and relinquish some of its key sovereign prerogatives 
when the time comes. In the words of the Head of the Western Balkans Task 
Force at the Policy Unit of the EU Council:  
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The EU is ready to interact with a non-orthodox state structure. Even a 
country like Dayton Bosnia, to a certain degree, with all its anomalies 
with regards to sovereignty and institutional arrangements, can 
interact with the EU14 ... Bosnia is a state apparatus that can be 
understood and thus changed only in relation to the European 
integration project. We cannot say, “Let’s do Bosnia and then we 
integrate it”. We are making Bosnia because of and through 
integration.15 
 
In the eyes of former HR/EUSR Paddy Ashdown (2007a: 112): ‘[t]he 
phase at Dayton was the stabilization phase and the phase of statebuilding is the 
phase of Brussels’. Perhaps inevitably at this stage, the idea that a stable and 
multiethnic BiH is in the making ‘because of and through’ the EU integration 
process is a deep rooted conviction amongst all practitioners working at the 
offices of both the EU Council and the Commission. In line with this perception, 
building the Bosnian state means moulding the future institutions of BiH into a 
supranational institutional expression that originally emerged from the main 
aspiration (of prosperity) that the Bosnian people have: increasing integration 
with Western European countries. In brief, the prospect of EU membership has 
induced the constituent peoples of BiH to attach to a supranational context their 
idea of developmental state – to employ a term widely used in the political and 
economic literatures, which has also ‘been crucial to the discussion of state failure 
and collapse’ (Milliken and Krause 2002: 762) since it encapsulates the idea that 
states’ legitimization stems from their ability to promote security and, most 
importantly, the welfare of their citizens. For this reason, there is not a single 
political leader in the country, even amongst the most radical or nationalist, who 
expresses skepticism regarding the EU integration process for BiH. 
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Opinion polls conducted on the tenth anniversary of the DPA (Prism 
Research 2005) show that EU integration is perceived by Bosnian citizens mainly 
as a process that should secure wellbeing and economic opportunity. Expressing 
their understanding of EU integration, Bosnian citizens described Brussels first 
and foremost as ‘a way to create a better future for young people’. The next most 
popular answers were that EU membership guarantees freedom to travel and seek 
opportunities abroad, as well as general economic improvements on the domestic 
front. Interestingly in a post civil war scenario, the idea that the EU guarantees 
‘lasting peace’ to BiH was only the fourth most popular answer, which actually 
was cited by less than 10% of the population. Interviewed on what meaning 
should be attached to EU citizenship, again, Bosnians indicated primarily the right 
to move permanently to any country in the Union (over 70%). Over 50% also 
pointed to the specific right to work in other countries; and an average of 23% 
mentioned access to healthcare and social welfare outside BiH. Political rights 
were only acknowledged by a very limited number of interviewees (less than 
10%) as a relevant implication of EU citizenship. Moreover, 61,8 % of Bosnians 
admitted to expecting concrete ‘personal advantages’ from integration into the 
EU. 
To some extent, as has been noted also by the Peace Implementation 
Council Steering Board (PIC-SB),16 since the prospect of EU membership was 
projected onto BiH, the whole international presence in the country has been 
working towards a single objective: to help the rapprochement with Brussels and 
guarantee better prospects for prosperity. Amongst other recent declarations, the 
Political Directors supervising the peace implementation process stated in this 
regard that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “peaceful, viable state irreversibly on 
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course for European integration” has been the longstanding objective of the PIC 
Steering Board and achieving this objective has been [also] the focus of OHR’s 
work’ (PIC-SB 2008).  
Explicit references to the idea of prosperity have become common features 
of EU statements and communiqués issued by the PIC. In an effort to encourage 
Bosnian political and economic elites to increase their commitment to EU 
integration, in June 2007 HR/EUSR Schwarz-Schilling asked for ‘a new 
pragmatism to the business of enacting and implementing economic reforms’ as 
the only way  ‘to turn the promise of prosperity into reality’ (OHR 2007t). Similar 
references are made by the Commission in relation to BiH and the rest of the 
Western Balkans. Whenever the Commission tries to clarify what are the main 
pillars that sustain the EU integration process for the region, the idea of ‘raising 
prosperity’ is listed (European Commission 2006). More recently, on the occasion 
of their joint visit to Sarajevo, US Vice-President Joe Biden and the then EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana 
expressed their support for those local ‘leaders who have the courage to reach 
across the ethnic divide to find compromise, build trust, foster stability and bring 
prosperity to Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (US Government 2009). 
The economic benefits of the European integration process are also 
emphasized by political elites in the country. For instance, the link between 
‘integration with the rest of Europe’ and the opportunity to ‘deliver a better 
standard of living for all [Bosnian] citizens’ was chosen as a starting point of the 
Bjelasnica Declaration (OHR 2003b), co-signed by the representatives of the 
domestic political arena at the time of the 2003 EU/Western Balkans Thessaloniki 
Summit.  
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Turning from the general population to local elites, the paradox within the 
paradox of sovereignty resulting from EU-driven statebuilding has yet another 
dimension. As will be demonstrated in the two empirical chapters that follow, 
policy-making in Brussels has been strongly influenced by the conviction that 
most (if not all) Bosnian political frictions and sources of instability arising from 
ethno-religious tensions will be successfully diluted within the wider European 
context. EU accession represents the culmination of what could metaphorically be 
referred to as ‘a shredding sovereignty process’. By joining the EU, Bosnian 
ruling elites will be deprived of several sovereign prerogatives that today 
constitute sources of tension amongst them. For this reason, a definitive solution 
to the internal sovereignty struggle has been for the most part omitted from the 
priority list by EU policy-makers. 
An analysis of the two main reform areas that have dominated political 
debate in BiH will also demonstrate that, in spite of this idealistic understanding 
of the EU integration process, Brussels has nevertheless been pushing for a 
technical anchorage of BiH. This takes place through the SAA agreement, which 
is designed to produce a series of positive and self-driven reforms, as well as to 
impact positively on the overall political process in the country. In the opinion of 
EU personnel serving in Brussels and Sarajevo, technical progress within the 
framework of the SAA should put BiH ‘automatically’ on the path to European 
integration and politico-institutional harmonization. The deadlines, the 
conditionality, and the reforms attached to the SAA have been conceived in 
Brussels as the only feasible means of overcoming political instability in BiH. 
Interviewed on this issue, the Desk Officer for BiH at the EU Commission has 
openly acknowledged this strategic choice. 
 76 
 
 
Obviously, the constitutional reform is at the basis of all. But I believe 
that with the SAA we should succeed to produce a chain reaction. 
Slowly – at least I hope – the Bosnians will understand that the state 
they have does not work and they will start to change it, piece by 
piece and without our direct impositions.17 
 
2.1. Ownership and sovereignty in the Bosnian stabilization 
process 
BiH demonstrates specific characteristics if compared with the legal regimes 
established by the UN in pre-independence Kosovo or East Timor. At least 
formally, Sarajevo was not a protectorate of the international community, such as 
those established with UNSC resolutions 1244 and 1272 (1999a; 1999b) in 
Pristina and Dili respectively. In these cases, an international administration was 
established, with UN authorities in the field formally tasked with overseeing the 
countries. However, the prolonged presence of the international community in 
BiH leaves little ground for doubt: this country was and continues to be heavily 
influenced by external actors, as it was in the very early stages of the DPA 
implementation phase.  
To be sure, the international presence in the country has changed its 
configuration if compared, for example, with early 1996. At present, BiH is 
predominantly under the tutelage and guidance of EU policy-makers. 
Nevertheless, as has been emphasized by Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin (2003: 
61) ‘in BiH, outsiders actually set that agenda, impose it, and punish with 
sanctions those who refuse to implement it’. Moreover, as these two former OHR 
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officials have warned, so long as the Western intervention in BiH continues to 
resemble the behavior of an ‘imperial power over its colonial possessions’ the risk 
that the Bosnian statebuilding experiment will fail remains (Knaus and Martin 
2003: 62). 
This de facto protectorate status is maintaining the fragile (and for the 
most part inefficient) central state institutions but, at the same time, it can also be 
seen as a source of instability. Institution-building and democratization initiatives 
have been continuously carried out by first the UN and later the EU, under the 
watchful eyes of NATO. However, the ethno-religious fractures that are 
negatively affecting political and social stability in the country as a whole have 
not been tackled directly. The risk that too much time has been wasted without 
implementing proper reconciliation strategies or facilitating a solution to the 
domestic sovereignty struggle has eventually started to be recognized also by 
high-ranking EU officials. Amongst other voices of criticism, a diplomat who 
spent four years working in the COWEB openly questioned both the management 
of this post-conflict space by the international community and the tendency, 
specific to the EU, to duplicate in BiH the model and pre-enlargement policies 
experimented with in the Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) and in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
The problem is that in BiH we tried to go quicker than the reality of 
statebuilding and post-conflict consolidation allows. And in this 
context we have a sort of intellectual responsibility. We did not 
focus on the real problems of BiH. We saw our sick man, we saw we 
had a medicine that had kind of worked in Central Europe and we 
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took that medicine again from our shelves to give it to BiH. We did 
not play the good doctor. The attentive doctor tries to see what 
specific sicknesses his patient really has.18 
 
Stability is a vague term, which can be exploited, politicized, and 
developed in many ways. The analysis of the Bosnian context proposed here 
develops from a relatively simple and general understanding of stabilization, 
which does not hide its normative construction: post-conflict stability in a country 
that has gone through civil war, ethnic cleansing and clear cases of genocide 
cannot be considered consolidated until there is a reorganization of sovereign 
powers among domestic political authorities that allows efficient interactions 
between well-functioning multi-ethnic institutions, and provides incentives for 
substantial participation and responsiveness of society as a whole.  
The last part of this definition is the most delicate. HR Wolfgang Petritsch 
emphasized that the socio-political aspects of a stabilization process are by far 
more important than the technical achievements registered through meticulous 
institution-building engineering. In the words of the former Austrian HR: ‘only 
once all citizens – and I stress citizens, not peoples, or ethnic groups, or collective 
bodies – only once all individuals can accept and respect the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a reality, then and only then the project of state-building will have 
succeeded’ (Petritsch 2006: 6).  
This indirect criticism of the international approach in BiH is valid. 
However, what is surely positive is that at least, for the past eight years, the 
international presence in the country has been put on the path to ‘rationalization’ 
thanks to the establishment of EU oversight. The system of so-called ‘inter-
locking’ international institutions is in its twilight phase. Today, the key to 
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Bosnia’s future lies mainly in the hands of the EU. Brussels has become the 
‘magnetic centre’ that holds the weak central organization of the Bosnian state 
together: the prospect of European integration works as an incentive that impedes 
the numerous centripetal forces characterizing the Bosnian political environment 
from provoking critical shocks. Scholars widely acknowledge that there has been 
a clear switch from the Dayton phase to ‘the era of Brussels’ (European Stability 
Initiative 2002; Ducasse-Rogier 2004; Chandler 2005a; Kerr 2005; Ó Tuathail 
2005; Bebler 2006; Hays 2006). 
But it is not merely the European perspective that is making the Bosnian 
state work. The EU is controlling the most crucial aspects of what has now 
become the Bosnian member-statebuilding process. After ten years of NATO-led 
missions (first IFOR and later SFOR), Bosnia’s military security is now almost 
exclusively managed by an ESDP Mission renamed ‘EUFOR/Operation Althea’. 
However, in spite of the presence of Operation Althea, the United States 
maintains its military base in Tuzla, and NATO keeps a small backup force at the 
Butmir base on the outskirts of Sarajevo. The residual NATO personnel maintain 
responsibilities in the areas of defense reform, counter-terrorism, information 
sharing with the EU, and investigations against suspected war criminals.19 The EU 
Police Mission has undertaken since 2002 the task of creating a multi-ethnic 
police force, which was previously handled by the UN. Finally, and most 
importantly, the EUSR in Sarajevo has since 2002 been ‘double-hatted’ and is 
simultaneously serving as head of the OHR. 
In general, observers have enthusiastically welcomed all of these 
handovers of responsibility from various international organizations to the EU and 
they have moved, as has been rightly pointed out by Bickerton (2005b: 4), from 
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‘excoriating the state-builders in Bosnia’ when they were not fully under the 
umbrella of the EU, to ‘supporting the EU’s own state-building policy’. 
Enthusiasm for the increased role of the EU apart, it is nevertheless possible to 
say that moving from the Dayton era to that of European integration requires 
those working in BiH to rethink strategy and objectives. This process of 
rethinking practical methods of intervention and concrete goals can be undertaken 
only by re-opening a very broad and theoretical debate: who should actually be 
sovereign?  
As has been emphasized in the previous literature review, sovereignty has 
internal and international dimensions, both of which are relevant to the discourse 
on statebuilding. The international dimension is useful in identifying the legal and 
normative foundations of statebuilding initiatives. Internationally, ‘sovereignty 
has been and remains the cornerstone of an entire, evolving system of diplomatic 
practices, conferring international status and enabling states to interact and 
cooperate on the basis of agreed methods and common understandings’ (Heller 
2001: 30). Internally, the discourse might be more complicated. Quoting from 
John Boli (2001: 54), it is advisable to highlight the distinction between the 
polity, which consists in a ‘social unit constituted by a body politic’, and the state 
as an institutional complex, which is ‘the structure by which central authority is 
organized within that unit’. To have a stable state, one might normatively claim, it 
is necessary that the individuals constituting the national body recognize the 
legitimacy and support the activity of the governing authority, at all levels of 
governance. 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that in an external statebuilding 
effort, international institutions are responsible for this process of identification 
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(which in BiH has been particularly arduous due to the war legacies and the 
multiethnic nature of the population), especially if they have strenuously 
advocated for the consolidation of the multiethnic nature of the state. Hence, 
external actors working on the reconstruction of a post-conflict multiethnic state 
must distinguish between the polity and the state; moreover, they must address the 
crucial question of whether it is the people, the parliament or, more generally, the 
central government that are the holders of supreme authority. Different answers 
inevitably produce different evaluations of the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda 
and statebuilding priorities, and provide different lessons for future interventions 
of this nature. 
 
 
2.2. The DPA: strengths and weaknesses, criticism and 
appreciation 
Dayton’s flexibility has been very important, especially since it has allowed for a 
series of substantial changes and institutional developments in BiH. The 
agreement has been rightly labeled as ‘the most impressive example of conflict 
resolution’ in contemporary history (Woodward 2001: 258). When the main terms 
of the DPA were being discussed, international policy-makers had the immediate 
objective of bringing to an end the violent conflict between the three ethno-
religious factions that fought in the civil war, and creating the proper political and 
strategic conditions to consolidate security on the ground and prevent any possible 
recurrence of hostilities. Using a formula lying half-way between Clausewitz and 
Foucault, an observer stressed that the DPA and its very first implementation 
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phases were ‘the continuation of the conflict by other means’ (David 2001: 10). 
Even if its architecture clearly was a ‘construction of necessity’ (Keane 2001: 61), 
it can be argued that it worked well at the end of the civil war.  
Beyond the immediate requirements of structuring an international 
presence to supervise the peace process, establishing the conditions to obtain and 
then consolidate hard security, and providing continuity to the existence of the 
Bosnian state, the agreement soon started to reveal some of its limitations. Firstly, 
the international presence legitimized on the basis of the DPA behavior typical of 
a protectorate regime, without any formal agreement acknowledging the particular 
status of dependence. As has been stressed by David Chandler (2005a: 336), the 
DPA ‘has enabled international actors, unaccountable to the people of BiH, to 
shape and reshape the agenda of post-war transition’.  
Secondly, the agreement left each constituent people with its own 
particular grievances. At the beginning for instance, Bosnian Serbs were reluctant 
to accept the deal, in spite of the fact that the territorial partition imposed through 
Dayton was, at least in statistical terms, clearly favorable to them. Dayton 
awarded 49% of the territory to the Bosnian Serbs and 51% to the Croat/Muslim 
Federation, while pre-war data showed that the Serbs accounted for no more than 
31.4% of the total population of BiH. Serbs also strongly opposed the 
incorporation of the city of Brčko into the territory of the FBiH. Brčko – which 
has always been considered a strategic area by both sides – remained under Serb 
jurisdiction from the end of the hostilities until 1999, when an international 
arbitration eventually oversaw its demilitarization and paved the way for the 
creation of a special district. 
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 As far as the Bosniak side was concerned, the text negotiated in Ohio and 
signed in Paris was particularly disappointing for the lack of any condemnation of 
war crimes and mass murders. Bosniaks found it unacceptable that the gross 
violations of human rights and ethnic cleansing committed by Serbs and Bosnian 
Serbs against the Muslim communities (like in Srebrenica and Prijador) as well as 
the cruel repression exercised by the Croats were completely ignored in the peace 
treaty. If the episode of Srebrenica represents the most tragic moment in the 
history of Europe since World War II, it should not be forgotten that the Croat 
army was also responsible for acts of repression or violence against Muslims, 
especially in central BiH. The lack of any reference to these crimes created among 
Bosniak elites the anxiety to receive justice through the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) based in The Hague. 
The peace settlement was not completely satisfactory for the Croats either; 
mainly because they did not get entity status, which was instead granted to RS. In 
addition, Croats share with the Muslims a common fear. Their respective minority 
groups still living in RS are the object of marginalization: they are excluded from 
playing an active role in the RS National Assembly and other key institutions of 
the Serb Entity. However, the marriage of convenience between Bosniaks and 
Croats ends here; the latter have worked for the exclusion of Muslims from 
political life in the cantons of the FBiH where they are in the majority with the 
same intensity that Bosnian Serbs have devoted to a similar objective in RS.  
When it comes to the confederal structure created by the DPA, the 
agreement has one major flow. The excessive emphasis on territoriality in the 
institutional framework is unlikely to be overcome, also because since its 
establishment, it has automatically favored the perpetuation of ethno-nationalist 
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politics. As has been emphasized by Sumantra Bose (2007: 140), the institutional 
architecture created on the basis of the DPA can ‘provide the basis for democratic 
stability in moderately segmented societies like Switzerland and Belgium’ but it is 
unlikely to work ‘in deeply divided postwar societies like Bosnia’. 
 
 
2.3. The High Representative and the Bonn Powers 
The role of the High Representative and his intrusiveness in Bosnian political life 
can justified by making reference to the idea of conditional sovereignty. When 
national authorities are unable to undertake their key responsibilities towards the 
domestic constituency, they can be legitimately confined by an international 
intervention (Etzioni 2006). However, for how long and how deeply can 
international institutions exercise their intrusiveness without creating excessive 
distortions in the domestic political environment? 
Under the DPA and the so-called Bonn Powers, the HR was given an 
undisputedly dominant position in Bosnian political life. At its meeting in Bonn in 
December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) requested the HR: 
firstly, to adopt binding decisions when local parties seemed unable or unwilling 
to act; and secondly, to remove from office public officials who violated legal 
commitments or, in general, the DPA. The section of the PIC conclusions that 
invested the HR with these powers proceeds as follows: 
 
The Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his 
final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement 
on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to 
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facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding decisions, 
as he judges necessary, on the following issues: a. timing, location 
and chairmanship of meetings of the common institutions; b. interim 
measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, 
which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of 
Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace 
Agreement on the issue concerned; c. other measures to ensure 
implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the 
common institutions. Such measures may include actions against 
persons holding public office or officials who are absent from 
meetings without good cause or who are found by the High 
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under 
the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation (PIC 1997: 
chapter 11 para 2, emphasis added). 
 
From the beginning of his mandate, the HR has intervened substantially 
and repeatedly in the institutional life of the country. In Annex 10, as agreed upon 
at Dayton, the HR was given just a general responsibility for the civilian 
implementation of the peace settlement and was envisaged as a sort of ‘father 
figure’ (Keane 2001: 74). A few years later, when Carlos Westendorp took up 
office as HR in 1997, he openly admitted: ‘[a]nnex 10 even gives me the 
possibility to interpret my own authorities and powers’ (as quoted in Chandler 
2000: 52). 
Amongst several other processes, one striking example of the HR’s 
massive intrusiveness concerned defense reform. This was launched in April 2003 
through the adoption of a series of measures which impacted deeply on the pillars 
of the Bosnian military structure. In order to overcome the well-known limitations 
of weak civilian control over the two entities armed forces and strengthen state-
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level command and control, the HR opted –autonomously and virtually in the 
absence of any kind of cooperation from the Bosnian political authorities – for the 
suppression of the Supreme Defense Council of RS (the HR justified this decision 
pointing to the Council’s failure to prevent the violation of some UN resolutions 
in RS) and passed a series of decisions amending articles of the RS Laws on 
Defense, the Army and the Federation Law on Defense and even some provisions 
of the Entity constitutions. In line with the requests made by the Council of 
Europe (CoE 2004), these decisions aimed to strengthen state-level command and 
control of BiH’s armed forces and to harmonize the entity constitutional 
provisions with the BiH constitution on all military matters. 
This example illustrates the degree of influence and power developed by 
the HR over the years. Observers have claimed that most Bosnians share the same 
criticism against the HR: ‘unelected [and] with the right to legislate and remove 
officials without any right to appeal’ (Moore 2004). What critics finds 
unacceptable are the immediate executive effects of his decisions regarding 
removals or suspensions. These decisions are regularly adopted and implemented 
without a previous hearing of the person accused, and they cannot be appealed 
before any court in BiH or elsewhere, even if in some cases removals imply a ban 
for life from holding any public office.  
But the HR does not just send ‘inappropriate’ officers home. After the 
2002 general elections, Lord Paddy Ashdown also decided to submit all 
candidates proposed by the political parties for major ministerial positions, both at 
Entity and state level, to an ad hoc evaluation process. The HR has also 
nominated high-ranking officers for key judicial functions, state prosecutors 
included. This brief look at the effects and implications of the HR’s decision is 
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helpful in understanding how domestic politics has been influenced since the very 
first use of the Bonn Powers.  
What is of particular interest is that in recent years the main assaults 
against the practices of the HR have come not only from local elites and NGOs, 
but also from the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. BiH joined this 
international organization on April 2002. Since then, the Strasbourg-based 
institution has on several occasions complained about the powers exercised by the 
HR. The main issue raised by the CoE has always concerned the apparent 
incapacity of the HR to relinquish responsibilities in favor of Bosnian domestic 
elites as rapidly as possible. It is interesting that already in 2004 Strasbourg was 
claiming that: 
 
More than two years after accession to the Council of Europe, the 
time has come to define a clear strategy for transferring 
responsibilities from the High Representative to domestic 
authorities. The question indeed arises as to the extent to which the 
current role of the HR is compatible with membership of BiH in the 
Council of Europe. Full ownership is crucial for the country 
becoming a credible candidate for further integration into European 
structures (CoE 2004).  
 
Pressure from the CoE (combined with the growing involvement of the 
EU in BiH) had an effect: slowly, the HR has become less intrusive. In recent 
years, the number of laws directly imposed by the HR and the number of public 
officials dismissed has substantially decreased. This appears to indirectly confirm 
that progress towards local ownership is intensifying. As we will see later in this 
chapter, the assessment elaborated by the Venice Commission (another institution 
working under the CoE umbrella), became a term of reference in the process for 
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the closure of the OHR, abolition of the regime established under the Bonn 
Powers, and the creation of a reinforced EUSR Office (cf. section 4.3. in this 
chapter). 
The presence of the OHR is not seen in the same way by politicians from 
different ethno-religious groups. As emphasized by a correspondent of ISN 
Security Watch in Sarajevo, when in mid 2006 the PIC-SB announced that the 
process for the closure of the OHR had formally been launched and was probably 
going to be completed in one year, several Croats and Bosniak representatives 
expressed doubts and concerns. In particular, Bosniak politicians have repeatedly 
declared that they would prefer the OHR to keep its presence, activities, and the 
right to make use of the Bonn Powers at least until the EU formalizes the 
acceptance of BiH as a full candidate member (Alic 2006: 5).  
On the contrary, Bosnian Serbs have engaged in a permanent struggle with 
the international envoy to BiH. Several episodes of this confrontation will be 
highlighted in the following two empirical chapters. In particular, extensive 
reference will be made to the struggle between the current RS leadership and the 
OHR. This confrontation has been clearly political in nature. However, in recent 
times, the struggle has become so sophisticated that the RS Government has even 
tried to question the legitimacy of the Bonn Powers on legal grounds. Relying on 
complex juridical arguments, the current RS leadership has defined the Bonn 
Powers as a violation of international law (RS Government 2009: 12-13).  
Continuing their polemic against the legitimacy of the OHR as it evolved 
after Bonn in 1997, RS leaders have labeled BiH ‘a deeply divided and terrified 
state’ (RS Government 2009: 10), an ‘unproclaimed protectorate and captive 
state’. In launching this accusation, they are also clear in saying that ‘the 
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instruments for creation and maintenance of such a situation are so-called „Bonn 
Powers“ and [externally] installed judiciary, which prevents self-sustainability and 
progress of BiH’ (RS Government 2009: 5). The most recent attacks from Banja 
Luka have focused on the supposedly biased approach by the OHR in dealing 
with each of the three constituent peoples and on the argument that keeping the 
international protectorate through the OHR informal and unproclaimed has 
allowed international policy-makers to avoid their responsibilities for the 
government of the country.  
 
From the beginning of the mission of the international community in 
BiH, its civilian part – High Representative and his numerous 
offices, created and cherished with great care the culture of 
dependence, helplessness and fear. It was not equally distributed to 
all three constituent peoples. Dependence was reserved for the 
Bosniaks ... The protectorate in BiH has never been declared, as that 
would mean full nullification of the Dayton Agreement, and its 
Annex 4 as the BiH Constitution would particularly be superseded. 
Apart from that, declaring protectorate also implies responsibility of 
the protector for the overall condition, relations and results of such a 
foreign administration (RS Government 2009: 6, 8). 
 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze the validity of the 
arguments put forward by the RS Government in its attempt to challenge both the 
moral and legal authority of the OHR and the use of the Bonn Powers. It is 
relevant here to quote again the Yugoslav writer Ivo Andrić, winner of the Nobel 
Prize for literature in 1961. In his Bosnian Chronicle, Andrić attributes to a citizen 
living in his hometown of Travnik at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century a 
comment that, to some extent, perfectly describes the endemic adversion of 
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Bosnians towards foreign rulers: ‘the Best vizier20 we ever had … was the one 
who got as far as the frontier, then went straight back to Istanbul and never even 
set foot in Bosnia’ (Andrić 1963: 9). 
 
2.4. Participation and nationalist partitions in BiH 
Without necessarily supporting the severe criticism and claims made by the RS 
Bosnian Serb leadership against the OHR, it nevertheless seems fair to say that the 
prolonged interference of the HR in Bosnian political life inevitably results in 
distortions of the democratic development of the country. Despite this, if we turn 
our attention from the OHR to certain concrete achievements in the 
democratization process of the country, there are arguments for optimism. 
Ongoing progress in the effective running of elections has been made since 1997 
(the year that Bosnians were allowed to exercise their vote for the first time 
following the entry into force of the DPA). The OSCE, CoE, and the UN – using 
personnel on the ground and the deployment of short-term observers – have 
invested significant efforts in this area. Implementing Annex 3 of the DPA, the 
OSCE has given a decisive contribution to the establishment of the Bosnian 
voting system. Given the institutional and structural complexity of the Bosnian 
context, the rules issued by the experts sent from Vienna and from the Warsaw-
based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the 
OSCE resulted in an extremely articulated system. For instance, refugees retain 
the right to vote in their communities of origin and thus have continued to be 
represented in their pre-war hometowns, often a considerable distance from their 
actual place of residence.  
 91 
 
The early years of democratic experimentation were not easy ones for the 
competent international organizations. For example, the election in September 
1998 of the ultranationalist Serb leader Nikola Poplašen as President of RS 
demonstrated the limitations of the OSCE operating beyond the purely technical 
aspects of the electoral process in BiH. Poplašen became President at the expense 
of the moderate candidate Biljana Plavšić, who had been RS President for the 
previous two years and was clearly the favoured candidate of Western observers.21 
Analysing the 1998 RS elections ex post, it is possible to conclude that the 
election of Poplašen – who was removed from his post by the HR only six months 
after the electoral victory (OHR 1999) – was favoured by the OSCE guidelines, 
which established a majority system based on a single direct ballot of registered 
voters (OSCE 1998: 6) despite the fact that other international observers operating 
in the country had warned against the risks associated with this system.22 
Technical and political complexities apart, it is possible to identify some 
encouraging signs regarding the improvement of the democratic system in BiH. 
For instance, since October 2002 the Bosnian authorities have been in a position 
to organize and run elections independently. A report from the CoE (2004: 21) 
confirmed that ‘for the first time since the end of the war, the October 2002 
general elections were administered by the domestic authorities themselves and 
not by the OSCE. Given the country’s unique constitutional framework, they were 
largely in line with international standards for democratic elections’. 
When this transfer of responsibilities took place, it was welcomed by the 
Ambassadors of the PIC-SB as ‘a great success for the democratic institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, especially because – they noted – the Bosnians 
‘performed that role with commendable competence and professionalism’ (as 
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quoted in OHR 2003a). Practically speaking, things went even better at the 
following 2004 municipal elections. In fact, these were the very first elections 
completely organized, run and even fully financed by domestic means. The 
municipal commissions worked independently, as the OSCE limited its 
intervention to the pre-electoral phase, instructing its experts to focus their work 
on increasing citizens’ trust and participation in the whole electoral process 
(OSCE 2004). 
Was the ODIHR successful in this complex undertaking? In spite of 
considerably expanded efforts, data collected in the field appears to confirm that 
trust and participation remain points of weakness. Unfortunately, lack of 
participation and, more generally, of confidence in the Bosnian political 
establishment remain sources of concern. As observers have stressed, ‘low voter 
turnout … signals a growing disillusionment among voters with the political 
process, and a growing popular disgust with political leaders of all stripes’ 
(Donais and Pickel 2003: 3). If one focuses on the specific details that emerge 
from available statistics, the picture appears even less encouraging. At the 2004 
municipal elections there were two million and several hundred thousand voters 
registered. Of these, only 45.52% actually went in the electoral booth to exercise 
their vote. Moreover, this percentage falls significantly if the specific participation 
of young people is taken into account. Data demonstrate that, among the million 
people that went to vote, only 7-10% were in the 18 to 30 year old category (Alic 
2006: 2). 
Representatives of the international community hope that the above trend 
will fade over time. The 2006 general election already registered a significant rise 
in participation, which reached the more encouraging level of 54.48% (OSCE 
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2006). However, years of very low interest in politics and inconsistent 
participation appears to show that something in the very expensive outside-in 
democratization project has not worked properly. Leaving aside for a moment the 
impact of the OHR on Bosnian democratic development, one can identify several 
disincentives that are not directly connected with the presence of the international 
community in BiH, but that are endemic to the domestic political environment. 
For instance, political analyst Tanja Topic stressed that in post-war BiH elections 
are repeated very frequently – perhaps too often – thus becoming a routine that 
induced people to lose interest (as quoted in Associated Press 2004). Moreover, 
this local analyst also added: ‘nobody elected so far has managed to solve any of 
the problems poisoning people’s everyday life, and in the eyes of the average 
citizen, all parties have become the same’ (Associated Press 2004).  
In addition to these factors, one can hypothesize that in recent years low 
people’s confidence in political parties may have been exasperated by three other 
elements. Firstly, politicians have been opportunistically moving from one party 
to another: 370 out of 450 top party list leaders have changed their allegiance 
even up to four or five times. Secondly, the presence of young people in the 
electoral competition is virtually non-existent, since the same old political class 
has prevented young candidates from finding their political space and running for 
election. Thirdly, recent domestic confrontation has confirmed that there are still 
few alternatives to nationalism.  
After the DPA brought the conflict to an end, the three national parties 
formerly at war ‘managed to remain the central points of reference for the security 
and political identities of the sections of the population they represent’ (Alic 
2006: 2). These parties – SDA, the Bosniak Party founded by Alija Izetbegović in 
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1990; HDZ-BiH, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
created in 1990; and the SDS, the Serbian Democratic Party founded by Radovan 
Karadžić in 1992 – were to a large extent defeated at the last general elections in 
2006. However, the parties that won the elections systematically continued to feed 
their constituency with nationalism and hatred. While ‘old’ nationalist parties lost 
a high share of their support, it is also true that the supposedly ‘moderate’ parties 
that won the elections have thus far confirmed – in their strategies, interactions, 
and modus operandi – that confrontation based on ethnicity remains a crucial 
factor in the Bosnian political arena.  
This came as something of surprise to the international community, as a 
top-ranking official serving at EUPM in Sarajevo candidly admitted when 
interviewed on the issue exactly one year after the elections. It is worth quoting 
him in details.  
 
Not even one year had passed after the 2006 elections and I realized 
that internationals missed nationalist parties. This became clear 
especially in the last months of crisis. There were great expectations 
on the supposedly social democrat or moderate parties that won last 
elections. We were not prepared to handle a renewal of the ethnic 
tension and an accentuation of the ethno-nationalist rhetoric, at all. 
Paradoxically that this might sound, we miss the nationalists! Look 
at what is happening in Republika Srpska. The SNSD is a totally RS-
based party. They are Social-democrats in their name and mottos, 
but at the end of the day they are nationalist and they feed their 
constituencies with nationalism. So you might wonder: what is the 
difference with SDS? Leaving aside pointless consideration on right 
and left wing, there is one answer that matters: the old SDS was a 
party that maintained its action on the whole territory of BiH. Or, at 
least, it tried to do so. After all, it was one of the founding parties of 
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BiH in 1991. SNSD is an RS party, and that’s it. They have no 
orientation towards Sarajevo. 23 
 
The three negative trends in the Bosnian political arena outlined above are 
particular features of the domestic environment; nonetheless, as critics have 
repeatedly pointed out, the international authorities might also bear a certain 
degree of responsibility for the low levels of interest and participation in national 
politics. Amongst other scholars who focused on the responsibilities of the 
international community, David Chandler (2005c: 308) has emphasized that 
basically all the international institutions involved in the reconstruction of the 
Bosnian state have dangerously tended to keep statebuilding strategies separated 
from politics: ‘there is a tendency to see state-building as a technical or 
administrative process, one which does not require building a popular consensus 
for policy-making’. This assessment can be fully endorsed. As the analysis in the 
following chapters reveals, the EU member-statebuilding exercise has been 
characterized by the marginalization of politics on the one hand, and an excessive 
focus on institutional and technical process rather than societal ones on the other.  
In line with Chandler’s analysis, Ivan Krastev (2002: 43) has complained 
about the growing tendency amongst international institutions (and Western states 
in general, which are also the most active with regards to their bilateral 
cooperation initiatives in the region) to dangerously perceive democracy ‘less as a 
matter of relations between leaders and led than as a set of institutions whose 
existence and effectiveness can be measured in concrete ways that are 
commensurate across cases’. Such a technocratic approach to democracy is 
flawed, since it reveals the tendency to overlook ‘the internal logic of politics and 
the ways in which citizens view their governments’ (Krastev 2002: 44).  
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In this specific regard, an interesting analysis and at the same time a clear 
policy proposal has been offered by Roland Paris (2004), who expressed 
disappointment at the tendency of multilateral peacebuilding mission to organize 
elections in a post-conflict environment as soon as a minimum degree of security 
has been achieved. To be precise, Paris expressed concern at the tendency to 
deploy significant international resources – both human and financial – to 
organize elections in realities that are still not ready for democracy. This general 
criticism can be supported. As the Bosnian case reveals, if the political 
environment is still suffering from a recent conflict, political stability can be hard 
to achieve within a short time frame and elections end up being held too often, to 
the point of becoming a routine for which people lose their enthusiasm. On closer 
examination, Paris takes an even more radical stand on the issue of elections in 
post-conflict societies, when he claims that peace-builders should actually refrain 
from running any elections at all, at least until they have clear evidence that 
moderate parties enjoy sufficient support ‘to prevail over immoderate parties at 
the polls’ (Paris 2004: 189-90). 
 
 
3. The statebuilding dilemmas and the Bosnian case 
The history of the Bosnian breakup and the ethnic war that took place between 
1992 and 1995 represents a classic example of state failure. As recognized by the 
State Failure Task Force (SFTF 2000: 23), ‘state failure is a new term for a type 
of serious political crisis exemplified by events that occurred in the 1990s in 
Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Afghanistan’. Given the 
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complexity of its socio-political environment, the legacy of the ethnic conflict, 
and the pervasive and prolonged interferences of the international community at 
all levels of governance in the country, BiH has now also become a key case in 
understanding the dynamics of internationally-driven statebuilding and assessing 
the effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization policies. The reconstruction process 
launched on the basis of the DPA offers a unique perspective on all the three 
dilemmas of statebuilding elaborated in the previous chapter.  
Moreover, the case of BiH offers a unique perspective on the difficult 
transition from international to EU-driven statebuilding. Commenting on the UN 
methodology for early statebuilding efforts in BiH, an official in the Enlargement 
DG of the Commission used a powerful metaphor in this regard, when he spoke 
about ‘Rolls-Royce statebuilding’. His analysis of the challenges of the handover 
from internationally-led to EU-driven statebuilding proceeds as follows:  
 
The EU, and particularly the Commission, committed to the Bosnian 
statebuilding project with the idea that the old ‘international’ 
methodology had to be abandoned. Before the EU-driven 
statebuilding was launched, BiH was subject to what we used to 
refer to as Rolls-Royce statebuilding. Basically we tolerated the 
following approach: whoever thinks to have a good idea, model, 
example from its own national experience, is entitled to work on the 
specific reform (obviously, also by putting the money and the 
necessary expertise). In this way, we copied and pasted many 
institutions, so that most institutions in BiH resembles ours back 
home. Basically, this is the way we created the state level from the 
late nineties until the end of the Ashdown era. Unfortunately, 
everything has taken place without rationalization and turned out to 
be expensive and tremendously inextricable. This is why today we 
speak in terms of conditionalities and technical progress.24 
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3.1. From the Western Balkans towards Western Europe: the 
good-neighborhood effect on BiH 
Maintaining the momentum and the credibility of the EU membership prospective 
in the Western Balkans is of the utmost importance, in particular, with a view to 
promoting what, paraphrasing Keohane, can be referred to as ‘the good-
neighborhood effect’. Even in relatively recent times, there have been worrying 
signs of a tendency for violence to erupt and episodes demonstrating that even 
simple political tensions can spillover state borders within the region.  
An example of how easily violence can still erupt in the Western Balkans 
can be found by looking back at early 2004. In that year, the riots that affected 
Kosovo provided clear evidence that the whole regional architecture was still 
based on very fragile balances and was still deeply affected by inter-ethnic and 
religious tensions. The violence that erupted in Kosovo was followed, within only 
a few days, by outbreaks of tension in parts of BiH, both in the FBiH and RS: the 
burning of a Serbian Orthodox Church in Bugojno (a city of the Bosnia Federation 
very close to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, IEBL) was followed by the stoning 
of the Islamic Community’s building in Banja Luka, the capital of RS.  
Apart from being permeable to violence, intra-regional borders in the 
Western Balkans have tended to prove ineffectual also when political tensions 
related to ethno-religious fractures re-emerge. This happened, for instance, in the 
critical days following the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. On 17 February 
2008 the Kosovo Assembly eventually formalized its separation from the 
Republic of Serbia. Pristina made the announcement on a Sunday following the 
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presidential elections in Serbia, thus respecting the timetable that had been 
suggested by its most supportive European partners and, crucial for the Kosovars, 
by Washington. The following day, the US recognized Kosovo as an independent 
state while instead, on the other side of the Atlantic, no common EU position 
could be reached on the matter. The EU General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) was concluded with the announcement that ‘Member States 
will decide, in accordance with national practice and international law, on their 
relations with Kosovo’ (European Council 2008a). On the ground, there were 
security incidents involving Kosovar Serbs in Mitrovica and in the city outskirts, 
which induced KFOR to temporarily close off all communication roads with 
Serbia. With the full backing of Russia, Serbia urged the UNSC to reject the fait 
accompli as an unacceptable attempt of illegal secession. At the same time, the 
Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica recalled one by one the Serbian ambassadors 
from those countries that recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state and had opened 
diplomatic relations with the government in Pristina. 
The situation was promptly exploited by nationalist elites in other 
agitated provinces of the region. Amongst the various reactions from other areas 
experiencing sovereignty struggles, that from neighboring BiH was again the most 
worrisome for the international community. Following the announcement by 
Pristina, the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik announced that the Serb entity of 
BiH had entered into a ‘state of democratic rebellion’ (Media Intelligence Agency 
2008). This statement was followed by a resolution adopted by the RS National 
Assembly reiterating the admissibility of a referendum for separation of the Serb 
Entity from the rest of BiH. 
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3.2. One, two or three BiH? 
The DPA, which was agreed at a US military air force base in Ohio and signed in 
Paris at the end of 1995, has simply ‘taped together’ the pieces of BiH that 
emerged from the civil war. However, the political entities that make up this 
multiethnic experiment have been left separated by an IEBL and by a series of 
institutional asymmetries that make the work of the central government extremely 
difficult. The asymmetries are particularly striking if one compares, for instance, 
the relatively simple structure of RS with the complex institutional castle that has 
been installed in the FBiH. Ironically, the same international elites that have 
drafted the DPA and then worked on its implementation have become the most 
vocal critics of the current structure. For instance, speaking at the UN in Geneva 
and advocating for the EU’s member-statebuilding in BiH, the then EU 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn commented on the excessive complexity 
and fiscal unsustainability of Dayton BiH asking ‘with only a small dose of 
sarcasm ... how anyone can call a country ungovernable if it has as many as 13 
governments for just over four million people? Which other country of the size of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has over 700 members of several parliaments, over 180 
Ministers, 13 Prime Ministers and three Presidents?’ (Rehn 2005). 
Building on Barry Buzan’s four ideal models of possible nation-state 
architecture, it can be argued that the Dayton experiment perfectly reflected the 
ambition of modeling a multination-state with a federative structural design. 
Distinct from a state with a federal political organization, federative refers to 
 
States which contain two or more nations without trying to impose 
an artificial state-nation over them. Separate nations are allowed, 
even encouraged to pursue their own identities, and attempts are 
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made to structure that state in such a way that no one nationality 
comes to dominate the whole state structure (Buzan 1991: 76). 
 
In addition to this structural weakness, two other problems have 
negatively influenced the initiatives for the stabilization of a multiethnic polity 
that followed the DPA. On the one hand, the Bosnian political context remained 
dominated for too long by the old nationalist factions. While these were partially 
defeated in the 2006 general elections, the supposed moderate parties that 
emerged have continued to feed their constituency with ethno-nationalist rhetoric. 
Added to this, state-weakening parallel structures (and illegal economic practices) 
appear to have resisted the numerous counter initiatives undertaken by 
governmental and non-governmental international actors. Corruption and 
organized crime thus remain a major obstacle on Bosnia’s path towards full 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (Petritsch 2008). 
In BiH, central authorities are weak and hindered by both the de facto 
ethnical partition of the state and the de jure repartition of responsibilities between 
Sarajevo, the entities, and the myriad peripheral centers of governance within the 
entities.25 In common with other countries of the Western Balkans, external 
statebuilding in BiH has produced a complex situation: ‘elites and constituencies 
throughout the region increasingly share a European orientation, but indigenous 
political and structural constraints tend to run counter to European priorities and 
conditionalities’ (van Meurs 2004: 5). Therefore, while the EU works on 
institutional stabilization and privileges a technical approach to its member-
statebuilding, underlying fractures remain dangerously ignored.  
The principal draw back of this approach is that it leads to a dangerous 
marginalization of reconciliation. For a long time in the post-Dayton stabilization 
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process international statebuilders overlooked evidence that ‘the fear of becoming 
a minority in someone else’s nation-state was exactly what was (and still is) 
motivating each community fight, from Croatia to Macedonia’ (Woodward 1997: 
63). Only recently, the ‘minority complex’ has started to be taken into 
consideration by the international community. Addressing the OSCE Permanent 
Council in Vienna on June 2008, HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčàk openly talked about 
the persistence of ‘competitive nationalist agendas’, and made the following 
points: 
 
The fundamental problem is that each of the country’s constituent 
peoples still has widely different visions of the country’s history, 
current status and future constitutional structure … To a large 
extent, the problems of BiH stem from an exceptionally developed 
and persistent sense of communal insecurity. This is the twin 
legacy of the war and the old the Yugoslav system, in which each 
people had its “own” republic or autonomous province – except, of 
course, the citizens of multiethnic BiH. Now, in an independent 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, everybody seems to want a unit, if not a 
state, of their own. Nobody wants to be a minority. As a result, 
significant numbers of citizens still tolerate – rather than embrace – 
the idea and fact of BiH statehood (OHR 2008b: emphasis added). 
 
 
3.3. Reconciled people in a stable state: complexity in the 
Bosnian statebuilding project 
The international statebuilding effort, which has now become the EU-led member-
statebuilding effort for BiH seems to respect the traditional view of both 
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sovereignty and power. The Bosnian stabilization process is pursued by 
contrasting the dispersions of sovereignty originated by the DPA. The problem 
with this approach is that it tries to build a state in a top-down manner, while the 
grass-root work is left to NGOs and only sometimes, in the best case scenario, to 
the limited resources made available through the OSCE channel. To overlook the 
tensions that characterize a complex society like post-Dayton BiH can be critical. 
Especially because, as stressed by Sumantra Bose (2002: 3, 10), ‘Bosnia is not just 
a society divided but a society polarized on the most basic of issues – the question 
of legitimacy of the state, its common institutions and its borders … understanding 
Bosnia necessarily involves an appreciation of complexity’. Critics of the 
strategies for BiH that are agreed in Brussels, argue that being ‘informed by a 
vision of technocratic efficiency [the EU approach] is not directly aiming at 
bridging the gap between citizens and institution’ (Bechev 2005: 3). 
The debate over the appropriate degree of international intrusiveness in 
post-conflict reconstruction projects dominated peacebuilding studies for several 
years after the end of the Cold War. Assessing the Bosnian statebuilding project 
from its very initial phases, Roberto Belloni (2007) has attempted to move beyond 
this debate. Making a series of interesting observations, he successfully 
overcomes a long-standing dispute among three groups of scholars. In his volume 
on State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia, Belloni unhinges the 
confrontation between historical determinists (those who argue that only the 
creation of ethnically homogenous states is sustainable in the long run), 
interventionists (those who advocate invasive and protracted international 
intervention) and autonomists (those who adopt radical standpoints against 
international intervention but without offering alternative forms of regulation). 
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Building on an analysis of societal, institutional, political, and strategic 
factors, Belloni proposes a simple but convincing methodology. In his opinion, the 
literature on peace- and statebuilding should be less centered on what degree of 
intervention and intrusiveness is ‘desirable’ in post-conflict stabilization projects. 
This ‘quantitative’ focal point should be abandoned, in favor of an approach 
which asks what type of interaction need to be established between peacekeepers 
and statebuilders on the one hand, and local actors on the other. Marginalizing the 
‘how much intervention’ question, the key problems that experts on BiH should 
address becomes more qualitative and policy-oriented: ‘why intervention has been 
somewhat disappointing and how it could be restructured to meet the expectations 
and needs of other similar cases of multilateral intervention in weak and failing 
states’ (Belloni 2007: 5). In line with this methodological suggestion, the 
following two empirical chapters analyze the developments in the overall 
constitutional reform process and the reorganization of the Bosnian police with a 
view to assessing the quality of EU-driven statebuilding.  
Fifteen years of international presence in BiH suggests that foreign 
statebuilders should approach their mission with better articulated bottom-up 
strategies and enhanced coordination between different agencies, thus minimizing 
the risk of creating phantom states that are not self-sustaining and need to be 
babied for decades with continuous injections of external financial aid. 
Specifically, Belloni argues in favor of policies oriented towards grass-root 
reconciliation, and criticizes international agencies for their prolonged tendency to 
‘consider Bosnia as a blank slate’ (2007: 97).  
To be sure, such a criticism is not new in the academic literature or in 
policy analysis. However, Belloni moves beyond previous contributions by 
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extending his investigation to the reconstruction of the, so to speak, ‘psychology’ 
of international statebuilding institutions. He successfully demonstrates that 
international agencies have not been able to facilitate the emergence of a truly 
stable BiH since they have failed to focus on a specific operational direction. An 
analysis of the different priorities and operational difficulties faced by main 
international actors in BiH (namely, the US and the EU) will confirm this 
assessment. 
The empirical findings of this thesis confirm that, not only has the modus 
operandi of the international community in BiH lacked coordination; more 
critically, international and EU efforts have not been backed up by a clear and 
definitive acceptance of an institutionalized separation of the three ethno-religious 
factions formerly at war, nor by a resolute promotion of pluralism, multi-ethnicity, 
and affective (but costly) strategies for reconciliation. External actors have failed 
to find an appropriate solution to the statebuilding operational dilemmas. Even the 
launch of EU member-statebuilding has not helped a substantial switch of modus 
operandi. The vertical dilemma has been for the most part resolved by privileging 
a top-down policy orientation, in other words, by focusing attention and resources 
on the interactions with the local elites. As a result, statebuilders have regularly 
been dragged into the blame games of domestic political confrontation, for which 
they were not always prepared. Similarly, there has been a lack of rationalization 
of financial and human resources for different stabilization efforts. The character 
and quality of external intervention – which have metaphorically been 
encapsulated in the idea of the horizontal statebuilding dilemma – have been 
predominantly technocratic.  
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International agencies can therefore be criticized for having a ‘bias 
towards maintaining the status quo’ and for procrastinating over a definitive 
solution to the Bosnian ‘stateness problem’ (Belloni 2007: 173, 17-19). This 
mental predisposition has induced internationals to overlook the need for 
structured, coherent, and stabilizing changes. As will be shown, this predisposition 
has not changed since the EU integration became the primary focus of all 
international efforts in BiH. One of the most particular features of the EU’s 
member-statebuilding in BiH has been a tendency to procrastinate on finding a 
solution to the internal sovereignty struggle, in the conviction that once integrated 
into the larger European family, this struggle would be diluted and subsequently 
resolved by systematic interaction in the post-nation state union. It is possible that 
one day we will witness the success of this strategy. However, the continued 
ethnic confrontation in the country indicates that the risks of separation are still 
very real (Parish 2009) and all the financial, political, and diplomatic efforts to 
preserve a unified multiethnic BiH may come to nothing after fifteen years. 
Partially in line with what has been suggested by Stephen Krasner 
(2004), Belloni also advocates for the formalization of shared-sovereignty 
institutions from the initial stages of statebuilding projects. These arrangements 
represent fair and more transparent alternatives to both massive and intrusive 
international missions on the one hand, and ‘naive calls for domestic autonomy’ 
on the other (Belloni 2007: 6). The experience in BiH has shown that while 
international post-conflict initiatives are systematically accompanied by 
proclamations on ownership, capacity-building, and domestic autonomy, they 
clearly maintain neo-colonial attitudes and end up compromising self-governance 
and democracy.  
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Arguing in favor of transparent and well-structured shared-institutional 
arrangements, it is possible to lift up that cloak of naivety that has often 
characterized the literature on post-conflict intervention and the role of 
multilateral institutions in crisis areas. Moreover, this policy prescription is also 
relevant to addressing another crucial aspect of intervention today. While the 
prolonged interference and external regulation of post-conflict societies is justified 
by making reference to the idea that sovereignty is an internationally-shared 
responsibility, international missions tend to encounter difficulties in dealing with 
all the implications of such reinterpretation of sovereignty once they are actually 
on the ground.  
While calling for a better definition of roles and mission objectives and 
for the formal appointment of international experts in domestic institutions of the 
recipient state, Belloni does not overlook the inevitable dichotomy between the 
objective needs of the domestic environment and the institutional interests of both 
multilateral organizations and their most important sponsoring states. As he points 
out, regardless of the type of mission they undertake or the extent to which their 
personnel can be integrated into local institutions, international agencies remain 
‘organisations with their own institutional interests, priorities and objectives 
resulting from the self-interest of their member states. Because self-interest is not 
necessarily in tune with the needs of a country recovering from war, the overall 
coherence and effectiveness of international intervention will always be difficult 
to ensure’ (Belloni 2007: 175-76).  
An analysis of the two main reform processes underway in BiH at 
present supports this assessment. However, the tension created by conflicting 
national interests and their impact on multilateral policy-making is not new. Even 
 108 
 
practitioners have openly recognized the limitations of multilateralism. For 
instance, examining the performance of the OSCE in BiH, Robert Barry (2002: 
11), an American diplomat with a consolidated experience in multilateral settings, 
has pointed out that ‘the Bosnia mission evolved into a truly multinational mix 
reflecting the interest of OSCE member governments that paid the basic salaries 
of seconded mission members’. 
Apart from resulting in organizational ambiguities that stem from the 
conflicting interests of member states, international multilateral institutions are 
often characterized by policies and, in the most extreme cases, even by an open 
competition to legitimize their primacy one over the other. For example, when the 
post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans was launched, a joke spread 
among Western diplomats. Commenting on the way in which the numerous 
international agencies and organizations were trying to carve out a proper space in 
the region, practitioners observed that the various missions ideally designed to 
produce a system of ‘inter-locking’ actors were too often working as ‘inter-
blocking’ institutions. An example is the reaction to the UN announcement that it 
was about to pull out the police training mission in BiH. The EU and the OSCE 
competed to take over the UN mission. Ultimately, Brussels prevailed over the 
Vienna-based pan-European organization, despite the fact that back then the latter 
had a more consolidated experience in this specific field and already established 
strategic Police-Matter Unit coordinating similar exercises from Vienna.  
Notwithstanding this often negative aspect of international missions, the 
EU retains the specific potentials to exert a stabilizing influence: “[t]he long term 
policy of the Europeanisation of Bosnia and the surrounding region is an 
important step forwards from short-term, ad hoc conflict management strategies’ 
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(Belloni 2007: 174). The long term perspective provided by the prospect of EU 
membership undoubtedly represents a positive qualitative difference from the 
predominantly short- and medium-term objectives that normally drive institution-
building initiatives in crisis areas and post-conflict scenarios. 
 
 
4. Beyond the sovereignty paradox: EU member-
statebuilding in BiH 
Looking at the websites of the EUSR or of the Delegation of the European 
Commission in BiH, one is struck by the series of animated images and banners 
that have been developed to symbolize ‘the EU commitment to BiH’. One 
particular features stands out that each time that the webpage is reloaded, the stars 
of the Bosnian flag start to spin in a circle, until they inscribe a drawing of the 
Bosnian state boundaries into a crown of twelve stars on a blue background, 
which evidently recalls the flag of the EU. This rather particular ‘e-marketing’ of 
the EU prospect of membership arrives in one of the most delicate moments of 
post-Dayton BiH. Spinning stars apart, this section highlights the main strategic 
peculiarities of the EU’s member statebuilding in BiH, thus paving the way for the 
empirical analysis that will be developed in Chapters III  and V, where it will be 
shown that, despite its more sophisticated mindset and self-serving goal, in 
common with UN statebuilding missions, the EU also tends to technify the 
relationship with the target state and dangerously marginalize politics and 
reconciliation in its strategic policy-making. 
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4.1. Peculiarities of EU-driven statebuilding   
International multilateral organizations working on statebuilding projects generate 
a paradox of sovereignty: the outside-in promotion of good domestic governance 
in failed or failing states takes place while sovereignty is subject to constraints. As 
Christophe Solioz has stressed (2007: 87), it is rather peculiar that ‘outside 
intervention, which has as its declared objective the establishment of an 
autonomous state, is also simultaneously the origin of reforms, with the negative 
consequence of marginalising the sovereignty of the state and the responsibility of 
the politicians of the designated state’.  
Often, international missions enjoy the right to adopt legislative acts, or 
they are granted corrective powers. Sometimes, even when these prerogatives 
have been officially dismissed and the administrative and legislative functions 
have been formally delegated to autochthon elites and institutions, international 
offices continue to condition heavily the actions of local governments, even if in 
indirectly. However, such constraints on self-governance and the temporary 
absence of local ownership in domestic reform process are justifiable. As 
Dominik Zaum (2007: 27) points out, ‘international administrations compromise a 
fundamental aspect of a political community’s sovereignty by violating its right to 
self-governance, but do so with the aim of making it sovereign with regards to the 
relations between state and society’.  
Criticizing the prolonged intrusiveness of the international community in 
BiH, David Chandler (2006: 45) has depicted post-Dayton BiH as a mere 
projection of an international agenda rather than ‘a collective political expression 
of Bosnian interests – expressing self-government and autonomy’. When the 
highly-intrusive statebuilding project was initially launched, the foreign actors 
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involved in the early reconstruction of post-war BiH compromised crucial aspects 
of what Stephen Krasner (2004: 87) refers to as ‘Westphalian/Vattelian’ 
sovereignty with a view to fostering a reorganization of sovereign powers among 
the domestic political authorities. This reorganization aimed to establish 
functional interactions between multi-ethnic institutions, in full accordance with 
the consociational institutional design and procedures established by the DPA. 
Until the prospect of EU membership was extended to BiH, the OHR 
represented the leading civilian agency of an ‘ordinary’ sovereignty-paradox type 
administration, which was reinforced with the adoption of the Bonn Powers in 
1997. However, a further paradox has resulted from having a post-nation state 
organization, the EU, hold the reins of the Bosnian multiethnic experiment. 
Paraphrasing Zaum, it is possible to state that, through the enlargement project, 
the EU has its own way of enabling weak or unstable states in its neighbourhood 
to regain sovereignty in their relations with their respective domestic societies. 
Amongst the countries of the Western Balkans, it is in BiH that the peculiarities 
of the EU’s member-statebuilding are most evident. While Brussels helps the re-
organization of the state by containing the dispersions and the asymmetries of 
sovereignty produced by the DPA and its implementation, it prepares the state to 
give up certain sovereign prerogatives when the appropriate time to join the 
Union arrives.  
The interferences inherent in EU-driven statebuilding cannot be justified 
simply with the goal of rehabilitating the Bosnian authorities to the full and 
legitimate exercise of their empirical statehood. As the findings in the following 
chapters confirm, these interferences can be traced back to the latent conviction 
that the various internal fractures and wounds of BiH will be healed only when 
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Bosnian sovereignty is diluted in the greater EU institutional arrangement. For 
this reason, it can be argued that the ‘ethics’ underpinning the EU’s member-
statebuilding is different from the one identified by the sovereignty paradox 
literature for ‘ordinary’ statebuilding projects. 
Opening a window on policy analysis, it can be stressed that strategic 
policy-making in Brussels is strongly influenced by the objective of integration 
and the ideals related to it. In other words, the idea that Europe is indeed a 
reconciliation process in itself – which is not contested here – induces EU policy-
makers to focus on the aim of integration and marginalize the means, which have 
not been properly adapted to the various different realities that the EU 
enlargement project encounters. A message that has characterized the evolution of 
European integration process since the very beginning is that the supranational 
construction that gravitates around the Brussels-based institutions ultimately 
represents an innovative way of relating the citizenry with the institutions 
governing the res publica.  
The European project was designed since its inception as an evolving 
architecture that should be adjusted to transcend national ‘particularisms’ and 
other sources of unconstructive confrontation among people. Commenting on the 
dichotomy between nation states and supranational institutions in the aftermath of 
the entry into force of the treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, one of the founding fathers of the European Communities 
commented that ‘Europe will exist, but nothing will be lost of all that gave glory 
and happiness to every nation. It is indeed in a wider society, in a more powerful 
harmony, that the human being can affirm himself and determine the extent of his 
intellect’ (De Gasperi 1953: my translation). 
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Needless to say, at the beginning of the European project, in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, integration was evolved through symmetric concessions by the 
states involved, which were all consolidated sovereign units and equal partners. 
The original supranational ambition stemmed from a negotiation process between 
nation states that symmetrically converged towards a set of common goals. The 
initial European construction came into being via a series of symmetric and 
converging moves. The picture today is different. The set of core institutions 
representing the Union have been consolidated and Brussels projects its influence 
and operational capabilities abroad through via both political decisions of the 
European Council and the technical assistance and capacity-building initiatives of 
the Commission directly in the target states in-the-making. 
This exercise is more intense in countries that have been offered the 
concrete prospect of membership, which at the moment are all the Western 
Balkans countries and Turkey. However, similar influence and efforts are carried 
out in those countries that come under the umbrella of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was formally established in 2004 (European 
Commission 2004a). This initiative involves all the countries on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean basin, the Caucasus region, as well as Belarus, 
Moldova, and Ukraine.26 The initiatives and, more generally, the degree of 
interference of the EU in these countries differ from case to case, and its intensity 
tends to vary depending on the degree of governing capacities of the domestic 
authorities.  
Going back to the enlargement process, it can be argued that Brussels 
presents itself as a very peculiar state-builder. In the parallel implementation of its 
statebuilding and enlargement agenda, the EU imitates a neo-medieval empire 
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training peripheral units towards full membership, since it considers inclusion and 
participation in its formal and informal networks as definitive indicators of 
rehabilitation. Among those who support this neo-medievalist understanding of 
the EU, Jan Zielonka (2006: 170, 43) defines the Union as ‘a civilian power 
enlarging its territory by consent and diplomatic bargaining’, which however – no 
different to past empires – is ‘more preoccupied with maintaining its internal 
cohesion than in solving external problems on the ground’. 
A further consideration completes the picture. The peculiarities of the EU-
driven statebuilding are neither just theoretical, nor are they confined to the 
sphere of normative principles and policy-makers strategic intensions. The 
‘paradox within the paradox’ cannot be explained simply by trying to reconstruct 
how Brussels envisages stability for the Bosnian state. EU-driven statebuilding 
differs profoundly also in the methodology and the choices made for field 
initiatives if compared with ‘ordinary’ UN-led operations of the same type. A 
practitioner serving in Sarajevo and previously involved in the work of the ICISS, 
has summarized this idea as follows: 
 
If the operations currently in place in BiH were still of an 
internationally-driven statebuilding the trajectory of sovereignty 
would look very differently. International statebuilding means: we 
put in place institutions; we stimulate a shift of the political culture 
in order to go beyond the rhetoric of wartimes – which unfortunately 
is still far than accomplished in today’s BiH; we implement 
structured confidence-building measures at all levels. This should 
help to re-establish a sovereign society and state. Only then, at an 
appropriate point, when reconciliation is achieved at all levels, this 
society can autonomously start to debate on what strategic and 
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political decisions/directions should be taken, both domestically and 
internationally.27 
 
Brussels has offered BiH (and the rest of the Western Balkans) a political 
model that is notably different from that thus far experienced in the region. 
Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans was 
characterized by two ideas that were inevitably sources of political tension. The 
first is that boundaries matter; the second is that ethnicity also matters. These two 
predominant perceptions of politics are interconnected. The history of the region 
over the past century demonstrates that ethno-religious majorities constantly try to 
consolidate their preeminence, while minorities try to counter by endeavoring to 
push borders to that point where they become a majority. The war in BiH was the 
most tragic consequence in the last two decades of these two dynamics. The 
recent experience of Kosovo is also emblematic, not only for the path that led 
Pristina to full independence from Belgrade, but also for the subsequent attempts 
by the Serb population living north of the Ibar river to return to Serbia and avoid 
‘the minority complex’.  
In contrast, the European integration model is based on three ideal 
political principles that are in complete opposition with the feelings, dynamics, 
and history of the former Yugoslavia. The project pursued by the EU through its 
efforts at supranational integration is instead grounded in reconciliation, dilution 
of boundaries of any kind, and the persistent promotion of a spirit of compromise. 
This last aspect actually permeates the EU’s institutional life at all levels and in 
all contexts, whether technical or political. To better understand how these three 
principles are implemented by the EU, reference can be made to several strategic 
processes and initiatives elaborated by Brussels for its near abroad. In the specific 
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case of BiH, one interesting example is the attempt to consolidate economic 
regions that transcend ethnic boundaries within the state. 
The EU funded a project called European Regional Economic 
Development in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EURED), which contributed to the 
creation of five economic regions cutting across the IEBL and all other internal 
administrative boundaries above the municipal level. A first trance of financial aid 
for the establishment of these five spaces of economic integration was provided 
via the EURED I framework, which was launched in April 2003 and was 
concluded in October 2005. A second financial package, labelled EURED II, was 
inaugurated in December 2005 and concluded in August 2007.  
The five economic regions promoted by the EU with this initiative are the 
following: the Northwest Economic Region (ARDA),28 the Northeast Economic 
Region (NERDA),29 the Herzegovina Economic Region (REDAH),30 the Central 
B&H Economic Region (REZ),31 and the Sarajevo Macro Region (SERDA).32 
Integration in each of these five geographic spaces is supervised by a Regional 
Development Agency (RDA). The five RDAs are responsible for the coordination 
and implementation of specific projects (for the most part financed through EU 
funding) and, more broadly, they are tasked with the promotion of regional 
development strategies. The main ‘partner’ for the five RDAs at central state level 
is the national Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA). 
The emphasis on the elimination of ethnic boundaries through economic 
integration appears to show the EU attempting to replicate at micro level, in BiH, 
the technical economic integration process experienced by EU member states in 
the early stages of their cooperation. Observers have confirmed that the 
reconfiguration of BiH beyond the two-entity model could indeed be based on the 
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project of transforming the five economic regions established through EURED 
into five multiethnic administrative shells that would replace the current middle 
level of governance and possibly also allow the elimination of the complex and 
financially unsustainable cantonal system of the FBiH (Metiljevic 2005). 
 
 
4.2. The EU prospect of membership as a benevolent imperial 
projection 
Thanks to the initial strength of the EU prospect of membership, BiH was 
launched on a peculiar rehabilitation track: some of the steps of the ‘ideal’ post-
conflict rehabilitation track as outlined in the previous quotation by an ICISS 
member were not achieved and, perhaps, not tackled with direct policies (Gori 
2007). Following the experiments of the past few years, two main questions need 
to be addressed. Firstly, can the EU prospect of membership, a merely indirect 
perspective, truly create incentives for fluid political cooperation amongst the 
elites representing the three ethno-religious factions previously at war? Secondly, 
does the EU perspective reflect strategic imperial designs or has it merely 
developed as a consequence of a ‘cold and distancing’ technocratism?  
Looking at Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia, and the degree of involvement of 
the EU in the stabilization processes of these complex realities, Sergio Romano 
(2003: 23), an Italian diplomat and historian, talked about the emergence of new 
‘European protectorates’. The word protectorate has a negative connotation; 
however, in contemporary international relations it can also take on other 
meanings. The term protectorate can be used to describe those contexts in which 
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international institutions (and/or coalitions of states working under an 
international mandate) take over responsibilities and financial burdens of unstable 
states, with the aim of containing potential security threats – regionally or even 
globally.  
This a positive understanding of the term protectorate can be applied to the 
current EU commitment to the troubled countries of the Western Balkans, even 
though some observers continue to criticize the EU for engaging in ‘a new 
colonialism’. For instance, when the handover from NATO to the EU in BiH took 
place, several critics questioned whether Operation Althea would substantially 
contribute to the improvement of security in BiH. By deploying a European force 
in BiH, skeptics in the international press claimed that the EU was trying to affirm 
itself as an exclusive regional player: the European troops (EUFOR) would have 
indeed ‘less to do with Bosnia’s needs than the EU’s ambitions as a military 
power’ (Wood 2004). 
 
4.2.1. Empire ‘through’ or ‘on’ states 
Can the label of imperialism, often attached to both statebuilding and the EU 
enlargement, be dismissed completely? The answer is at best uncertain. Some 
scholars claim that these two processes are easily distinguished from a supposed 
post-modern imperialism. While the rationale underpinning imperialist logic used 
to develop along pre-defined ideological tracks, statebuilding and European 
integration appears to be ‘organized along purely technocratic, administrative 
lines’ (Bickerton 2005a: 1). In contrast with this view, other scholars depict the 
EU precisely as a neo-medieval realm: Brussels as the capital of a benevolent 
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empire with fuzzy borders, exporting rules and procedures in its neighborhood 
(Zielonka 2006), establishing protectorates (e.g. BiH and Kosovo), and sometimes 
even pushing forms of constitutional reorganization that may suit European 
idealizations but that in the end may result in complex institutional ‘straitjackets’ 
(Malic 2007). 
In this regard, it might be interesting to replicate in the EU context, an 
exercise carried out on the US by Hendrik Spruyt (2008), who applied the 
definition of empire as ‘effective control, formal or informal, of a subordinated 
society by an imperial society’ – a definition provided by Michael Doyle (1996: 
30-47) – to the current network of overseas relations established by US 
diplomacy. Spruyt summarizes the main features of Doyle’s definition using four 
attributes. Center/periphery relations are imperial in nature when: they are based 
on systematic interactions; they are based on asymmetric power; they are directly 
correlated to the degree of cohesion in the centre; and they are sustained by the 
presence of groups at the centre that have a stake in the maintenance of the 
imperial projection towards the periphery. Further to these four aspects, Spruyt 
(2008: 293) complements the work of Doyle by adding two additional attributes. 
On the one hand, empires are characterized by heterogeneous relations between 
the center and the different units at the periphery. On the other hand, the 
establishment of unequal relations must be based on a qualitative justification of 
why the centre is superior to the periphery. 
Using this premise, Spruyt concludes that, while employing imperial 
practices worldwide, US foreign policy lacks the structural features that are 
typical of formal empires. Specifically, these features coincide with: 
institutionalization of hierarchical relations between the periphery and the center, 
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the perspective that opposite poles in the empire can develop their relations up to 
the point of becoming ‘an integrated whole’ (Spruyt 2008: 298). In other words, 
statebuilding projects promoted by US policy-makers represent attempts to 
consolidate sovereign units and increase global power through them rather than 
on them (Spruyt 2008: 291). 
This can be compared with the key characteristics of the EU imperial 
member-statebuilding activities. First of all, there is a quantitative difference 
between the ambitions pursued by the EU and those pursued by the US. While the 
latter seeks a network to further the consolidation of influence on a global scale, 
the former is still mainly focused on the completion of a regional project. If the 
enlargement process is a way to consolidate the borders of the empire, the ENP 
has resulted in policies and instruments through which Brussels tries to establish a 
security-belt right beyond its fuzzy boundaries. Secondly, the EU expansion 
project is qualitatively different because it is a way of consolidating control by 
containing sovereignty. The main logic of the EU member-statebuilding process 
is to exercise control from the center to the periphery through imposing 
limitations ‘on’ the sovereign state. Quite on the contrary, US statebuilding 
initiatives place the emphasis on restoration of sovereignty according to a 
classical understanding of the term, and demonstrate that Washington seeks to 
increase power through the establishment of stable friendly but independent 
governments. 
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4.2.2. The EU perspective: successes and failures 
Through the power of the prospect of membership, the imperial stabilizing 
influence of the EU in the Balkans continues to function. The prospect of 
membership has already revealed some of its stabilizing effects in Croatia, is at 
present being critically tested in BiH, and is expected to be the key element of the 
overall stabilization of the Western Balkan region. This indirect statebuilding tool 
can be situated mid-way between traditional externally-driven statebuilding and 
the formal procedures typical of the EU enlargement process based on the 
Copenhagen criteria. It is worth stressing that this concept is relatively new in the 
scholarly literature: it was practitioners who first coined and developed it.  
Amongst others, the former Head of the OSCE Mission in what was then 
Serbia and Montenegro provided a clear description of the Euro-Atlantic 
prospective shared among key Western Balkans states (Massari 2005). Giuliano 
Amato, head of the International Commission on the Balkans, has stressed that the 
idea of becoming an EU member state is a widespread aspiration throughout the 
Western Balkans, and that this ‘dream is by far [the] most powerful force driving 
positive change’ (Amato 2005). Amongst the first scholars to pioneer the study of 
the relatively uncharted area of the European prospect of membership and its 
indirect appeal, David Chandler has argued that this tool increased the regulatory 
power of the EU; however, he has remarked that this new mechanism of indirect 
stabilization cannot alone solve the delicate problem of accountability: 
 
The long process of negotiating European membership, through 
'Partnership' agreements and the Stability and Association process, is 
the form international statebuilding takes; this process distances the 
potential accession states at the same time as giving the EU greater 
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regulatory authority. The decision-making power lies with Brussels 
but the accountability rests with the governments of the Balkan 
states (Chandler 2005b: 5). 
 
Unfortunately, the issue of accountability is not the only problem 
associated with the process of harmonization between the Western Balkans and 
the EU. If we really want to evaluate the EU prospect of membership as a 
stabilization tool, the Bosnian test case is quite revealing. On the one hand, it 
cannot be denied that the prospect of European integration has so far successfully 
reined in the centripetal forces characterizing the Bosnian political environment 
and prevented them from producing critical institutional shocks. Bosnian political 
elites are divided on all of the most sensitive issues, but the European integration 
project is the one area on which they can all agree. A political advisor who served 
at office of the Bosnian Chief Negotiator for the EU SAA declared: 
 
Everybody in Bosnia considers the EU as ‘the’ anchor. Currently, 
the idea of working for the EU accession is the only issue on which 
all parties agree. Elites unanimously share the idea that our place is 
in the EU. Personally, I see Europeanization as a key component if 
not the sole engine of this complex statebuilding and normalization 
process.33 
 
On the other hand, Bosnian political life over the past three to four years 
has been characterized by a series of worrying signs, two of which are worth 
mentioning in some detail. Firstly, the political rhetoric – not only in the 
proximity of elections – sometimes resembles the type of confrontation that often 
precedes wars: the fear of reverting to the pre-war time atmosphere is recurrent 
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among average Bosnian citizens. Secondly, another source of preoccupation is 
that key parties have not agreed on a concrete plan for constitutional reform, nor 
have they pursued any constitutional consolidation of the changes that were put in 
place under the influence of the international community in the implementation 
process of the DPA.  
As Chapter III will show in more detail, this last point is particularly 
significant: the structural and institutional changes that have been put in place so 
far (mostly through the direct imposition or in some case through soft 
interferences of the OHR) have not being given any kind of constitutional 
formalization. This is a clear sign that the EU prospect of membership cannot 
substantially stimulate a domestic constitutional debate if it is not backed up by a 
constant and active mediation that aims to, so to speak, ‘round off the angles’ 
between the various extremist lines taken by the representatives of the three main 
ethno-religious groups.  
In the words of a scholar from the University of Sarajevo, ‘if the EU 
technocratic approach was the right way to produce positive change on the 
Bosnian political environment, then constitutional consolidation would have 
already taken place long time ago’.34 Perhaps this statement overlooks the fact 
that Bosnian politicians also have a degree of responsibility for this failure. 
However, it would also be an exaggeration to state that the EU has always acted 
as the ‘anchor for the process of inter-ethnic and inter-state reconciliation’, as 
Dimitar Bechev and Svetlozar Andreev (2005: 4) have claimed. As Chapter IV 
will demonstrate, the Bosnian police reform process represents a specific area 
where the EU has not been able to handle the frictions between its own 
technocratism and rigid schemes on the one hand, and political rhetoric and inter-
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ethnic confrontation on the ground on the other. As clarified on the OHR website 
when the process was officially launched: 
 
The European Union has made police restructuring one of the 
priority criteria for the start of negotiations on a BiH Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement … [T]his reform must: place exclusive 
competence for police legislation and budget at the State level; recast 
regional police areas on the basis of functional police criteria; and, 
help protect the police from improper political interference (OHR 
2005c). 
 
As will be demonstrated in detail later, apart from a few technical 
adjustments adopted by the Bosnian legislator, at present, there is still no 
agreement among the main Bosnian political parties on the core aspects of the 
reform package. It should be noted, however, that in 2006 an agreement was 
almost reached. The failure occurred when the Bosniak leader Haris Silajdžić and 
the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik transformed police restructuring into a 
battlefield for their personal sovereignty struggle. The EU did not contribute to an 
easing of confrontation. Brussels tried to obfuscate the more ideological purposes 
of the reform and instead pushed the idea that police restructuring was a necessary 
step in the adoption of European standards. Dodik strenuously defended the 
integrity of the RS Police as a sovereign prerogative of his Entity that could not 
be surrendered.   
It is worth noting that the fight for the integrity of the RS entity status was 
not a political battle pursued merely by Dodik – who in his capacity as RS 
premier has also repeatedly threatened to hold a referendum on secession. In 
Banja Luka, the RS has priority over BiH across the entire political spectrum. In 
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the political programs of many parties it is possible to find formulas like ‘the X 
party is committed to the integration of RS and BiH in the European Union’. 
Formulas that are very similar to this one are encompassed in the program and the 
rhetoric of the RS premier’s party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 
(SNSD), but are made explicit also by other political groups. For instance, the 
Party of Democratic Progress (PDP), founded by and still run under the guidance 
of Dragan Ivanić, has identified the motto ‘Europe, the house of the future’ as first 
pillar of its new political strategy. Commenting on this choice, a member of the 
party’s executive board admitted: ‘The first point of our new strategy makes 
explicit what is actually clear since 1999, which was the beginning of our activity. 
We defined ourselves as an EU-party, whose main objective is the integration of 
RS and BiH into European networks and the EU’.35 
Interestingly enough, in 2006 the RS president Milan Jelić used the 
celebrations for the statehood day as an opportunity to launch a polemic against 
the international community. Jelić argued that the ‘non-existent Bosnian statehood 
day’ represented a breach of the sovereignty of BiH, ‘a state of two equal and 
integral entities’ (Slobodanka 2006: emphasis added). Since this national 
recurrence has formally been introduced only one Entity (obviously the FBiH) 
celebrates it. The situation is particularly pronounced in Sarajevo, where every 
November 25 ministries and other institutions of the central government are only 
half empty. Bosnian-Serb civil servants refuse to take a day off from work, while 
all Bosniaks and most Croats celebrate the national day. The differences in 
approach to this celebration are evident also in the streets of Sarajevo. While 
nothing changes in the Serb Eastern part of town, almost every activity in the 
Bosniak-dominated historical centre of the city, Baščaršija, shuts down. 
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Interestingly, the city centre of Baščaršija is decorated with both the new and the 
old Bosnian state flags as well as, sporadically, with the symbols of the Bosniak-
dominated Armja that defended the city during the siege.36   
 
4.3. The OHR-EUSR transition: from the Venice Commission 
assessment to the ‘five-plus-two’ test (2005-2009) 
The plans for the closure of the OHR have for some time been on the agenda of 
the PIC. To some extent, the end of the OHR era and the creation of a reinforced 
EUSR Office represent a key turning point in the full installation of the EU-driven 
statebuilding in BiH. The issue erupted on the international agenda in March 
2005, following the release of a detailed report by the ‘European Commission for 
Democracy through Law’ – a working group established within the CoE 
framework and also known as the ‘Venice Commission’. Providing a detailed 
‘opinion on the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the powers 
of the High Representative’, the Venice Commission (2005: 20-25) examined the 
impact of the HR on both Bosnian political and institutional life. Evaluating the 
compatibility of this institution and its prerogatives with CoE standards in the 
field of democracy, the Venice Commission concluded its work with some 
detailed policy prescriptions that were submitted for the attention of the PIC.  
An examination of this document reveals a clear recommendation by the 
Venice Commission in favor of a substantial reorganization of the international 
community presence in BiH. In a straightforward assessment, the report advocates 
in particular for the elimination of the regime determined by the Bonn Powers, as 
well as for the subsequent transformation of the double-hatted HR/EUSR into a 
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less intrusive and impartial mediator, responsible only to European institutions, 
and therefore fully committed to promoting the consolidation of the European 
perspective of BiH. Moreover, the Venice Commission has argued in favor of a 
further rationalization of the same EU presence in BiH: with the political input 
from the EUSR offices and the technical activities of the Commission Delegation 
to be headed by the same person. The proposal elaborated by the five 
rapporteurs37 on the role of the EUSR proceeds as follows: 
 
While BiH may still need more guidance from the international 
community, this could be provided by more subtle means. At 
present, the High Representative is at the same time the EU Special 
Representative. If he were to retain only the role of EU Special 
Representative comparable to the practice in “the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia”, this would allow the transformation of the 
role of the High Representative from a decision-maker into that of a 
mediator. The interest of the people of BiH in European integration 
should ensure the effectiveness of this role (§100). 
 
It is interesting to note that the experts from the Venice Commission made 
specific reference to the experience of the EU’s representative to FYROM. The 
political envoy sent from Brussels to Skopje in October 2005 was also installed as 
Head of the Commission Delegation in FYROM. An argument in favor of this 
choice can be made. As recent history confirms, the process of European 
integration has mostly developed along the same lines: the efforts for the socio-
economic harmonization of the European space have been accompanied by 
attempts to generate political convergence, consolidate common values, and 
standardize good-governance practices. Hence, integration has taken place 
through supranational institutional developments, but also through a redefinition 
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of the institutional and legal structures inherent to the states that are taking part to 
the process. In view of this experience, it can be argued that the most substantial 
and tangible added value of EU-driven statebuilding has been precisely this 
unique link between political stabilization on the one hand, and promotion of 
welfare and multiplication of economic opportunities on the other. The experience 
in FYROM has shown that a EUSR that channels political inputs, while at the 
same time coordinating the technical efforts pursued by the Commission, can 
better manage the EU prospect of membership, intended in its broadest sense. 
Moving from policy analysis back to the specific critique launched in 2005 
by the Venice Commission on the prolonged presence of the HR in BiH, it should 
be noted that the argument for the elimination of the Bonn Powers was built on 
two sets of considerations, which converged towards one basic idea: the 
prerogatives that were granted by the PIC to the HR back in 1997 could then be 
justified by the existence of a state of emergency, ‘emergency powers have 
however to cease together with the emergency originally justifying their use’ 
(§86). The excessive activism of the HR was examined both as a source of 
legislation by decree and as an instrument of censorship in the political and 
administrative life of the country, in view of his authority to dismiss officials that, 
in his eyes, were guilty of creating obstacles to the peace implementation process. 
The extended use of the Bonn Powers beyond a clear state of emergency 
have been recognized as being in breach of the very principle of popular 
sovereignty, which ‘requires that legislation is adopted by a body elected by the 
people’ (§88). Apart from the domestic dimension of democratic responsibility of 
the government, the report has also highlighted the international aspects related to 
the participation by BiH in the human rights regime established by the CoE: ‘as a 
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member state … BiH is responsible for the commitments with respect to the 
Organisation and this responsibility has to be fulfilled by the country and not by 
the international community’ (§88).  
At the centre of this complex picture of responsibilities and democratic 
dynamics, the OHR has been depicted as an element of division, especially with 
regard to its legislative activism. As pointed out by the Venice Commission, 
politically, the chain of responsibility of the HR goes directly to the PIC and 
cannot in any way be referred to the Bosnian population, ‘although the personal 
commitment of the present High Representative and his predecessors to the well-
being of the people of BiH is beyond doubt’ (§89). The situation does not become 
more ‘democratic’ if analyzed in a purely juridical way. The Bosnian 
Constitutional Court ‘exercises judicial control of the constitutionality of the 
content of legislation enacted by the High Representative in the same way as for 
legislation adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH’ (§89). However, the 
existence of such control ex post does not counter balance the fact that the right to 
adopt binding decisions is purely at the discretion of the HR: the Bosnian 
Constitutional Court indeed ‘does not examine whether there was enough 
justification for the High Representative to enact the legislation instead of leaving 
it to the democratically elected organs of BiH’ (§89). 
The discretionary right to remove public officials (civil servants or 
democratically elected politicians that they might be) has also been strongly 
criticized by the Venice Commission. The report has looked at this praxis starting 
from a social consideration: ‘the termination of the employment of a public 
official is a serious interference with the rights of the person concerned’ (§94, 
emphasis added). Based on this evaluation, the Venice Commission has also 
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warned that, ‘in order to meet democratic standards, it should follow a fair 
hearing, be based on serious grounds with sufficient proof and the possibility of a 
legal appeal’ (§94).  
Needless to say, in examining the direct interference in the democratic 
relationship between the constituent people and governing elites, the actions 
initiated by the HR for the removal of elected representatives have been 
characterized by an additional element of concern if compared with cases where 
the career of unelected civil servants were at stake. In the cases involving 
politicians who have been democratically elected, it is not only the life of the 
removed officials (and maybe that of his family) that is directly affected by the 
decisions of the international envoy, ‘the rights of their voters are also concerned 
and particularly serious justification for such interference is required’ (§89). The 
report concludes with a broader negative assessment on the impact of the HR on 
the consolidation of the Bosnian state as a fully democratic system, which is 
worth reporting extensively: 
 
The High Representative is not an independent judge and he has no 
democratic legitimacy deriving from the people of BiH. He pursues a 
political agenda, agreed by the international community … As a 
matter of principle, it seems unacceptable that decisions directly 
affecting the rights of individuals taken by a political body are not 
subject to a fair hearing or at least the minimum of due process and 
scrutiny by an independent court (§96). [The Bonn Powers do] not 
correspond to democratic principles when exercised without due 
process and the possibility of judicial control. Its justification 
becomes more questionable over time (§100). 
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4.3.1. The call for ownership and the issue of the Bonn Powers heritage 
This strong and clearly articulated call for democracy launched by the Venice 
Commission served as a catalyst to rethink the structure of the international 
presence in BiH and promote a transfer of responsibilities from the OHR to 
domestic authorities. In the words of Olli Rehn, the presence of an institution 
equipped with the Bonn Powers represents a serious limitation on the country’s 
‘ownership for decision-making and reform’; therefore – continued the EU 
Enlargement Commissioner in his speech at the UN in Geneva – the ‘time has 
now come for Bosnia and Herzegovina to assume more responsibility for its own 
future’ (Rehn 2005).  
Published only a few months from the 2006 general elections, the call 
from the Venice Commission and the plea made by Olli Rehn were temporarily 
left in stand-by. However, important political signals were given by the PIC-SB. 
In June 2006 the PIC-SB Political Directors adopted a communiqué titled: 
‘Towards Ownership: From Peace Implementation to Euro-Atlantic Integration’, 
which clarified that the process for the closure of the OHR had to start 
immediately, in order to be completed within at most one year and therefore allow 
BiH ‘to take full responsibility for its own affairs’ (PIC-SB 2006c). Moreover, the 
PIC-SB Political Directors formally welcomed the commitment made by the EU 
to the establishment of a reinforced EUSR Office (PIC-SB 2006b), and they 
encouraged the politicians that were about to run at the general elections to 
engage, once elected, in constitutional reform as ‘a top priority in order to build a 
sustainable democracy and to make governmental and parliamentary institutions 
efficient and effective’ (PIC-SB 2006b). 
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Following the October 2006 general elections, witnessing the defeat of the 
old nationalist parties and the emergence of what back then appeared as relatively 
new and more moderate forces in the country, the main body supervising the 
implementation of the DPA in BiH began to consider more seriously the 
possibility of bringing to an end the experience of the OHR by June 2007 and the 
related abolition of the Bonn Powers. Already at the last meeting in 2006, only of 
a few weeks after the October general elections, the PIC-SB adopted with 
unanimous consensus a communiqué that represented an explicit exhortation to 
the recently elected government and Parliament: ‘Time to Meet the Ownership 
Challenge’ (PIC-SB 2006a). This document was the outcome of a two-day retreat 
of the PIC-SB Political Directors in Brussels, which was also attended by some 
representatives from the newly installed Bosnian Parliament and government, 
including the Prime Minister.  
The document put clear emphasis on the responsibilities of Bosnian elites 
for the realization of the Euroatlantic future of the country. The PIC-SB Political 
directors urged local elites ‘to live up to their responsibilities to the people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ... and to return to the reform agenda in line with the 
European Partnership priorities. In their actions and through their political 
activities, they must keep in mind the need to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a 
factor of stability in the region’ (PIC-SB 2006a). 
However, an interesting note of caution was introduced in the conclusions 
of the document. PIC-SB Political Directors welcomed ‘Spain’s willingness to 
take on the role of OHR’s successor in interest and invited Spain to join the PIC 
Steering Board as an observer’ (PIC-SB 2006a). This formula was overlooked by 
international observers and scholars, but it reveals that while preparing the way 
 133 
 
for the closure of the OHR, the international community was at the same time 
debating possible legal mechanisms to resume rapidly the Bonn Powers if 
required. What can be referred to as ‘the issue of the Bonn Powers heritage’,38 is 
confirmation that, probably from within the same OHR, international legal experts 
identified Spain as a reasonable candidate to take on responsibility for the Bonn 
Powers using a legal fiction. The government in Madrid could indeed have the 
right to assume at any time the exercise of those powers in the event of new 
emergencies arising after the formal closure of the OHR.  
The interpretation of this signal as a cautelative legal measure was 
confirmed by the lack of concrete progress in the OHR-EUSR transition. Despite 
a general consensus in the PIC-SB on the need to implement substantial changes 
to the international presence in BiH, the closure of the OHR and the installation of 
a reinforced EUSR (not equipped with any kind of authority that could resemble 
the Bonn Powers) remained practically frozen for over a year. The reluctance of 
some members of the PIC-SB (in particular the US and the UK) to push for more 
concrete moves in this direction stemmed from the political crisis determined by 
the difficult EU-sponsored police reform process and the related delay in the 
finalization of the SAA between BiH and the EU, which eventually carried in 
December 2007. 
 
4.3.2. The ‘5+2’ test 
At the first meeting of the PIC-SB after the initialing of the SAA, five objectives 
and two conditions were identified as a final mandatory test for Bosnian political 
elites prior to giving the green light for the OHR closure. At the end of a two-day 
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meeting in Brussels, the PIC-SB Political Directors carefully remarked that local 
‘politicians must end the practice of threatening unilateral changes to the 
constitutional structure of the country’ (PIC-SB 2008). Moreover, the following 
objectives were listed: acceptable and sustainable resolution of the issue of 
apportionment of property between state and other levels of government; 
acceptable and sustainable resolution of defense property issues; completion of 
the Brčko Final Award; fiscal sustainability (promoted through an Agreement on 
a Permanent ITA co-efficient methodology and establishment of a National Fiscal 
Council); entrenchment of the rule of law (demonstrated through adoption of 
National War Crimes Strategy, passage of Law on Aliens and Asylum, and 
adoption of National Justice Sector Reform Strategy). This list of five objectives 
was complemented with two further conditions: the signing of the SAA and a 
positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC-SB based on full 
compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (PIC-SB 2008). As has been also 
stressed by international policy analysts (ICG 2009b: 16), this last political 
condition undoubtedly represented a sort of safety clause, which has enabled the 
PIC-SB to exercise a degree of flexibility prior to formalizing the OHR closure on 
the basis of purely technical developments.  
In their joint report on the status and perspectives of the international 
presence in BiH – which was circulated amongst relevant governmental and non-
governmental actors on 31 October 2008 with the title ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
the International Mission at a Turning Point’ – Javier Solana and Olli Rehn 
provided a convincing argument for the need to reach agreement on the closure of 
the OHR by the end of 2009. According to the assessment of the High 
representative for CFSP and the EU Enlargement Commissioner, ‘if the OHR is 
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still around in 2010, then the High Representative, his role, and that of the IC 
presence could once again become central campaign themes in the 2010 general 
elections’ (as quoted in ICG 2009b: 15). 
At the moment of writing, however, the transition from the OHR to a 
reinforced EUSR Office has not definitely started. Therefore, it is highly probable 
that the prophecy made by Javier Solana and Olli Rehn will actually be fulfilled. 
As general elections are now only a few months away, it seems unlikely that the 
PIC will be able to reach a consensus and finally launch the transition process. 
The impasse is also connected to the difficulties in planning for a reinforced 
EUSR presence. The EU Council is exploring possible ways to associate three 
non-European countries – the US, Russia, and Turkey – with the EUSR Offices. If 
the presence of the latter has received an obvious veto by Greece and Cyprus, also 
the possible presence of the US has resulted in a lively debate in Brussels.  
In concluding this section, it is worth referring to a recent analysis made 
by Florian Bieber (2009), who attentively emphasized both the weaknesses of the 
EU strategies for BiH and labeled as completely ‘out of date’ the presence and 
role of the OHR: 
 
International, and first and foremost EU, policy in Bosnia has been 
inconsistent and counterproductive. The High Representative, OHR, 
as an institution has outlived its usefulness. However, instead of 
leaving the scene with a bang, the OHR has been reduced to a 
whimper. Marginalized, excluded from key decisions, without the 
backing of key states in the Peace Implementation Council and at 
times the EU, the institution has been allowed to become an 
institution with great powers, high expectations and little ability to 
make use of them. 
 136 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
BiH is s complex multiethnic polity where socio-political reconciliation is still 
lacking and the three main ethno-religious constituent people are still fed a 
nationalist and inflammatory rhetoric. The following two chapters will explain 
extensively the EU approach to the reorganization of the Bosnian state and the 
normative principles informing such a complex undertaking. There inevitably be 
criticism of certain attitudes and strategic choices made by the EU for the 
stabilization of its most delicate potential candidate member. However, the aim of 
this thesis is neither to produce a sterile critique of the EU’s approach to the 
Bosnian stabilization process, nor to indirectly imply that the strategies developed 
in Brussels and tested in BiH, in the very long run, are destined to result in 
inevitable failure.  
As has been shown, this thesis sheds light on two grounds of analysis. On 
the one hand, it examines the normative understanding of sovereignty and post-
conflict stabilization underpinning EU policies; on the other hand, it reconstructs 
the actual modus operandi of the EU and how European policy-makers interact 
with local elites. The point of contact between these two spheres of inquiry is the 
issue of responsibility. The following two empirical chapters will thus serve two 
purposes: firstly, to measure the distance between the ideal of sharing 
responsibilities and the systematic disregard in the actual practice of multilateral 
cooperation on a statebuilding project; secondly, to understand why, at the 
moment of writing, the Bosnian statebuilding process seems to be at a standstill. 
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To be precise, there is substantial evidence that most of the conditions exist to 
declare BiH a striking case of ‘failed international statebuilding’.  
Based on the analysis of the Bosnian context presented above, the 
following pages approach symmetrical aspects of what can be metaphorically 
referred to as the ‘responsibility coin’ of post-conflict reconstruction. Chapter III 
highlights the main characteristics of what will be symbolically referred to as the 
EU’s ‘hands-up’ approach to political reconciliation and constitution-making in 
BiH. Analyzing the problems related to a structured reorganization of the Bosnian 
constitutional architecture, and the particular reluctance of the EU to invest in 
such a delicate project, reveals the predominance in Brussels of a risk-avoidance 
mentality. Interviews with international personnel in both Brussels and Sarajevo 
and an analysis of official documents demonstrate the general tendency of EU 
policy-makers to technify the relationship with the target state – exercising what 
resembles a neo-medieval imperial projection – while they encourage it on the 
path to Euro-Atlantic integration.  
The EU’s reluctance to launch a proper debate on constitutional reform 
and implement policies aimed specifically targeted at resolving the domestic 
multilevel sovereignty struggle confirms that Brussels is still conditioned by the 
residual statebuilding influence exercised by Washington. An analysis of the timid 
approach to constitutional change, however, demonstrates only one aspect of the 
‘troubled’ relationship that Brussels has developed vis-à-vis its responsibilities in 
the neighboring Western Balkans region and, in particular, in BiH. The other side 
of the ‘responsibility coin’ will be investigated in Chapter V, by examining the 
genesis and developments of police reform in BiH.  
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For four years (2004-2008) the challenge of reorganizing the Bosnian 
police was ‘the’ EU’s top priority. The way in which this reform was launched, 
sustained, and transformed into the key condition for the signing of the SAA with 
BiH, but then subsequently dropped from the negotiation table reflects a tendency, 
typical of multilateral institutions operating in crisis areas, to create a fictional ‘no 
mistake policy’. This expression is typically employed by practitioners when 
referring to their systematic denial of objective miscalculations, mistaken politico-
diplomatic and reform strategies.  
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(Chapter III) 
 
The Buck Stops Where? Responsibilities in the 
Bosnian Constitutional Reform Process 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
More than six years have passed since the (then 15) EU member states gathered in 
Thessaloniki with the countries of SEE and agreed that ‘the future of the Balkans 
is within the EU’ (European Council 2003). Since then, BiH has had four 
different HR/EUSRs (the British Paddy Ashdown, the German Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling, the Slovak Miroslav Lajčàk, and the Austrian Valentin Inzko, 
who is currently in office) held a general election, signed the SAA with the EU 
following a year of serious political crisis, experienced renewed ethnic tensions, 
and faced critical uncertainties. 
The SAA was signed in June 2008. By agreeing to proceed with the 
signature, Brussels rewarded the elites representing the three ethno-religious 
factions formerly at war for their adoption of two technical laws that were 
expected to form the basis of a more comprehensive police reform. The 
reorganization of the Bosnian police structure was introduced as part of the pre-
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SAA EU conditionality package when Paddy Ashdown became double-hatted 
HR/EUSR and, over four years, was assigned ‘absolute priority’ status by EU 
policy-makers. In addition to the reform of the police structures, the EU’s pre-
SAA conditionality package required the Bosnian authorities to strengthen ICTY 
co-operation, reform public broadcasting, and reorganize the public 
administration. 
While we can say that there has been some progress in the area of police 
reform, it is also true to say that most questions related to the broader 
constitutional reform have been left unanswered. Since the signing of the DPA, 
there have been several attempts to institutional restructuring, mostly driven by 
the international community. However, to date there has been no process of 
constitutional consolidation and the problem of a general constitutional reform 
has for a long time been neglected by EU policy-makers. As a result, with the 
country in the fifteenth year of its troubled post-Dayton history, a definitive 
stabilization and reorganization process of the Bosnia’s costly, inefficient, 
asymmetric, and fragmented state structures seems far from being achieved. At 
time of writing, the Bosnian statebuilding process can be considered as 
dangerously stalled. Even if the difficult period that preceded the signing of the 
SAA has now come to an end, in concrete terms, it seems that the passage ‘from 
Bonn to Brussels’ envisaged four years ago by the International Commission on 
the Balkans (ICWB 2005: 37) is far from being completed. 
The renewed activism of US diplomacy, following the installation of the 
Obama Administration in Washington, has reopened the domestic confrontation 
on constitutional reform. However, the prospects for a smooth mediation are still 
very limited. Years of inconsistent policies promoted by Washington and Brussels 
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contributed to the exacerbation of nationalist rhetoric in the country. The 
prolonged lack of transatlantic convergence over the Bosnian stabilization process 
has contributed to a crystallization of the conflicting positions that each ethnic 
group adopts with regard to the reconfiguration of the central Bosnian state and 
reform of the constitution. 
Focusing on the attitude of the EU vis-à-vis the Bosnian constitution-
making process, this chapter sheds light on the peculiarities of what I refer to as 
EU’s hands-up statebuilding. While keeping its feet in BiH, the strategic thinking 
in Brussels reflects something that goes beyond a subtle and indirect denial of 
responsibilities: a refusal to interfere that is inconsistent with the massive field 
presence and the promises developed on the basis of the Thessaloniki agenda. 
Interviewed on what strategies could best facilitate reconciliation and 
constitutional reform, EU officials have tended to systematically throw their 
hands up, denying that they have any right to interfere and that the EU does not 
‘deal’ with sovereignty.   
It thus appears that the EU has taken a step back from the implicit Empire 
in Denial proposed by David Chandler (2006) towards an explicit – but even 
more incoherent – denial of having the right to act, which has allowed Brussels to 
avoid undertaking a constructive role in the Bosnian reconciliation project. Based 
on extensive interviews and archival research in both Brussels and Sarajevo, this 
chapter shows that the attitude of most EU actors towards Bosnian elites is based 
on the fiction of a ‘quasi-sacred respect for sovereignty’ that hides a substantial 
shortcoming: without the support of the US, the EU proved unable to provide 
clear strategic direction to the Bosnian constitution-making process.  
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The ambiguity of the hands-up attitude has thus far allowed Brussels to 
escape the two crucial dilemmas of statebuilding: bottom-up vs. top-down 
approach, and technical presence vs. complex post-war stabilization. Moreover, 
this particular stance has allowed EU officials to put on hold two other strategic 
issues. Firstly, the hands-up attitude provided Brussels to arrive at a comfortable 
modus vivendi with the US and cope with its residual influence on the OHR. 
Secondly, by distancing itself from structured constitutional reform and 
reconciliation policies, the EU has avoided a difficult internal confrontation on 
methods, principles, and issues to be pursued on the ground in BiH. 
 
 
2. The EU’s ‘hands-up’ statebuilding of BiH 
The prolonged stalemate in the constitutional talks is revealing in what it tells us 
about the EU’s attitude towards the politico-institutional dynamics of its most 
troubled ‘potential candidate member’. According to Joseph Marko (2005: 16) – 
former international judge at the Bosnian Constitutional Court – what is evident in 
BiH is that ‘[t]oo often, the IC and even the EU does not speak with one voice but 
is divided along national lines and spheres of interest’. International divisions, 
determined by both national fracture lines and intra-EU institutional tensions, 
affect the ability of the EU to exert a constructive influence on the Bosnian 
constitutional reform talks. This was particularly striking in the period between 
October 2006 and September 2009. During this time span Brussels, lacking the 
‘pull’ of Washington, intensified its efforts to technify the relationship with the 
Bosnian government and public administration. The US had become trapped in its 
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attempts to promote the so-called ‘April package’ for constitutional reform, and 
later maintained a certain disengagement from BiH, at least until the new 
administration was installed in Washington following the 2008 Presidential 
elections. 
However the usual limitations of the intra-EU multilateralism and the 
inevitable dependence on the evolving attitude of its transatlantic ally are not the 
only explanation behind Brussels’ detached approach towards the reform process 
of the Dayton constitution and the constitutions of the two entities (FBiH and RS). 
Elaborating on a series of interviews with participants and observers of the EU 
decision-making processes with regard to BiH,39 it is possible to construct the 
ideal picture of a very specific ‘EU’s hands-up statebuilding approach in BiH’ 
that is a step back from the more promising reconstructions made on the basis of 
the sovereignty paradox literature. 
Quoting again from Dominik Zaum (2007: 41), the sovereignty paradox is 
described in the following terms: ‘the international community compromises one 
important norm associated with sovereignty – self-governance – to create the 
conditions for full empirical statehood and sovereign authority in the country it 
intervenes in, by establishing the capacity of the state to fulfill its international 
and domestic obligations’. On the basis of this understanding, all contemporary 
statebuilding efforts share the same ethic and ideology. This ‘ethic’ has as its 
normative core the idea that sovereignty cannot be intended merely in negative 
terms, as an obstacle. Internally, governments have duties and responsibilities 
both of facere and non facere towards the population under their jurisdiction.  
The inability of local authorities to fulfill fundamental governance 
requirements allows the international community to undertake initiatives aimed at 
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preventing the population of a failing or failed state from experiencing insecurity 
and suffering. In the jargon of the ICISS, this idea can be identified as a 
generalized commitment to prevent. When catastrophes and forms of instability 
strike, it is the duty of the international community to intervene for the protection 
of the affected population. A last, but nevertheless crucial corollary that 
completes this logic is the idea of a responsibility to rebuild (ICISS 2001: 19-28, 
39-46). The normative idea at the basis of this series of commitments is the 
understanding of sovereignty as an internationally shared responsibility.  
 
2.1. The EU’s step back from the Empire in Denial 
Some doubts concerning the genuine diffusion of the sovereignty as responsibility 
ideal have already been raised in the literature review. But here another question 
arises: looking at the prolonged reluctance of the EU to have any role in the 
reform process of the Bosnian constitution(s), it seems that we are facing a 
particular approach to responsibility. Building on Chandler, we might look at 
Brussels and wonder whether we are making a step back from the implicit Empire 
in Denial (that according to Chandler can be generalized to the West) towards an 
explicit but even more incoherent denial of having the right to act that has thus far 
being predominant in the EU member-statebuilding of BiH?  
Relocating statebuilding ‘in the broader context of international politics 
today’ (2006: 189) Chandler has argued that the centrality of the external 
regulation of failing and failed states in the international political debate perfectly 
serves the rationale of an Empire in Denial. What he has presented is an 
innovative challenge. On the one hand, he has targeted interventionists and 
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capacity-building enthusiasts; on the other hand, he has opposed those who 
criticize Western governments for merely implementing neo-colonial practices, 
even when they operate under the legitimizing umbrella of relevant multilateral 
organizations. Building on Zaki Laïdi’s idea that power in the post-ideological era 
is just exercised with the sole aim of avoiding responsibility and accountability, 
Chandler (2006: 18) has argued that contemporary statebuilding initiatives ‘are 
driven less by the desire to extend and enforce Western power than they are by 
the desire to deny it’. Developing this critical assessment in more detailed terms, 
he has specified that ‘the new international institutional focus on the non-Western 
state … is driven by western elites’ desire to avoid political responsibility for their 
relationships with large areas of the world’ (Chandler 2006: 30).  
The blame attached on the elites from the developed world is as resolute as 
it is clear: ‘[r]ather than grasping the opportunities to reshape positively a new 
international order in the wake of Cold War division, Western states and 
international institutions would appear to be embarrassed by their power and 
influence’ (Chandler 2006: 73, emphasis added). Amongst other practices that 
compose the toolbox of contemporary statebuilding missions, the outside-in 
promotion of democracy and good governance practices in the developing world 
is identified as ‘a distancing operation, designed to exercise influence without 
assuming direct formal responsibilities of power’ (Chandler 2006: 70).  
Moving from the international arena to the specific experience of the EU, 
Chandler has focused on the principles informing Brussels-based statebuilders 
who work on the stabilization of the Western Balkans and regulate the modalities 
of the next EU enlargement. Empire in Denial has offered an articulated (and 
sometimes radical) critique of the regulative mechanisms that have been tested in 
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failing or failed states. Chandler has distanced himself from previous 
contributions in this field for two reasons. The first relates to sovereignty. 
Chandler has traced the attempts to redefine sovereignty as an internationally 
shared responsibility back to the needs of the Empire in Denial. Generally, 
scholars and practitioners have welcomed the sovereignty as responsibility ideal 
as a watershed, since it represents a normative innovation that interconnects the 
exercise of sovereignty to the fulfillment of an articulated set of responsibilities. 
Such a re-conceptualization sheds light on both the international and domestic 
accountability of national governments.  
While Chandler has not dismissed all the positive implications that could 
stem from these elaborations, he has nevertheless warned that this update of the 
concept of sovereignty might have been, so to speak, ‘exploited’ to justify 
mechanisms and modalities of intervention that keep the Empire in Denial at 
work. To his eyes, the new normative understanding of sovereignty has been 
presented in a way that constitutes ‘a medium through which non-Western states 
and societies become integrated into networks of external regulation’; moreover, 
this conceptualization ‘off-load[s] responsibility onto the non-Western state at the 
same time as these states increasingly lose their policy-making authority’ 
(Chandler 2006: 37, 31). 
The second point that has allowed Chandler to distance himself from the 
recent literature on internationally-driven peace- and statebuilding concerns the 
problematic relationship between populations and their domestic political elites, 
in both the developed and the developing world: Western governments today tend 
to engage in crisis areas due to a ‘shifting away from the antagonistic and divisive 
ethics of the ‘interventionist’ 1990s’ (Chandler 2006: 80). This attitude 
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supposedly stems from a lack of self-confidence: Western elites are no longer 
‘convinced of their ability to justify their power openly to their own publics’ 
(Chandler 2006: 107). Paradoxically, also the policies exported to the developing 
world (or in crisis areas in general) disconnect domestic constituencies from 
autochthon rulers. The result is a proliferation of ‘phantom states’ composed of 
technical administrative shells, sustained mainly through external policy-making 
and resources, and dangerously detached from their constituent population, over 
which they are expected to exercise their political powers. 
The picture emerging from Empire in Denial is that of an international 
community where Western states rationally engage in statebuilding initiatives in 
troubled regions of the world with a view to transferring responsibilities to local 
governments and, therefore, avoiding accountability for the impact of their main 
international policies. By multiplying the number of states and facilitating the 
installation of ‘somehow’ legitimate governments, Western countries consciously 
minimize the risk to be held accountable for the developments in troubled areas. 
Such a goal justifies two recurrent peculiarities of statebuilding missions: the 
emphasis on institution-building and the systematic hurry to organize domestic 
elections, even when the stabilization of peace in war-torn societies is still 
uncertain and hard security has not been guaranteed yet.  
If this last critique can be shared, when focusing on the EU approach 
towards BiH it seems that the terms of the Empire in Denial are not so evident. To 
a certain extent, it seems that Chandler overstates the capacity of Western 
countries (and the EU in particular) to think so strategically and act so 
coordinated. The specific attitude of the EU with regards to the reorganization of 
the Bosnian state and the constitutional order in that country seems instead to 
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move beyond a subtle, strategically planned, and indirect transfer of 
responsibilities. Quite on the contrary, the approach of the EU resembles an a 
priori refusal of interference that is totally incongruent with the massive field 
presence, especially if we analyze in detail the 2006-2009 timeframe. In the 
course of this period, the EU reached the apex of its technical approach to 
statebuilding, which proved to be unsatisfactory, up to the point of inducing 
Brussels to a drastic change of policy and to follow the US in their recent efforts 
for constitutional change in BiH. The ambiguity of throwing the hands up with 
respect to the constitutional reform process, for such a long time, hides the 
strategic decision to avoid direct responsibilities and initiatives in the Bosnian 
reconciliation project, something that EU officials interviewed on the matter have 
had no hesitation about confirming.  
A voice from the Policy Unit of the EU Council who spoke on the condition 
of anonymity has openly admitted: ‘we are not doing reconciliation in BiH. This 
has been evident since the EU stabilization project was launched. We are not in a 
position to face complex political issues as the harmonization of the Bosnian state 
pillars’.40 On the same line, a diplomat interviewed right at the end of a four-year 
posting in Brussels and service at the COWEB provided an interesting answer to 
the question ‘what is the first thing that comes to your mind thinking at the 
stabilization of the Bosnian state?’: 
 
Reconciliation. Sovereignty is indeed about reconciliation. This 
actually stems from the fact that there is no will among elites to form 
a functional state in BiH. This lack mostly can be traced back to the 
fact that we have not being able to reconcile elites and population, 
truly, on the war. A successful reconciliation scheme at elite level is 
vital for the future of Bosnia as a stable state. But to be successful, 
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the reconciliation process has to be owned by the Bosnians 
themselves. In a sense we could speak about ownership of the 
reconciliation process.41 
 
More or less the same comment could be heard at the Commission, even 
though the personnel of the Enlargement DG takes more care to emphasize that 
something positive has still happened, also with regards to reconciliation. 
Approached in mid-2007 (when the idea ‘no police reform equals to no SAA’ 
became a mantra amongst EU policy-makers and constitutional reform was 
completely obfuscated in the EU agenda for BiH) a practitioner from the 
Commission with more than ten years of experience on the Bosnian file has 
admitted that, even if randomly, ‘things are moving. Surely, we are not tackling 
directly the constitutional deadlock because this would mean involving the 
Commission in a difficult effort for reconciliation. Still, I believe that we are 
doing reconciliation our own way, step by step, progressively, sometimes 
indirectly, with different programs and means’.42  
Doubts about the effectiveness of this ‘unstructured’ approach and vague 
commitment were raised, even by the European Parliament (EP). However, it 
seems that voices from the EP, even when they underline legitimate concerns, do 
not reach other European institutions so easily. In June 2007, disappointment was 
raised from the EP against the inability of EU agencies to elaborate, agree, and 
promote clear and sustainable instruments of reconciliation in all the divided 
societies at the periphery of the Union. Amongst other voices of dissent, speaking 
specifically on the deadlocks of the Bosnian constitutional reform, a MEP from 
multiethnic Süd-Tirol questioned: ‘until we clarify the problem of guilt, how can 
people get together in a pluriethnic solution?’43  
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As will be further clarified in the next section, what is truly paradoxical is 
that the attitude of most EU actors towards the Bosnian elites has been based on 
the claim of ‘a quasi-sacred respect for sovereignty’. This justification was 
constructed to hide a substantial inefficiency: in the attempt to distance itself from 
difficult political processes, the EU refrained to approach the Bosnian 
constitution-making process. Differently than the US, the EU tried to experiment 
a statebuilding methodology based on technocratic relationships and indirect 
pressures. To use another metaphor, we could talk about a ‘statebuilding by the 
backdoor’ strategy. 
 
2.2. Evading responsibilities, avoiding risks … and sovereignty 
is said to be again sacrosanct 
The EU entered the Bosnian field in 2003 when it took over the responsibilities of 
the international police mission that had been previously directed by the UN and 
installed its own mission (EUPM), which was the first field deployment under the 
framework of the ESDP. However, the first concrete sign that inaugurated ‘the 
EU commitment to Bosnia’ was the Road Map drafted by the European 
Commission in 2000. Through this Road Map the Commission identified 18 areas 
of reform (divided into three fields: political steps, economic steps, and steps in 
the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law) that the Bosnian 
government was asked to adopt in order  to allow the Commission launching a 
Feasibility Study for the Stabilisation and Association Process.44 
Since then, the EU presence in BiH has gone through a constant and 
significant ‘escalation’. A EUFOR Mission ‘Operation Althea’ jumped into the 
shoes of SFOR (the second NATO mission to BiH after IFOR);45 the EU 
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Commission consolidated its field delegation;46 but most important, with the 
adoption of Lord Ashdown’s mandate, the HR was given a ‘double hat’ and his 
office was thus renamed OHR/EUSR.47 Since five years, thanks to the initiative of 
five leading European countries (France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain) also a newly created European Gendarmerie Force has been testing its 
field capabilities in BiH. Known also as Eurogendfor, this initiative has allowed 
‘MSU/Carabinieri’ forces to take over the Integrated Police Unit within the 
EUFOR framework. 
In spite of this dominant position in the Bosnian field, the mentioned initial 
successes, and the potentials of its prospect of membership, Brussels has tried not 
to directly engage in the constitutional challenge. Initiatives in this field have 
been mostly left to the US, which, regardless of its changed geopolitical 
perspectives and renewed field activism in Iraq and Afghanistan, has continued to 
prove a relatively active diplomacy in BiH. Washington was behind the ‘April 
Package’ of reforms, which was voted down by the Bosnian parliament in spring 
2006 (The Dayton Project 2006).48 Following the parliamentary stalemate – and 
with the EU focused exclusively on police reform – in 2007 the US remained the 
most active mediator between the leaders of RS and their Bosniak opponents, as 
shown by the attempt (unfortunately unsuccessful) to bring the Bosnian Serb 
leader Milorad Dodik and the Bosniak politician Haris Silajdžić to the same table 
in Washington (Associated Press 2007b). 
Once also this mediation seemed at dusk, several actors in the US started to 
call for a greater involvement of the EU on the constitutional dossier. The 
reluctance to tackle the constitutional issue in a structured way was also criticized 
by the Dayton Project (i.e. the American NGO that together with the US Institute 
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of Peace structured, supervised, and promoted the constitutional talks that led to 
the informal political approval of the April Package in 2006). Observers from the 
other side of the Atlantic recognized that only a greater and structured 
involvement by the EU might have helped overcoming stagnation. A reasonable 
call has explicitly been made in favor of a revitalization of this process through 
the establishment of clearer links with the SAA and through greater involvement 
by the EU in the difficult mediation. The experts working for the Dayton Project 
suggested:  
 
one option to consider is for the EC and US to meet in Brussels with 
the leaders of the State, the entities, and representatives of Mostar, 
Tuzla, Sarajevo, and Banja Luka to discuss this issue and indicate 
that, although completely abandoning the Dayton institutions may 
not be necessary, nevertheless without significant change in the 
constitution and the way in which Bosnian governmental entities 
function, there will be little if any chance for Bosnia to obtain EU 
membership (The Dayton Project 2007). 
 
However, the EU tried as much as possible to refrain from intervening on 
the matter of constitutional change, and it did not manage to develop in Brussels a 
framework that could facilitate the domestic confrontation on constitutional 
issues. Up until summer 2009, the main priority in Brussels remained the reform 
of the police. After the summer, insisting on the necessity of a joint effort for 
constitutional change in BiH, the new US Administration succeeded to involve the 
EU in the debate. How to explain the prolonged reluctance of the EU? The current 
impasse over the constitutional reform was seen as a mine field, too risky and too 
complex to be approached. In spite of the prolonged externally-facilitated 
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institutional restructuring and the EU membership perspective, there is no 
agreement among Bosnian elites on how to replace the constitution attached to the 
DPA. Interestingly, party leaders have refrained from formalizing in a process of 
‘constitutional consolidation’ the institutional developments already achieved over 
the years (largely through the actions of the international community and the 
OHR). As in the immediate aftermath of the peace settlement in 1995, the three 
constituent people still have conflicting views on how the central Bosnian state 
should be organized. In particular, Serbs and Bosniak have antithetic positions. 
The latter consider the main structure established through the DPA as a starting 
ground for progressive centralization; the former instead strenuously defend the 
division of labour between the central state and the Entities, thus pointing at the 
constitutional framework of the DPA as to an insurmountable ceiling. 
In spite of the clear difficulties, a process of constitutional reform and, in 
parallel, a definitive decision by the international community to relinquish the 
Bonn Powers still represent the only possible combination through which BiH can 
be regenerated as a truly sovereign and multiethnic state. As Philip Roeder (2007: 
63) has pointed out, ‘the sovereign state is distinguished from other jurisdictions 
by its authority to allocate and reallocate decision rights within its border’. 
Against this backdrop, it seems clear that a successful constitutional process is an 
inescapable moment of sovereign reallocation of powers and prerogatives. 
Rumors from the DG Enlargement confirmed that in 2007 at least 
fundraising was undertaken. According to one EU official, at that time the 
Commission had gathered adequate financial resources designed specifically to 
support the process of constitutional reform. From the information obtained from 
a top-ranking EU official, the Commission apparently was ready to send to BiH 
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up to one million euro for this purpose. The same source further specified: ‘people 
in BiH have been informed about this. If they want to start talking about the 
constitution we put the money in, and perhaps some of our expertise. We are 
ready to set up proper frameworks and bureau for this. For the rest, we keep going 
with the SAP’.49  
Undoubtedly, the readiness of the Commission (at least on the financial 
level) has to be appreciated. But to stimulate complex processes like constitutional 
reform in a post-war fragmented state, unfortunately, does not only depend on the 
availability of financial resources. Clearer political decisions on strategies to be 
implemented and paths to be chosen and pursued are probably more relevant in 
such cases; this is particularly important for the international community when it 
is clear that autochthon elites do not yet cooperate in a climate of reconciliation.  
Up until mid-2009, no common European strategy was adopted on the 
matter. As emphasized above, the frictions were institutional and diplomatic, 
normative and methodological, and in several respects, they had a lot to do with 
sovereignty. The flag of sovereignty was indeed often raised by EU officials when 
they were asked to elaborate on the shortcomings of the international community 
in BiH. The ‘sovereignty excuse’ was manipulated and presented systematically, 
often to the extent of depicting paradoxical explanations. According to a diplomat 
who completed a four-year mandate in the COWEB and has a prolonged field 
experience in the Western Balkans, it should be clear that 
 
…the EU does not have its own vision of the Bosnian sovereignty 
and does not intend to produce direct policies related to the 
reorganization of sovereignty. There is not indeed a design for the 
redefinition of the Bosnian sovereignty. Who is dealing with 
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sovereignty is the UN. Probably Kosovo will be an exception to this 
EU reluctance, but it is too early to say. The interference with 
sovereignty in BiH takes place with the use of the Bonn Powers, not 
with the hat of the EUSR.50 
 
Even if it addresses only indirectly the problem of the current constitutional 
impasse of BiH, this statement provides a series of significant hints. Prior to 
elaborating on them, a preliminary clarification has to be made. After an extensive 
series of interviews (undertaken between late 2006 and 2008) with other 
diplomats attached to national permanent missions to the EU and serving as 
delegates to the COWEB, the statement above represents a synthesis of the vision 
of sovereignty and EU responsibilities shared by diplomatic elites sitting in 
Brussels and working on BiH and the Western Balkans.  
The constitution is identified by definition as the maximum expression of 
the sovereignty of a state, so that – in the eyes of basically all delegates in the 
COWEB – it would be too much not only to intervene formally but also to 
provide targeted external incentives to stimulate the process for the revision of the 
constitutional architecture. Perhaps forgetting that the Bosnian constitutional 
arrangement in force was agreed at a US air force base and signed in Paris (not to 
talk of the implication of EU integration on national legislative and governing 
systems), EU elites depict the constitution as the final test for the maturation of 
the country that should not be ‘changed or distorted’ by any kind of European 
carrot or stick.  
A further element of interest has emerged when, specifically asked to 
elaborate on the massive EU field presence, practitioners in Brussels made no 
direct or indirect reference to the idea of sovereignty as an internationally shared 
 156 
 
responsibility; at best, they produced general statements about guilt and the EU 
mistakes of the early 1990s or they referred to a vague idea of a ‘European family’ 
based on common history. Surprisingly often, EU officials openly admitted that 
BiH provided a context with optimal conditions for the EU to test its operational 
capabilities. The EU should have indeed experimented its potentials in 
neighboring areas prior to engage with large scale missions also in more delicate 
scenarios, far beyond its near abroad. Finally, the connection between stability in 
BiH and security throughout Europe represents another equation to which EU 
officials normally referred to. This mix of strategic considerations, contingent 
evaluations, and feelings has been spelled out in an interesting overview by an 
official from the Commission:  
 
BiH should be an EU country. Our coming into the scene has been 
partially determined by the disengagement of the US but not only. 
Suddenly we realized that we should not have allowed having a 
tumor in the heart of Europe and also that only EU countries were 
entitled to help the transition of another European country. Now it is 
all our challenge to Europeanize BiH.51 
 
When asked to explain the EU reluctance to intervene on the constitutional 
field and the obstinacy to focus on police reform and technically-driven changes, 
the diplomats interviewed have pointed their fingers merely to the prolonged 
indifference of the Commission – presented as the Deus ex machina of the EU 
enlargement process52 – apparently forgetting that also what happens in the 
Council and among the permanent missions in Brussels is relevant for the EU 
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policy-making processes. At least on paper, a first timid sign from the Council 
was actually given at the beginning of 2007. Precisely, this arrived in February 
2007 when a renewed mandate of the EUSR was officially adopted. According to 
article 3(p) of the updated EUSR mandate, amongst many other tasks, the latter 
should ‘provide political advice and facilitation in the process of constitutional 
reform’ (European Council 2007).  
The criticism made by the Council against the Commission, could also be 
sensed at the EP; even though, at a closer look, the disapproval from the EP 
targeted the work and initiatives of both the Council and the Commission. For 
instance, interviewed on this specific matter at the time when both the 
Commission and the Council showed an exasperated attention for police reform 
and the US was the only actor trying to mediate on constitutional reform, the MEP 
Doris Pack had no hesitation to declare:  
 
I didn’t understand why Dodik and Silajdžić went to Washington. 
Anyway, this has been a failure of the Commission and mostly of 
Solana to change the political climate in BiH. The Bosnians need 
people who really understand them. In particular, I have the 
impression that the Commission is too technically oriented. You 
have to go there and speak to politicians. The Commission sees itself 
as a technical body.53 
 
Unfortunately, as it will be explained in the coming sections, the facilitation for 
the constitutional reform has been hindered by the lack of coordinated and 
unequivocal political support from the Council to the HR/EUSR. While the 
German HR/EUSR Schwarz-Schilling had initially received a blessing to operate 
on the matter and was then left isolated in the difficult undertaking, the story that 
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regards his successor turned out to be quite different. The Slovak HR/EUSR 
Miroslav Lajčàk54 was sent to Sarajevo with the idea to restore that gradualism in 
the reform agenda that had been peculiar at the time of Ashdown’s tenure. To 
serve this purpose, during summer 2007, the police reform was re-attached 
priority status. Actually, Lajčàk had been properly instructed to make appear in 
his daily work that this specific reform had not much to do with the constitutional 
architecture of the state.  
Witnessing how Schwarz-Schilling slowly lost support to stimulate the 
constitutional debate (and how he ended up not being backed at all by any 
political will even to simply promote structured discussions amongst local elites 
on how to consolidate the institutional changes de facto in place) a voice of 
criticism from within the OHR/EUSR has claimed that Lajčàk’s instructions 
depended on the following factors: 
 
In Europe there is no shared model; no pre-determined 
understanding of what is a state or a constitution. Moreover, there is 
no shared vision over democracy, the rule of law, the idea of nation, 
or even the idea of rights. Evidently, there cannot be smooth political 
convergence at the Council that would allow overcoming these 
normative clashes. The problem is that only by solving these 
divergences it will be possible to choose a path between the nation-
building approach and the technical approach. The former is a latent 
idea that is always there at the Commission, mostly because of the 
national background of the people that are currently on the Bosnian 
file. But the latter remains a predominant vision, based on the idea 
that all countries are the same and that there is not so much 
difference between Bosnia and the other former Communist states 
that already went through the enlargement process.55 
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To continue with the reconstruction of the hands-up attitude shown by the 
EU towards the Bosnian constitutional impasse between 2006 and 2009, another 
look at the work of the EP is needed. Clearly, the Brussels- and Strasbourg-based 
institution does not have any direct or substantial impact on the CFSP or the 
enlargement process; nevertheless, it remains a relevant forum for discussion and 
political inputs.56 In March 2007, in a recommendation from the EP to the 
Council, the Bosnian constitutional issue was analyzed with particular attention. 
The EP recognized that ‘deep reflection should be undertaken among the different 
components of society in BiH on how to transcend the rigid ethnic division of the 
country so as to reform its structures and make it more flexible and compatible 
with the European democracies’ (European Parliament 2007). But what were the 
responsibilities on the part of the EU to properly stimulate a similar process for 
reconciliation? Not much was said on the matter. Even if indirectly, an answer 
came during the closing session of the yearly EP-BiH Inter-Parliamentary 
Meeting. Talking to her colleagues from BiH about constitutional reform, the 
German MEP chairing the meeting (who was then also Chair of the EP delegation 
for the relations with SEE countries) made the following points clear: 
 
We have the money, we have the know-how and we could put it. But 
we have no responsibilities. You have to find the compromise … It 
is your constitution … Moreover, note that I do not like that there is 
someone who goes to Washington to discuss his own constitution. 
You do not want to become members of the United States of 
America, so come here to us! Let’s stay home, doing homework 
without taking this long trips to Washington, that is so far away!57 
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On the same line, the vice-president of the EP delegation for SEE countries, 
declared in that occasion: while ‘it is true that the Americans are the ones who 
made peace happen, we cannot accept anymore an abstract concept of constitution 
to be imposed. We want a process and I hope that people understand that 
Washington is not the right address to make this happen’.58 Both these 
interventions confirm that while at the EU level it is easy to find positions against 
excessive American intrusiveness into the Bosnian constitutional reform process, 
it is equally difficult to propose clear strategies and launch political initiatives that 
enjoy wide political consensus amongst member states. This was so evident to the 
eyes of the Bosnian MPs invited to Brussels that one of them replied to the 
exhortation above with a rather sarcastic analysis:  
 
Bosnia cannot survive as a state based on two separate entities and 
three people. Dayton is an unfair and unpractical constitution. I 
could even accept another external imposition if it is fair. Obviously, 
it would not be good if the US breaks the constitutional deadlock. 
We would be pleased if the EU takes over more responsibilities in 
the constitution reform process. I speak as a citizen prior to 
launching this proposal as a Bosnian MP. It is a long and difficult 
process, but the EU has to allow us to make it.59 
 
 
3. Conflicting methodologies for the constitutional reform 
process (2005-2007) 
The intra-EU institutional divergences presented in the previous section cannot 
explain alone why Brussels has not yet developed a coordinated effort to help 
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Bosnian elites cleaning up their internationally established constitutional 
(dis)order. This analysis has to be completed with additional elements gathered on 
the Bosnian field, particularly at the OHR/EUSR offices, as well as with the 
elaboration of a series of elements acquired from various members of the 
diplomatic circle in Sarajevo.  
Looking at the past three years, it is possible to sum up two main different 
approaches to constitutional reform that were discussed among international elites 
in Sarajevo. Some of them were timidly presented and pursued, while some others 
were accompanied by more vigorous diplomatic sponsorships and political 
initiatives. The two main approaches have taken the form of the American 
sponsored April Package (an externally designed and introduced reform plan) and 
a law-based commission supported by some (but not all) EU member states and 
somehow negotiated by the HR/EUSR Christian Schwarz-Schilling at a very 
preliminary stage. It will be made clear in the following paragraphs that the 
position of the EU, other than suffering from the lack of cohesion and coherence 
among its member states, has suffered from the attempt to ‘technify’ the 
relationship with this potential candidate member and emphasize police reform 
and gradual institutional changes.  
Section 4 will close this chapter with the analysis of the so-called ‘Butmir 
process’, which took place in late Fall 2009. The recent convergence of the US 
and the EU eventually made possible the creation of a framework for 
confrontation over constitutional reform, which has involved the key actors of the 
Bosnian domestic political environment. However, already during the very early 
stages of the process, it became clear that the debate was too negatively 
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conditioned by the precedent prolonged marginalization of constitutional change 
from the EU reform agenda. 
 
3.1. The negotiations for the ‘April Package’ and the US 
diplomatic initiative (November 2005 - June 2007) 
The first concrete attempts to reach a structured and comprehensive constitutional 
reform in Bosnia have to be attributed to the US diplomacy. These initiatives were 
pursued through the persistent commitment of the (now ex-) US Ambassador to 
BiH, Douglas L. McElhaney, who headed the US mission in Sarajevo between 
September 2004 and September 2007 (when he left his post to Amb. Charles L. 
English). Throughout his mandate, McElhaney constantly sought to build, on a 
bilateral basis, close relationships with leaders of main political parties, with a 
view to push them towards a common project for constitutional reform. The 
methodology blessed by Washington and put in practice in Sarajevo was clear: 
party leaders should be convinced with targeted efforts to grant their personal 
commitment to a schematic reform plan; once the plan was drafted by the 
expertise identified by the US and approved in Washington, leaders were asked to 
subscribe it as a common proposal for constitutional change. 
The process was launched by the US Embassy in Sarajevo in mid-2005. A 
few months away from the tenth anniversary of the DPA, US diplomatic 
representatives in BiH started to explore what initiatives could be organized by 
the end of the year, possibly in Sarajevo. As confirmed by a high-ranking US 
official ‘we had an important anniversary on the way, but the mood in the country 
was not celebratory at all. So we thought it was us who, in a professional way, had 
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to do something that could have pushed things at least a bit forward. Otherwise 
the tenth anniversary of Dayton would have just underscored the total lack of 
progresses’.60 As clarified by the same source, Amb. McElhaney sent to 
Washington a list of deliverables (in which the goal of broad constitutional change 
was only one amongst other possible items on which to focus) and confirmed his 
readiness to ‘take advantage’ from the tenth anniversary of Dayton in order to 
push local elites to move forward on the reform agenda.  
The proposal was particularly welcomed by the Under Secretary of State 
(USoS) for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns, who between 1995 and 1997, had 
developed lots of experience on the Bosnian peace-making process, working 
closely to Madeleine Albright as Spokesman of the Department of State and 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. By welcoming McElhaney’s 
activism, Burns proposed the organization of some events in Washington. The 
meetings should have gathered Bosnian top governmental officials (e.g. the 
Chairman of the tripartite Presidency of BiH Ivo Miro Jović and the RS President 
Dragan Čavić) other relevant members of the domestic political community 
(eventually, these included: Mate Bandur, the back then ‘rising’ RS social 
democrat politician Milorad Dodik, the former FBiH President Safet Halilović, 
and the SDP leader and former Foreign Minister Zlatko Lagumdžija), as well as 
key representatives from relevant Transatlantic institutions and organizations. 
On 21-22 November 2005, a series of celebratory events were organized in 
Washington. On November 21, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) hosted 
a conference titled ‘Beyond Dayton: The Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration’, 
where Bosnian political representatives met at the presence of USoS Burns, Amb. 
Richard Holbrooke, the HR/EUSR Paddy Ashdown, and other representatives of 
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the international community in BiH (US Department of State 2005b). In his 
opening speech, Burns made a clear call for political commitment towards 
constitutional reform; moreover, he reminded to the Bosnian politicians attending 
the meeting that their presence in Washington had to be intended as an 
opportunity ‘to consider the future of Bosnia, the modernization of the Dayton 
Accords themselves, and to agree on a new, more unified Bosnia-Herzegovina for 
the generations ahead … The Dayton Accords need to be modernized. Bosnia 
needs to create new national institutions that can chart a new future for the 
country’ (US Department of State 2005a). 
On the following day, three additional events took place. The first was a 
conference of religious leaders from BiH (US Department of State 2005f). The 
second was a commemorative ceremony, in honour of Amb. Robert Frasure, 
Nelson Drew, and Joseph Kruzel, three American diplomats who were killed in 
BiH in 1995 (US Department of State 2005d). The third was a meeting between 
the US SoS Condoleezza Rice and President Jović (US Department of State 
2005c) for the signing of two agreement, one in the field of defence (a bilateral 
agreement on Status Protections and Access to and Use of Facilities and Areas in 
BiH) and one on the field of civil aviation (a bilateral Open Skies Civil Aviation 
agreement). On this last occasion, SoS Rice called on Bosnian leaders to start 
working on institutional centralization and create a ‘stronger energetic state’. Ms. 
Rice stressed that ‘to advance the promise of peace and progress, we must now 
move beyond the framework constructed a decade ago. A weak, divided state was 
appropriate in 1995, but today in 2005, the country needs a stronger energetic 
state capable of advancing the public good and securing the national interest’ (US 
Department of State 2005e).  
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At the end of the two-day celebrations, the most important outcome was a 
joint statement, signed by all Bosnian leaders gathered in Washington, in which a 
general (not to say timid) commitment to constitutional reform was highlighted. 
At the final press conference the US leadership was challenged on the substantial 
strategic objectives of the project and the real goal pursued by the American 
government. Confronted with the idea that ‘constitutional reform’ had been put on 
the table as a rather vague concept, USoS Burns provided a detailed clarification 
of the US diplomatic strategy, which is worth quoting extensively:  
 
Actually, the concept of constitutional reform is quite specific. It's 
not vague … When I proposed six weeks ago that they ought to 
agree to constitutional reform that was considered a rather radical 
notion because constitutional reform implies that the Dayton 
Accords are not immutable. It implies, specifically to the Bosnian 
Serbs, that there has to be a process of strengthening the state and 
not just the entities that, of course, received most of the power at the 
Dayton negotiations. And it assumes – constitutional reform – that 
there will be a narrowing from three presidents to one and assumes 
the development of a strong prime minister and it assumes the 
development of a strong speaker of the parliament and strong 
parliament. So it's very specific in that sense. What we hope they'll 
agree to tomorrow is, as political party leaders in the country, that 
they will dedicate themselves to this process of constitutional 
reform, that they will pursue that over the coming months in advance 
of the 2006 elections. We would hope that's what they propose -- 
commit themselves tomorrow. I don't think you'll find specific 
language in the agreement about the elements -- the type of 
presidency, the type of prime ministership, the type of parliament -- 
because that has to be worked out subsequent to any agreement 
tomorrow. That would have to be worked out in the parliament of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, we hope, over the next few months. But when 
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they say they're agreeing to constitutional reform and to agree on the 
elements of it in the next few months, that is a very specific process. 
It's not vague at all. I just wanted to make that note (US Department 
of State 2005a).  
 
In Washington, Bosnian leaders made only a general commitment and 
confirmed in principle their readiness to contribute to a process that ‘will enhance 
the authorities of the state government and streamline parliament and the office of 
the presidency’ (as quoted in McMahon 2005). Party leaders also agreed that the 
process should have been concluded at the last by the end of March 2006. This 
deadline was identified by the US mediators with the date of the next general 
elections in mind (which were scheduled to be held in October 2006). According 
to the expertise in Washington, at least six months would be necessary to 
implement a first structured reform scheme of the Dayton constitution. Based on 
this shared political will, the US Embassy in Sarajevo launched a process of 
domestic political confrontation on key issues related to constitutional change and 
tried to promote a draft agreement that could serve as a common minimum basis 
for reform.  
Respecting the deadline set up in Washington, in late March 2006, the 
commitment to pursue on the path of constitutional reform was turned into a 
reform package, which later would be labeled as ‘April Package’. The package 
was for the main part prepared on the other side of the Atlantic, by American 
intellectuals and former practitioners who worked under the guidance of the US 
government. Formally however, the main preparatory discussion forums, 
workshops, and negotiations took place outside the Department of State. The 
initiative of the Department of State converged into the activities of USIP, which 
 167 
 
at that time had a large program on BiH, thanks to the leadership of former 
Deputy HR in BiH, Amb. Donald S. Hays, who then led the USIP Center for Post-
Conflict Peace and Stability Operations.61 At the same time, the drafting exercise 
was carried out back-to-back with a prolonged multilateral confrontation in 
Sarajevo. After the meetings in Washington, Amb. McElhaney started to gather 
main party leaders on a regular basis (at least once a week from December 2005 
until April 2006). A source from the US Department of State confirmed that 
Ambassadors from relevant EU countries attended only on some occasions those 
working sessions among local politicians, but they remained merely sporadic 
observers.62 
Considering that this chapter focuses on the methodological, normative, 
and political frictions underpinning the international debate for constitutional 
change in BiH, detailed references to the specific content of the April Package (as 
well as to the other technical institutional changes that have so far been discussed 
on the various negotiation tables) are not relevant. However, the main proposals 
encompassed in the April Package can be summarized as follows: definition of a 
set of competences to be formally assigned to state level institutions; abolishment 
of the bicameral system; reform of the tripartite Presidency at state level; changes 
to the structure, electoral modalities, and working procedures of the Council of 
Ministers.63 
Once the Package was ready, the US diplomacy intensified its lobbying 
activities in BiH, with a view to consolidating the final consensus among key 
Bosnian political leaders on the main lines of the proposed reform. This process 
consisted mainly in bilateral contacts and negotiations, as well as in a series of 
multilateral working sessions with representatives from main parties. Despite all 
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these initiatives, however, the focus on party leaders did not paid entirely off. 
Certainly, the adoption of the reform plan was affected by some contingent 
factors; in particular, the tensions typical of the pre-election environment had a 
negative impact on the debate. But the main weakness of the Package probably 
lay in its conception and negotiation modalities. Since no talks were undertaken 
with broader delegations of Bosnian MPs and no contribution was sought from the 
representatives of the domestic cultural establishment, the Package did not pass 
the crucial test in the Parliament, which voted down the reform project with a tight 
majority. The fate of the Package was affected by the decision to rely on targeted 
external pressure from Washington and from the American Embassy in Sarajevo 
on key party leaders, thus avoiding a broader and more open debate with the rest 
of the political establishment.  
The decision to persist with this approach was probably reinforced by the 
promise reiterated by some politicians – e.g. Haris Silajdžić and Sulejman Tihić, 
who for clear opportunistic reasons at the beginning of the process were strongly 
in favour of the proposed reform – to further promote the package in the domestic 
arena. These two politicians, together with other leaders belonging to the Bosniak 
political community, saw the institutional and procedural changes outlined in the 
April Package as a good starting point to promote further centralization, from the 
Entities to the national government. In contrast with this approach, Bosnian Serb 
leaders have been historically for the maintenance of a highly decentralized 
system based on the recognition of strong prerogatives to the Entities.  
It should not be disregarded however, that the dismissal of the April Package 
in the Bosnian Parliament shall also be attributed to key Bosniak MPs. The 
two/third majority was not reached only for two votes, and it is not a mystery that 
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the six Bosniak representatives belonging to Silajdžić’s SBiH were among the 
sixteen MPs who voted against the approval of the April Package (Marko 2006: 
213). The vote in the House of People confirms that, probably hoping to achieve 
even a better deal in the sense of centralization, Silajdžić did not push until the 
end for the approval of the proposed reform within his same party. 
 
3.1.1.  The issues of entity voting and the vital national interest clause 
Following the dismissal of the reform plan by the Bosnian Parliament, the US 
Ambassador nevertheless continued systematically to develop consensus around 
the Package. Amb. McElhaney actually pursued in this attempt until June 2007, 
when the end of his mandate approached. Essentially, in the time frame between 
the negative vote of the Parliament and the beginning of summer 2008, there was 
a quiet but constant negotiation on the main terms of the Package. Several 
problematic issues on the reconfiguration of the central Bosnian institutions were 
at stake; however, the hinge of all discussions in this period was mostly entity 
voting and the revision of the so-called ‘vital national clause’, which allows the 
representative of each constituent people to block legislation. On the issue of 
entity voting, the text of Bosnian constitution attached to the Dayton agreement 
reads as follows:  
 
All decisions in both chambers shall be by majority of those present 
and voting. The Delegates and Members shall make their best efforts 
to see that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes of 
Delegates or Members from the territory of each Entity. If a majority 
vote does not include one-third of the votes of Delegates or Members 
from the territory of each Entity, the Chair and Deputy Chairs shall 
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meet as a commission and attempt to obtain approval within three 
days of the vote. If those efforts fail, decisions shall be taken by a 
majority of those present and voting, provided that the dissenting 
votes do not include two-thirds or more of the Delegates or Members 
elected from either Entity’ (US Department of State 1995).  
 
Still today, these norms represent the most critical points of friction between 
political leaders with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The CoE has 
repeatedly criticized these norms, calling for a radical reform that should deprive 
nationalist political leaders of a powerful tool for legislative obstructionism. For 
instance, in one of the latest resolution dealing with this particular issue, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Strasbourg-based organization has emphasized the 
following points:  
 
The entity voting system in the House of Representatives and the 
excessively broad scope of the “vital national interests” clause, 
together with the related veto mechanism in the House of Peoples, 
must be reformed for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a genuine 
civic state for all those living in it. Members of Parliament should act 
as free and democratically elected representatives of all the citizens 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not as defenders of purely ethnic 
interests. The so-called “Others” should be given an effective 
opportunity to participate fully in political life, by running in the 
election for members of the presidency and participating in the 
designation of delegates to the House of Peoples’ (CoE 2008: para. 
4). 
 
On the very same line, the latest country progress report released by the 
European Commission in October 2009 has stressed the following critical issues: 
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While progress has been made under the current constitutional 
structure, it still offers too many possibilities for political 
obstructionism. The misuse of provisions such the “entity voting” 
[Article IV 4 (d) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina] and 
complex rules on quorums prevents swift decision-making and, 
therefore, hinders reform and the country's capacity to make rapid 
progress towards the EU. Among other things, the problem of 
blockages due to the entity voting rules needs to be addressed, and a 
stricter definition of the vital national clause in the Constitution is 
necessary’ (European Commission 2009) 
 
From its part, the HR/EUSR has repeatedly pointed at this issue as one of the 
most critical deadlock hindering the political and legislative life of BiH. In the 
report to the UNSC presented by HR/EUSR Valentin Inzko last November 
(2009a), it has been reiterated that still today: 
 
One of the key problems related to the work of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly is the trend by which the 
political parties support draft legislation in the Council of Ministers, 
only then to oppose the same draft laws in one or both houses of the 
Parliament … Overall the performance of the Council of Ministers 
and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly has been 
poor, with ethnic and entity agendas prevailing over the State’s 
intentions to fulfill requirements for EU and NATO membership. 
 
 Apart from the technical and political criticalities related to the reform of 
the entity voting procedure and the vital interest clause, the defeat of the April 
Package in the National Parliament was depending on excessive confidence that 
the ‘party leaders approach’ could work. A US diplomat who was directly 
involved in the negotiations for the April Package admitted: ‘our focus on leaders 
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was justified with the idea that in fractured courtiers like BiH, to get change you 
need to force “the big boys” in the political arena to accept it. The problem in 
Sarajevo was that the same big boys who signed the Declaration in Washington 
did not lobby their party members sitting in the Parliament at home’.64  
As this statement confirms, to a certain extent, the process that led to the 
debate on the April Package in the Bosnian Parliament represents a manifestation 
of the Holbrook and, more in general, standard American diplomatic practices in 
post-conflict areas. This could be summarized as follows: subsequent to the 
identification of key political actors, these must be brought around a negotiation 
table; once some kind of general consensus is reached, the compromise is 
wrapped and presented without much alternative choices, and in the absence of 
broader and more open multilateral discussions. Looking at this attitude from 
Brussels, a diplomat from an EU member state commented: ‘the US confirmed 
that they have no problem in substituting themselves to local elites. The April 
Package failed precisely for this reason. If the EUSR launches a process with 
shared political support, he could probably achieve some results. But today 
support for such initiatives is at the minimum’.65 
 
3.2.  Schwarz-Schilling’s convention approach (2006-2007) 
The saga of the so far unsuccessful constitutional reform process reveals other 
nuances if we look at what happened in Brussels and at the OHR/EUSR, 
especially during the tenure of Schwarz-Schilling. The appointment of the 
German HR/EUSR – known in the diplomatic environment in Sarajevo as the 
‘quiet’ High Representative – was promoted by some EU member states (with 
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Germany at the forefront and Austria supporting) with two ambitious goals in 
mind. On the one hand, Schwarz-Schilling was expected to be able to re-enter the 
Bosnian arena (where he had already experience) and promote as much local 
ownership of the reform agenda as possible. On the other hand, the unwritten 
mandate (supported only by some member states) was to pave the way for both 
the closure of the OHR structure within a year and the inauguration of a 
reinforced EUSR Office.  
In his inaugural TV address to the Bosnian people, while reiterating the 
crucial importance of the SAA and the strategic implications of a possible 
participation of Bosnia in NATO’s Partnership-for-Peace Programme, the German 
HR/EUSR clarified that ‘[t]he steps that must be taken in order to reach these 
milestones are known – and these will form the agenda of my work. But to take 
these steps, Bosnia and Herzegovina must be fully sovereign. That means that I 
must step back’ (Schwarz-Schilling 2006). Appreciated for his consolidated 
experience as a mediator in the Western Balkans, Schwarz-Schilling was seen by a 
relevant (but not decisive) section of the EU Council as someone who could have 
completed the installation of EU-driven statebuilding, while encouraging 
recalcitrant political factions into a discussion on key reforms of constitutional 
relevance. 
During the tenure of Lord Paddy Ashdown, the prevailing methodology 
chosen by the HR/EUSR resembled the one sponsored by the US, at least in its 
tendency to focus on key party leaders. Moreover, it was clear that back then the 
HR/EUSR benefited mostly from the support of the Anglo-Saxon axis in the 
Steering Board of the PIC. Methods and objectives changed drastically as soon as 
Schwarz-Schilling took office. Contrary to his British predecessor, he tried to limit 
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intrusiveness through the exercise of the Bonn Powers and started to deal more 
directly with the issue of constitutional reform. Emphasizing the importance of 
inclusive and systematic multilateral dialogue, he started to deal more directly 
with the issue of constitutional reform. In practice, Schwarz-Schilling put on the 
table what could be referred to as ‘the constitutional convention approach’. In the 
opinion of the German HR/EUSR, a Nice-style convention – open as much as 
possible, also to the civil society and cultural establishment – should have been 
convened to debate over the constitutional future of BiH. 
However, the tensed political climate induced Schwarz-Schilling to believe 
that, even if the convention was launched, openness and inclusiveness would only 
result in endless talks. At the same time, as soon as the plan for a broad 
convention appeared too unrealistic, from the legal department of the EUSR a new 
proposal was launched under Schwarz-Schilling’s supervision: a narrower law-
based constitutional commission could be nominated passing through the Bosnian 
Parliament. According to information obtained at the OHR legal department, this 
commission was to be composed of one main council gathering only 
representatives from the political environment (mostly chosen from amongst the 
Bosnian MPs) and supported by a technical secretariat.  
This approach was not welcome in Brussels, where it was seen as a process 
without full ownership. Criticism from Brussels targeted in particular the 
excessive involvement of internationals in the offices designed to support the work 
of the commission and its steering troika. The idea launched by Schwarz-Schilling 
was indeed to nominate three co-chairs: one from Washington, one chosen by the 
EU, and only one selected from amongst national politicians or within the Bosnian 
cultural community. Moreover, the prevailing opinion was that the secretariat had 
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to be equally composed of locals and internationals. Several possible ways to 
organize such a secretariat were considered; however, the idea of the HR/EUSR 
was to divide it ratione materiae into three sub-sections (economy, legal affairs, 
and security-related reforms), which had to be supported by a joint administrative 
unit. 
On several occasions (both in Brussels and at the meetings of the PIC-SB) 
Germany confirmed its readiness to take on the main financial burden for the 
creation of the structure (which potentially, could have also been supported with 
the previously mentioned 1 million euro extra-budget allocated in mid-2007 by the 
Commission for BiH). In principle, all Bosnian parties expressed their 
appreciation for the initiative and confirmed to be in favor of a similar exercise. 
But no concrete politico-diplomatic support came from the EU Council. The 
feasibility of this project started to fade as summer 2007 approached, for the 
reluctance of most EU member states. More or less in the same days, the US failed 
in Washington their last strenuous attempt to mediate between Dodik and Silajdžić 
in view of revitalizing the April Package.66 
 
3.3. The last round of exploratory talks under the tenure of 
Schwarz-Schilling (April/June 2007) 
Following this double defeat, the HR/EUSR facilitated some rounds of 
exploratory talks. Once again, the result was uncertainty: while most parties 
confirmed their willingness to accept a law-based commission, some started to 
reconsider their support. The position of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-
BiH) was particularly interesting. Initially, the critical issue was mostly related to 
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what kind of legal basis should granted to the commission. HDZ-BiH, the 
Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990), the Alliance of Independent Social 
Democrats (SNSD), the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP) and even the 
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) were in favour of a law-based commission. 
However, Sulejman Tihić succeeded to convince HDZ-BiH to change side. The 
strategy pursued by the leader of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was 
driven by a desire to obstruct the creation of a constitutional commission, hoping 
that an opportunity to re-launch the April Package would come. Tihić was indeed 
one of the main sponsors of the Package.  
When at the beginning of summer 2007 HDZ-BiH withdrew its support 
from the project, also the exploratory talks were considered as closed. The idea of 
persisting in rounds of debate was pursued by Schwarz-Schilling on the basis of 
the conviction that only through structured dialogue could it have been possible to 
launch a comprehensive process. The HR/EUSR probably thought that only 
within the framework of a dynamic process could the different visions promoted 
by Dodik (Prime Minister of Republika Srpska who supports the maintenance of a 
highly decentralized system based on the recognition of strong prerogatives to the 
Entities) and Silajdžić (who is in favour of the centralization of the state) be 
eventually reconciled.67  
Beyond Schwarz-Schilling’s personal commitment, what was the role of the 
EU in these talks? Several OHR/EUSR officials have confirmed that, while the 
EU Council started to focus increasingly on the issue of the upcoming 
independence of Kosovo, the Commission turned out to be reluctant to support 
these consultations. As confirmed by a representative on the ground, the 
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Commission prioritized the debate on police reform alone, which had become a 
key prerequisite for the signature of the SAA between BiH and the EU:  
 
The funny thing of the Commission is that they always make lots of 
objections but they never openly say no and take responsibility for 
their refusals. The Police reform is part of the conditionality package 
that was put on the table for the formalization of the SAA. The 
Commission is afraid that emphasis on constitutional reform might 
spoil their circumscribed and technical efforts. In light of this, I am 
afraid that Mr. Lange68 and his team at the Commission lack 
completely a proper understanding of the Bosnian environment and 
its dynamics.69  
 
As we will see more extensively in the next chapter, with the arrival of 
Miroslav Lajčàk the reform priorities of the international community were 
switched again.  The change respected the input of the Commission, paving the 
way for one of the most delicate crises experienced in BiH since the 
implementation of the Dayton agreement has started. Clearly, the Commission’s 
‘technical understanding’ of EU-driven statebuilding is based on the idea that the 
countries of the Western Balkans are like all others that have already gone through 
the enlargement process; therefore, they are equally expected to strive to take over 
the acquis communautaire and implement it line by line.  
The critique that can be moved against this view is simple: BiH is a rather 
peculiar country. To certain extent, it is possible to state that in BiH there is the 
absence of a social contract between different ethnic communities. There is not 
one political BiH, but a state divided into three political ethno-religious groups. 
Pre-requisite for the construction of the state is sufficient cohesion at the socio-
political level. Currently, BiH resembles a mere assemblage of ethnic group that 
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do not share the same commitment to the state. However, the attitude of the 
Commission is justified in Brussels by making reference to the idea that, while 
technocratism can be slow to induce political and institutional development, it 
should nevertheless be privileged because it preserves local ownership of changes.  
 
 
4. The 2009 attempt at the finalization of a ‘Dayton II’ 
constitutional compromise: from the Prud process to 
Butmir retreat 
On 8 November 2008, the presidents of three key parties from the Bosnian 
political arena (the Croat Dragan Čović for HDZ, the Serb Milorad Dodik for 
SNSD, and the Bosniak Sulejman Tihić for SDA) signed a joint statement on key 
reforms, which followed another prolonged period of paralysis. According to the 
text of this agreement, which was finalized in the Bosnian village of Prud, 
constitutional reform should be placed at the very top of the domestic reform 
agenda. The three leaders presented themselves as ready to play a pivotal role in 
this difficult area of reform and expressed hope that other parties would also 
commit to bringing a positive input to the process.  
The final statement agreed in Prud stated that all efforts at constitutional 
reform would seek progress in four main areas: harmonization of the BiH 
Constitution with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR); responsibilities of the State; more functional BiH institutions; 
and territorial organization of the mid-level of government (OHR 2008a: 1). 
Moreover, the Prud Declaration encompassed a reference to the resolution of the 
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impasse on the legal status of the Brčko district, to be ‘regulated by a 
Constitutional Act, or by a Law with a constitutional two-third majority’ (OHR 
2008a: 2). 
While this agreement lacked broader consensus across the wide and 
complex Bosnian political environment – contrary to what was initially hoped for 
by its three original signatories – it did contain a number of interesting points. 
Amongst these, it is worth noting that the three aforementioned leaders, at the 
moment of launching the Prud process, explicitly called for direct international 
assistance in a possible structured process of constitutional reform. Čović, Dodik, 
and Tihić openly stated that: the ‘Constitution should be changed by operation of 
amendments to the current Constitution and that they will use expert assistance of 
international institutions’ (OHR 2008a: 1).  
Based on the initial entente signed at Prud, the three leaders continued to 
meet in tripartite format for a few months after their first rendezvous, gathering on 
average once a month. According to the analysis proposed by the International 
Crisis Group (ICG 2009b: 4-5), when they met on 26 January 2009 Čović, Dodik, 
and Tihić apparently reached agreement on one of the most sensitive issues 
related to the reorganization of sovereignty in the country: the opportunity to 
redesign the middle-level of governance by overcoming the current structure 
through the creation of four entities. This promising agreement, however, 
reflected a very low common denominator. No consensus was reached on how the 
boundaries of these four new entities would actually be designed, structured, and 
put to work in terms of institutional arrangements.  
On the one hand, Čović and Tihić stressed the idea that the reorganization of 
governance in the country should be based on completely new internal 
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boundaries. The IEBL would be rendered obsolete through the creation of the four 
new entities. More specifically, Čović and Tihić shared the view that this internal 
reorganization should also be based on the abolition of RS as it currently stands. 
On the other hand, the RS premier Milorad Dodik made clear that the boundaries 
of the Serb Entity would never be modified. Dodik later clarified that his support 
for the general idea of creating four entities to manage the middle level of 
governance was conditional on acceptance by the other two leaders of the right of 
RS to secede from the Bosnian state and become independent by popular 
referendum, after a ‘probationary’ period of three years within the new state 
structure (ICG 2009b: 5).  
Only a few weeks following the launch of the Prud initiative, the emergence 
of such a substantial disagreement revealed that the process was destined for early 
failure. Despite witnessing this stalemate, US and EU diplomats maintained a 
belief that an opportunity existed (this time) for joint and coordinated efforts to 
promote constitutional improvements in the Bosnian institutional scheme. The 
three leaders of the Prud process were hosted in Brussels by Javier Solana for 
bilateral meetings at the end of March 2009. Following this initiative, a first 
important sign of convergence between the US and EU on the Bosnian dossier 
arrived on 20 May 2009, with visits to Sarajevo by both the US Vice-President 
Joe Biden70 and the EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana.  
These visits by the two high-level representatives were intended as a public 
diplomacy initiative, in other words, an occasion to demonstrate to Bosnian 
politicians that Washington and Brussels were singing from the same hymn sheet. 
Biden and Solana also announced unequivocally that they were prepared to devote 
a high level of attention to BiH again, in order to facilitate its transatlantic 
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integration and, to that end, would work together on joint EU-US initiatives. In 
the words of the two leaders, ‘movement on the path to EU and NATO 
membership will bring genuine benefits … this will require concerted efforts and 
compromise to achieve needed reform, including a functioning BiH constitution. 
The United States and the EU will support this process of growth and reform’ (US 
Government 2009: emphasis added). 
Renewed US activism on the Bosnian dossier had been called for by several 
EU member states, especially following the difficulties encountered with regard to 
police reform and finalization of the SAA. For example, at the beginning of 2009, 
witnessing the initial slow development of the Prud process and the slow pace of 
other countries in the region in their respective attempts to get closer to the EU, 
Rome-based policy-makers elaborated an eight-point roadmap for the Western 
Balkans.  
This document, which was presented first at EU level, opened with a short 
but significant message to other EU member states: ‘The European Union needs 
to send a reassuring message to the Countries of the [Western Balkans] region on 
their European perspective, whilst exacting from them a renewed commitment 
towards reforms’ (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Elaborating its eight 
policy proposals, Italy stressed that cooperation with the US was of the utmost 
importance, especially on the Bosnian dossier. The role of Washington in BiH 
was defined as literally ‘crucial’, also with reference to ‘the future international 
civil presence based on a reinforced EUSR’ (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2009: §4). Italy also proposed the organization of a new EU-Western Balkans 
Summit in the first half of 2010, ten years after the Zagreb summit, and suggested 
that the event should be held ‘with the participation of the US’ (Italian Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs 2009: §8). Moreover, the convergence between Washington and 
Brussels was also identified as ‘vital ... to support Kosovo both in terms of direct 
commitment on the ground and of financial aid’ (Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2009: §7). 
 
4.1. US diplomacy focuses again on the Bosnian dossier 
The call for renewed American activism on the Bosnian stabilization process did 
not pass unheeded. The Biden/Solana declaration of May 2009 was just the 
starting point of what could be referred to as a complex process of strategic and 
operational ‘recomposition’ between the two sides of the Atlantic. The 
rapprochement between Washington and Brussels has taken place via a series of 
intense diplomatic and political contacts. In particular, most of the strategic 
discussions have taken place within the framework of the ‘Quint’ meetings, thus 
confirming the leading role played by a block of key European governments on 
the Bosnian dossier. The Western Balkans ‘Quint’ brings together the United 
States, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
Two important meetings of the Quint took place following summer 2009. 
One was held in Brussels on 17 September; and a second at the level of Political 
Directors was organized on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New 
York on 22 September. These two meetings served as a crucial point of 
confrontation on the following two issues: OHR/EUSR transition and possible 
ways of following up on the commitment solemnly announced a few months 
earlier by Biden and Solana. The preparatory documents that were exchanged 
between US and EU diplomats clearly reveal that in mid-September 2009 the 
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strategic concerns of the two sides of the Atlantic were still quite different. An 
examination of the organization of a ‘retreat’ for Bosnian political leaders71 in the 
Butmir military base (located in the outskirts of Sarajevo) in October 2009 
demonstrates that, in the end, the US successfully managed to confirm its 
leadership role and promoted its strategic vision which ultimately prevailed over 
the more cautious European plans. An analysis of the two main strategic policy 
documents that were exchanged by Brussels and Washington leave no grounds for 
doubt. 
On 16 September the four EU member states represented on the Quint sent 
to their US counterpart an articulated series of policy proposals entitled: ‘First 
Ideas for a “Package” Solution to the Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the 
End of 2009’ (EU 2009). The document was based on the broader discussion held 
within the EU framework at COPS level and also included a draft ‘Road-map for 
BiH and EU involvement’. The schedule drafted in Brussels encompassed the 
possible organization of ‘a retreat of BiH political leaders’ in early October, but it 
specified that this exercise should allow Bosnian politicians ‘to consolidate ideas 
as their final input’ to the broad package of measures presented by the EU. The 
retreat was intended as a lengthy brainstorming exercise and not as an occasion to 
exert pressure for a deal on constitutional reform. For its part, the US presented a 
non-paper with a more specific focus on constitutional reform. It is revealing that 
the document drafted in Washington (in response to the EU proposal) was 
entitled: ‘The Why of Constitutional Reform’ (US Department of State 2009). 
 
 184 
 
4.1.1. The EU’s ‘package solution’ deal 
The EU position can be reconstructed by referring to the report jointly presented 
by Solana and Olli Rehn to the European Council in November 2008. This 
document made a series of suggestions on the priorities that the EU should pursue 
in the months to come in its targeted member-statebuilding efforts, without 
opening the Pandora’s Box of the constitution. As noted by the High 
Representative for CFSP and the then EU Enlargement Commissioner, the time 
had come to make ‘active and comprehensive use of all the EU's tools and 
mechanisms available: A comprehensive EU approach should mobilise all the 
possible EU instruments with consistency and determination’ (EU 2008: 2, 
emphasis added).  
The formula arrived at by Brussels can be explained in the following terms: 
as EU integration was the only macro strategic issue on which different 
representatives from the Bosnian political environment could agree, the EU 
should launch a renewed (and clear) commitment to the Bosnian stabilization 
process; all EU policy-makers were expected to involve key Bosnian elites in the 
technical reforms necessary for the future implementation of the SAA. As 
explained in the summary note of the Solana/Rehn report (that was only partially 
released to the press by the European Council) it should be clear that: ‘EU 
integration represents a policy area that all BiH leaders agree on. This gives the 
EU unique leverage and responsibility’; in other words, the European Partnership 
and the SAA implementation should be the only ‘drivers of reform’ (EU 2008). 
The report – which was handed to the Bosnian Prime Minister Nikola Špirić 
during an ad hoc ceremony in Sarajevo by the Head of the Commission 
Delegation to BiH, Ambassador Dimitris Kourkoulas, and the HR/EUSR 
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Miroslav Lajčák (EC Delegation to BiH 2008) – concluded with the following 
text, which is indicative of the cautious EU approach to constitutional reform: 
 
Constitutional reform is neither a requirement for OHR closure nor 
for BiH's further journey towards the EU. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional framework must evolve to ensure effective state 
structures capable of delivering on EU integration, including the 
requirement to speak with one voice. The EU can support 
constitutional reform with expertise and funds, but the process must 
be led by BiH itself (EU 2008: 2). 
 
In spite of strong signals from Washington and initiatives by US diplomats 
in BiH, a belief that constitutional reform should be marginalized as much as 
possible was maintained by the EU up until September 2009. This is confirmed by 
the structure and content of the previously mentioned policy paper that 
summarized the EU position on BiH prior to the WB Quint meeting of September 
2009 in Brussels. The document opened with the acknowledgment that the 
‘imperfect Dayton constitution complemented by international oversight and a 
degree of international rule ... has clearly reached its limits’ (EU 2009: 1). In 
keeping with this pessimistic assessment of the status quo, the EU position 
proceeded with the observation that ‘to apply for membership of the EU and 
NATO, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to recover its full sovereignty’ (EU 2009: 
1).  
Interestingly however, the limited sovereign capacities of the Bosnian 
authorities were not linked to the inefficiencies of domestic multiethnic 
institutions. No reference was made to the nationalist elites and their prolonged 
dispute on the reconfiguration of the Bosnian state. The document elaborated in 
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Brussels emphasized mostly the international dimension of the Bosnian 
conditional sovereignty, since it presented sovereignty primarily as a matter of 
formality: ‘only after a decision has been taken to close the Office of the High 
representative and relinquish the Bonn powers can BiH sensibly hand in its 
application for EU and NATO membership’. This approach confirms: firstly, the 
tendency of EU policy-makers to emphasise formal ownership over actual 
sovereign capacities; secondly, the willingness by the EU to prolong its hands-up 
statebuilding stance over reconciliation and constitutional reorganization in BiH; 
thirdly, the preference for technically-driven change and a step-by-step approach; 
and fourthly, the necessity to present Bosnian elites with ‘a package solution ... 
combining reforms and incentives’, in which constitutional reform was just one of 
a number of issues to be addressed and would therefore continue to be 
procrastinated over. In other words, the strategy proposed by the EU indirectly 
attached emphasis to the idea that the rehabilitation of the formal Bosnian 
sovereignty would be followed by a de facto restoration of sovereignty through 
assimilating the country into Euroatlantic supranational structures. As previously 
mentioned, the EU has consistently presented supranational integration as a 
panacea to the Bosnian domestic sovereignty struggle. 
The assessment above finds more explicit confirmation in the 
methodological section of the EU policy paper: ‘constitutional reform is not part 
of the “5+2”, but needed to improve BiH’s functionality to get closer and to join 
Euro-Atlantic structures (EU 2009: 4). Moreover, the document noted that 
‘constitutional reform is not a requirement per se, but some constitutional change 
will be necessary for full membership (speaking with one voice, prompt 
decisions)’ (EU 2009: 5, emphasis added). These two statements provide a useful 
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synthesis of the EU’s understanding of constitutional change in BiH. In contrast 
with its transatlantic ally, Brussels intends constitutional reform as a progressive 
development that follows on from the EU and NATO integration processes and is 
functional to the future embedding of the country into the formal and informal 
supranational networks determined by membership of these two organizations.  
Only a few carefully calibrated steps in the overall process of constitutional 
reform were considered feasible by EU policy-makers. These included, first of all, 
measures for the harmonization of the Bosnian constitution with the ECHR. 
Having a constitutional order that privileges the rights of three constituent people 
identified along ethno-religious lines, the Bosnian system is a source of 
discrimination against those citizens who belong to minorities that do not fit into 
one of these three categories – e.g. Roma, Jewish or, more simply, citizens who 
are born of mixed marriages and refuse to identify themselves as members of a 
defined ethno-religious community. In addition to alignment of the constitution 
with the basic requirements of the ECHR, EU policy-makers also proposed a 
revision of the procedures for the election of the BiH Presidency, and an increase 
in the number of MPs sitting in the House of Representative. This last measure 
should be connected to a broader reform of the cantonal structure within the FBiH 
(EU 2009: 4). 
 
4.1.2. The ‘constitution first’ approach proposed by the US 
The US opposed the EU strategy. Brussels-based policy-makers had focused on 
the promotion of a broad package deal that only marginally touched upon issues 
of clear constitutional relevance. Washington’s analysis was instead more firmly 
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based on the conclusions of the report of the Venice Commission (2005), which 
while providing a detailed analysis of the Dayton institutional order and a 
negative assessment of the interferences of the OHR in the political life of the 
Bosnian state, also reached a series of interesting conclusions on issues related to 
constitutional change in BiH.  
Analyzing the complex and precarious Bosnian institutional balances, the 
Venice Commission offered the following general policy proposal: ‘Constitutional 
reform is indispensable since present arrangements are neither efficient nor 
rational and lack democratic content’ (2005: 24-25, emphasis added). The report 
went on to propose a re-allocation of the responsibilities of governance from the 
Entities to the central state and  the undertaking of targeted institutional and 
procedural changes with a view to better clarifying the prerogatives of the central 
government in its efforts towards integration into EU structures, as well as a 
‘streamlining of decision-making procedures’ (Venice Commission 2005: 25).  
The beliefs that constitutional reform is indispensable and that further 
centralization of the state is equally necessary are the two pillars of the recent US 
strategic proposal, which formed the basis of the Butmir process. Elaborating on 
‘the why of constitutional reform’, US policy-makers raised three main critiques 
of the EU’s cautious approach. Firstly, further recalling the ideas of the Venice 
Commission, US analysts reiterated that ‘negotiation of [EU] enlargement would 
be impossible without constitutional reform and the transfer of competencies to 
the State’ (US Department of State 2009: 1). Secondly, in a more direct critique of 
the EU’s member-statebuilding strategy they said: ‘the EU believes the 
enlargement process (i.e., use of avis and acquis) will identify legal and 
constitutional changes and provide a rationale for constitutional reform as 
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enlargement proceeds. It is unclear whether this process will address the specific 
structural and institutional changes needed in state government as identified by the 
Venice Commission’ (US Department of State 2009: 1). Thirdly, the analysis 
described as ‘naive’ the idea that the closure of the OHR would automatically 
result in local ownership and a more responsible political attitude on the part of 
domestic elites. The assumed correlation between closure of the OHR and an 
increase in local ownership was judged to be unrealistic ‘under the current 
constitutional arrangement. A more realistic outcome will be the continued 
paralysis of the state’ (US Department of State 2009: 1). 
The policy prescriptions proposed by the US proceeded with a list of 
principles and steps designed to favour the establishment of a framework for 
mediated constitutional change. The success of such a process would depend on 
the identification of ‘parameters for the negotiations and assure the Serbs that we 
are not undertaking a Dayton 2 exercise, while at the same time convincing the 
Bosniaks that we are committed to making state institutions more functional’ (US 
Department of State 2009: 3-4). In other words, the document went on, ‘we must 
convince the Bosniaks that the process will conclude with a more functional state 
and convince the Serbs that a state government need not be either unitary or 
highly centralized to be functional’ (US Department of State 2009: 5). The most 
interesting principle proposed by Washington was to prioritize NATO-friendly 
reform (which involves only a few ministers at state level and already enjoys 
broad local consensus). The promotion of reform related to BiH’s NATO 
accession process was presented as a potential Trojan horse in an effort to break 
the political deadlock. If this proved successful, the US argued, it should prove 
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possible to build ‘the institutional basis for EU enlargement negotiations’ (US 
Department of State 2009: 4).  
The urgency demonstrated by the US in pushing for a compromise on 
constitutional reform was also connected with two other strategic considerations. 
Firstly, the US preferred that such a comprehensive process would be launched on 
the first possible occasion following the summer. This would have enabled 
agreement on a constitutional deal by the end of 2009 and avoided the negative 
pre-electoral climate of the planned October 2010 general elections. Secondly, as 
a source from within the EUSR Office has confirmed,72 the plan to intensify 
international pressure on Bosnian elites was also connected with a certain 
‘ferment’ shared amongst international legal experts working in the country with 
regard to the imminent ruling of the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) on the case involving ‘Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’. 
The two plaintiffs are Bosnian nationals, who do not belong to any of the 
three ‘constituent peoples’ as identified in the Bosnian constitution, since their 
ethnicity is respectively Roma and Jewish. Sejdić and Finci challenged the 
legitimacy of the Bosnian constitution, which formally recognizes the right to run 
for the state Presidency and the House of Peoples only for those citizens who 
identify themselves as belonging to one of the three ‘constituent peoples’. 
It was most probably not by chance that the Venice Commission published 
on the second day of the Butmir retreat an amicus curiae brief on the ‘Sejdić and 
Finci case’, which perfectly anticipated the ECtHR final verdict. Using the same 
legal basis as the Court, the Venice Commission (2009: §22) made clear that 
‘different treatment on the basis of ethnicity can hardly ever be justified’. 
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Moreover, the Venice Commission (2009: §34) stressed that the emphasis of the 
DPA constitution on the constituent people is overly complex, since it effects 
citizens belonging to other nationalities, but also those who cannot identify 
themselves as members of one ethnic group or another: ‘the “Others” in Bosnia-
Herzegovina comprise not only persons who, like the plaintiffs, consider 
themselves to belong to a specific group (Jews or Roma); they also comprise 
anyone (including people in ethnically mixed marriages) who refuses to define 
him or herself as belonging to one of the constituent peoples. 
The Grand Chamber of the Court issued its judgement on 22 December 
2009. The ECtHR acknowledged that the balance among the three constituent 
people established under the DPA was appropriate in 1995, in consideration of the 
urgent necessity at that time to reach a compromise between the three ethno 
religious factions previously at war (ECtHR 2009).73 However, observing 
‘significant positive developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Dayton 
Peace Agreement’ the Court also recognized that ‘the applicants' continued 
ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina lacks an objective and reasonable justification’ (ECtHR 2009: §47, 
§50). 
To understand the potential impact of this judgment, it might be useful to 
refer – paradoxically though it may seem – to the statement of the dissenting 
Maltese Judge Giovanni Bonello, who posed a question of competence: ‘does it 
fall within this Court's remit to behave as the uninvited guest in peace-keeping 
multilateral exercises and treaties that have already been signed, ratified and 
executed?’ (ECtHR 2009: 34). According to Bonello, the ruling had too brusquely 
divorced Bosnia and Herzegovina from the realities of its own recent past’ 
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(ECtHR 2009: 33). Confirming its prudent approach to constitutional reform, in 
September 2009 the EU narrowly linked the ‘Sejdić and Finci case’ to the 
question of discrimination in the Bosnian constitution (EU 2009: 4).  
 
4.2.  Joint EU/US pressure and the constitutional project 
presented at the ‘Butmir retreat’ (October 2009) 
As previously mentioned, in summer 2009 the EU presented a project that 
proposed different priorities, approach, and methodology if compared with what 
the US identified as the steps necessary to produce extensive constitutional change 
in BiH. Nonetheless, when proposing its own ‘package solution approach’, the EU 
clarified that the main expectation for the weeks to come would be an intensified 
operational transatlantic cooperation. Brussels expressed the hope that the 
political platform on which Bosnian elites would be working to consolidate their 
Euro-Atlantic perspective could be structured on a ‘joint EU-US approach, 
endorsed at political level on both sides’ (EU 2009: 1).  
Amongst other interesting methodological recommendations, Brussels 
emphasized the need to develop actions that should be ‘clearly explained’ as well 
as ‘capitals driven’. The first formula encompassed the hope that both the EU and 
the US would ‘take responsibility for ensuring proper public communication, as 
well as ensuring proper information and understanding in the IC in Sarajevo’ (EU 
2009: 2). Even more interestingly, Brussels expressed the hope that renewed EU-
US cooperation would be established at the level of capitals and that these would 
remain the main strategic and coordination centers for reform initiatives promoted 
in BiH. The specific formula coined in Brussels was: ‘the EU and US  will need to 
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be in the driving seat; Sarajevo (OHR) should support, but not drive the process’ 
(EU 2009: 2). 
When the Butmir process was launched (20 October 2009), the exercise was 
co-chaired by the Swedish Foreign Minister and former HR in BiH, Carl Bildt74 
and the US Deputy SoS James Steinberg. The ICG labeled the meeting as ‘an 
emergency attempt to push through reform’ (ICG 2009a: 4, emphasis added). 
Using a similar tone, when news of the preparatory meetings for the Butmir 
exercise were made public, the international press defined the US-EU 
convergence as a ‘last-ditch effort to drag Bosnia out of the mire’ (McLaughlin 
2009). The EU high-level participation was reinforced soon after the introductory 
sessions, when the EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn joined the meeting. 
However, it soon became clear that the American methodological approach was 
going to take precedence: Bosnian leaders were gathered in the military base to be 
confronted with the broad issue of constitutional change and the reconfiguration 
of sovereignty in the country, in order to finally move it beyond the Dayton 
implementation phase towards a concrete and speedy process of transatlantic 
integration. At the same time, the two specific methodological indicators proposed 
by the EU were accepted. A degree of public diplomacy was pursued and the 
ambition of a ‘capitals-driven’ process was respected, via a certain 
marginalization of the OHR from the main stage of the talks.  
To further confirm the predominance of the US-sponsored objectives, it 
can be noted that a few sections of the document presented at the Butmir meeting 
recall the constitutional charter through which Kosovo became independent from 
Serbia in February 2008 (Assembly of Kosovo 2008). In the document issued by 
the Kosovo Assembly there are many references to Euroatlantic integration, so 
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that the charter emerged almost as the formalizing act of a silent shared-
sovereignty agreement – mainly between Kosovo and the EU – rather than a 
classic declaration of independence.  
In one move, Pristina dismissed UNMIK, erected a wall with Serbia, and 
tried to jump into the arms of the EU. Having expressed their gratitude to the UN 
for both its post-conflict peacekeeping efforts and prolonged administrative 
activities (§ 7), the members of the Kosovo Assembly went on to ‘invite and 
welcome’ the international civilian presence and the EU rule-of-law mission (§ 5). 
Furthermore, the Kosovar representatives solemnly announced: ‘for reasons of 
culture, geography and history, we believe our future lies with the European 
family. We therefore declare our intention to take all steps necessary to facilitate 
full membership in the European Union as soon as feasible and implement the 
reforms required for European and Euro-Atlantic integration’ (§ 6). 
Similar to the text that forms the basis of Kosovo’s independence 
declaration, the Butmir draft (Anon 2009: 5) included a section (6) on the relations 
between the Bosnian state and relevant international organizations. The section 
opens with a paragraph specifying that accession to international organizations is a 
prerogative of the central Bosnian state. Specifically, the paragraph makes clear 
that: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have the responsibility for applying to 
membership in International Organizations and to conclude treaties … To that end 
it may transfer sovereign powers to such organizations’ (§ 6a). The exclusive 
responsibility of the central level of governance to conduct the negotiations for EU 
accession was also specified: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have the 
responsibility to conclude agreements with the European Union and to undertake 
legal and political commitments required for the process of accession to the 
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European Union, including on matters that in accordance with other provisions of 
this Constitution are the responsibility of the Entities’ (§ 6a, emphasis added). 
 
4.2.1. Criticism from Washington 
On the other side of the Atlantic, neo-conservatives did not welcome the efforts of 
the Obama administration to resume activity on the Bosnian dossier. For instance, 
Bob Dole criticized the US government for resuming its efforts in BiH under the 
shadow of the EU. In the opinion of the former majority leader in the US Senate, 
the reform plan that was proposed at the ‘Butmir retreat’ was not the most 
appropriate solution for the country: ‘Bosnia is again under threat. This time the 
threat is not from the brutality and immediacy of genocide. Rather, it is a more 
subtle menace: the prospect of a state weakened to the extent that it dissolves; 
leaves its people in separatist, monoethnic conclaves; loses all hope for 
democratic development; and validates ultranationalism’ (Dole 2009). 
When rumors began to spread of the imminence of a broad high-level 
multilateral effort aimed at breaking the Bosnian constitutional deadlock, another 
interesting critique of the Butmir exercise was launched by USIP by James C. 
O'Brian – an American lawyer with considerable experiences of constitutional 
issues in the Western Balkans, having served as a former Special Presidential 
Envoy for the Balkans and Senior Advisor to SoS Albright. In this capacity, he 
also gave a direct contribution to the negotiations on the Bosnian constitution that 
was included in the DPA, assisting in the drafting exercise that was coordinated by 
Paul Szasz.75 
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O'Brian (2009) proposed a ‘new agenda’ for the international commitment 
to BiH, with a series of interesting and concrete methodological proposals. Some 
of these represented a kind of ‘preliminary’ warning against the upcoming high-
level international effort in Butmir. In general, O'Brian (2009: 1) criticized the 
tendency of the international community to press for ‘big initiatives’ that tend to 
promote a framework institutional solution to complex processes. Building on this 
critique, he proposed the development of a new gradual approach to reform, 
mostly led by EU bureaucracies, which should be authorized to ‘pick many, many 
little fights’ with the elites ruling in BiH. At the same time, he expressly invited 
both EU and US policy-makers to avoid complex and structured efforts for the 
imposition of constitutional change en bloc: ‘Constitutional reform is not 
necessary. It can certainly improve Bosnia’s governance structures and so should 
not be discouraged. As long as it is negotiated with leaders who benefit from the 
current system, however, it will not be enough’ (O'Brian 2009: 4).  
It is interesting that such a call for gradualism comes from a  legal expert 
that in the past has often participated in international teams that drafted 
constitutions for post-conflict societies (apart from BiH in 1995, O'Brian played 
also an advisory role in the preparation of the constitution adopted by the Kosovo 
Assembly on 17 February 2008). To some extent, however, at the core of 
O'Brian’s new policy plan for reform in BiH there is the idea that the European 
membership perspective should be exploited in a more concerted way. On the one 
hand, O'Brian invites EU policy-makers to ‘be themselves’ and engage Bosnian 
elites in their responsibilities related to the SAA process. On the other hand, he 
encourages US diplomacy to accept that the negative cycle that is currently 
 197 
 
dragging down the political and institutional life in BiH will not be broken 
overnight with an agreement on the constitution.  
 
Because the Dayton agreement defines each constituency in ethnic or 
national terms, the result is a self-reinforcing cycle: politicians 
reward their voters for approving ethnic appeals, and voters naturally 
seek more rewards by approving the politicians who make those 
appeals. As long as this cycle continues, no policy prescription can 
make the popular parties less nationalistic, or the less nationalistic 
parties more popular (O'Brian 2009: 2). 
 
This appears to be an accurate analysis of the current stalemate. Further 
developing on O'Brian’s ideas, it can be added that the tendency of US diplomacy 
to identify externally facilitated constitutional changes and negotiate their 
approval en bloc with key local leaders does not reflect the constitutional tradition 
of the United States. Constitutional history shows that changes in the founding 
rules in the American order are for the most part elaborated following macro 
societal or political developments which are then consolidated in praxis. 
Moreover, history confirms that macro developments in the community, whether 
they are relevant for the whole body politic or merely for state institutions, are 
usually followed only by small amendments to the basic ‘rules of the game’, 
which are carefully calibrated by the legislator. To be sure, the Bosnian experience 
can hardly be compared with other constitutional orders. Amongst other reasons, 
the most relevant is that the text included in the DPA was not the outcome of a 
structured process of reconciliation, but it was a construction of necessity that 
aimed to impose as many checks and balances as possible between the constituent 
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peoples previously at war. The DPA remains an internationally established 
constitutional order. 
 
4.2.2. Criticism from Europe  
Criticism of the modus operandi of the Butmir retreat also came from three former 
HR/EUSRs. Lord Paddy Ashdown, Wolfgang Petritsch and Christian Schwarz-
Schilling issued a public statement in which they offered a ‘methodological’ 
critique of the joint EU/US efforts for constitutional development in BiH.  
The most relevant critique proposed by the trio of former international 
envoys to BiH concerns the limited involvement of the HR/EUSR in the process: 
‘the way the Butmir initiative has been prepared has imperiled the international 
community’s and the future European Union Special Representative’s authority 
and integrity. It is imperative to integrate the High Representative into the process 
to allow for a proper and dignified conclusion of the peace implementation 
process and the opening of a new chapter’ (as quoted in Latal 2009). Furthermore, 
the three former heads of the OHR/EUSR questioned the absence of an open and 
more structured process of confrontation:  
 
The West should try new approach…The talks this week must pave 
the way for a sustainable constitutional reform process anchored in 
the institutions and civil society of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
supported by the European Union and the Council of Europe … In 
close cooperation with the United States, Europe should provide 
financial, structural and organisational support to facilitate a final, 
effective reform process (as quoted in Latal 2009).  
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Finally, the three former HR/EUSRs advocated for the maintenance of 
some form of external ‘power to internationally guarantee Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s peace and stability; also after the closure of the Office of the High 
Representative’ (as quoted in Latal 2009). The reference to the term ‘power’ 
indirectly evokes one of the most critical issues related to the transition away from 
the OHR and towards the creation of a ‘reinforced’ EUSR: what will happen to the 
Bonn Powers? When in 2007 the EU Council started to debate the future of the 
EUSR office after the closure of the OHR, little attention was paid to the Bonn 
Powers. To some extent, the Bonn Powers were not even an issue. The closure of 
the OHR was actually evoked as a step that could have allowed, on the one hand, 
the end of an era of excessive international interference in Bosnian political and 
legislative life and the inauguration of the ‘era of Brussels’ on the other. As the 
experience of the Slovak HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčák demonstrated, between 2007 
and 2008 the Bonn Powers were still a useful tool for the international community, 
especially in consideration of the tough confrontation that the police reform 
process entailed between EU representatives on the one side, and local Bosnian 
politicians trapped in their traditional nationalist rhetoric on the other. 
Rumors from the EUSR offices have confirmed that in the aftermath of 
Lajčák’s tenure, even EU countries started to debate whether or not the Bonn 
prerogatives should be preserved. One of the proposals considered by the 
European Council hinted at the hypothesis that Spain could inherit the Bonn 
Powers. In 1997, these powers were assigned by the PIC with a formula ad 
personam to the Spanish diplomat Carlos Westendorp, who headed the OHR from 
June 1997 until July 1999.  
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The recent decision adopted by HR/EUSR Valentin Inzko, which amended 
the statute of the city of Mostar including the procedure for the election of the 
mayor, has demonstrated that there are still issues in BiH that the international 
community tends to resolve by imposing solutions through the Bonn Powers 
(OHR 2009b). However, the attention that is still paid to the future of the Bonn 
Powers is mostly related to the possible removal of politicians who are judged to 
be guilty of obstructing the DPA implementation process. More precisely, the 
cautiousness of several EU member states in considering the Bonn Powers as ‘out 
of date’ stems from the ongoing showdown between the RS Prime Minister 
Milorad Dodik and the HR/EUSR. 
 
4.3. The Russian non-variable 
While Brussels and Washington tried to steer political confrontation in BiH 
towards the constructive acceptance of a new constitutional compromise, Moscow 
adopted extreme caution. When the Butmir retreat began, the Russian Ambassador 
in Sarajevo, Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, distanced himself from the exercise. 
Firstly, he suggested to RS media representatives that ‘the time is not right to 
agree on a reform of the DPA’ (as quoted in Vukicevic 2009a: my translation). 
Secondly, Botsan-Kharchenko stressed that Russia had no role in the preparation 
of the event and would not be involved in the discussions taking place at the 
international military base: the initiative ‘seeks to accelerate the convergence of 
the Bosnian state towards Euroatlantic institutions; since Russia is not a member 
of those institutions we are not involved in the realization of the initiative, but we 
monitor what is happening’ (as quoted in Vukicevic 2009b: my translation).  
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Moreover, Botsan-Kharchenko – who prior to his arrival in Sarajevo 
served as Russia's special envoy for Kosovo76 – renewed the Russian appeal in 
favor of the closure of the OHR and the definitive abolition of the Bonn Powers: 
‘the interferences of Bonn must be frozen from now until the definitive disclosure 
of the OHR. After that, any set of power of such kind shall not exist anymore’ (as 
quoted in Vukicevic 2009a: my translation). Interestingly, an analyst on the 
ground has pointed out that the visit of the Russian President Dimitry Medvedev 
to Belgrade almost at the same time as the Butmir exercise got underway 
indirectly compromised the success of the talks even before they began. Milorad 
Dodik was apparently heading to Belgrade to meet with Medvedev, when he 
should have been participating in the US/EU  initiative in Butmir (Alic 2009). 
The absence of Russia from the negotiation table in Butmir came as no 
surprise. Over the past few years, Moscow has been a consistently staunch 
supporter of the key policy developments demanded by the Bosnian Serb 
leadership, which include: the immediate closure of the OHR and the related 
abolition of the Bonn Powers; the consolidation of the central Bosnian state 
institutions without further formal changes to the main pillars of the current 
architecture; and the maintenance of the entities as middle-level of governance. 
Historically, Russia has always been a supporter of the Serb community in 
BiH. Russian investments in RS are already a clear sign that Moscow is ready to 
support the financial stabilization of Banja Luka (cf. section 4.2. in Chapter V). 
However, it has been only since 2009 that Russia started to adopt a more active 
attitude on the PIC. This, to some extent, formalized its disengagement from 
confrontation with the rest of the international community and the RS premier 
Milorad Dodik. Back in mid-May 2009, the Russian head of mission in Sarajevo 
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refused to support its colleagues on the adoption of an important communiqué, 
prepared by the PIC-SB Political Directors to condemn the RS government for its 
reiterated public challenges to the DPA.  
The intense showdown on police reform between HR/EUSR Miroslav 
Lajčák and the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, which started during summer 
2007, came to an end with the beginning of the Mostar process for police reform 
in December 2007. From that moment, the relationship between Banja Luka and 
the OHR seemed to have arrived at a ceasefire. The first months of the new 
Austrian HR/EUSR Valentin Inzko seemed relatively calm on the RS front. A new 
season of tensions between Dodik and the international community was 
nevertheless very close at hand. The apparent calm was interrupted abruptly on 14 
May 2009, when the RS National Assembly (RSNA) adopted a document 
challenging 68 competences that, in the course of the previous years, were 
transferred from the entities to the central level of governance. The RSNA labeled 
this transfer of competences as an illegal acquisition by the central government 
and also called on all Bosnian Serb representatives sitting in the government in 
Sarajevo to help the transfer of those prerogatives back to the institutions in Banja 
Luka.  
The document adopted by the RSNA was somehow indirectly 
preannounced at the beginning of the year by Dodik himself. Interviewed by the 
RS-based newspaper Večernje novosti in early 2009, he made clear that the season 
of transfer of powers from the entities to the national government was considered 
to be closed by the leadership in Banja Luka: ‘Before me, RS was like a store – 
you came in and took what you wanted. Only different to a store, you didn’t have 
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to pay for anything. It will never be like that again’ (as quoted in Vujanović 2009). 
Further to that, Dodik polemically argued: 
 
The International Community has made an enormous mistake by not 
implementing Dayton but the «spirit of Dayton». And once they 
released the spirit and started chasing it across BiH, we all knew 
what the only ending could be. Such that we are now going to ask for 
the competencies taken away from us to be returned. This will be the 
basis of our concept in the process of constitutional changes. Nobody 
should have any doubts about us achieving that. Be assured – RS will 
not lose one single competency more … We have not received yet 
the 49 percent of the territory as belongs to us according to Dayton. 
We are going to request that our territory is returned. We are not 
interested in the stories that it is all Bosnia and it is all ours. No! I am 
only interested in RS, and others should make their own agreements. 
(as quoted in Vujanović 2009: emphasis added).  
 
In spite of the pressures made by HR/EUSR Inzko, on 15 June 2009 the 
RSNA authorized the publication of this controversial document on the pages of 
the RS Official Gazette. Witnessing this development, the PIC-SB reacted with a 
strong condemnation, in which the attitude of RS leader was defined as an attack 
against the constitutional stability of the whole country: 
 
The PIC Steering Board expressed its concern about recent political 
developments in BiH, not least the adoption of the Conclusions on 
14 May by the Republika Srpska National Assembly. Statements and 
actions challenging the sovereignty and constitutional order of BiH, 
as well as attempts to roll back previously agreed reforms and to 
weaken existing state level institutions display open disrespect for 
the fundamental principles of the GFAP, are unacceptable and have 
to stop. These actions also run counter to the GFAP and the long-
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established efforts of the PIC Steering Board to support state 
building. Actions such as these will be taken into account when 
assessing the second condition set by the PIC Steering Board for 
OHR-EUSR transition, which is a positive assessment of the 
situation in BiH by the PIC Steering Board based on full compliance 
with the Dayton Peace Agreement (PIC-SB 2009a: emphasis added). 
 
The most interesting aspect of this statement was that PIC-SB Political 
Directors were forced to mark the paragraph against the RSNA document with the 
following clarification: ‘the delegation of the Russian Federation could not join 
with the rest of the PIC’ (PIC-SB 2009a). By taking distance from its colleagues 
on such an evident provocation, the head of Russian diplomacy in Sarajevo made 
clear how far is Moscow from the Western members of the PIC-SB when it comes 
to assessing the political decisions adopted by the RS leadership. 
Following the summer break, in the proximity of the Butmir retreat, the 
confrontation between Dodik and the international community restarted on the 
same track. Once again, Russia confirmed its disengagement, thus providing 
indirect support to the Bosnian Serb leader. After the RSNA document on the 
reacquisition of competences by the Serb Entity, a new formal direct attack was 
brought against the OHR and the Bonn Powers. On 24 September 2009 in the 
document highlighting the RS government conclusions of the 124th session held in 
Banja Luka, it was stated that all the decisions adopted by the HR in the use of the 
Bonn Powers would no longer apply on the territory of RS. As confirmed on the 
pages of the Southeast European Times, this document was a challenge to the 
intervention by HR/EUSR Inzko in the governance of the national electric 
company Elektropenos (Associated Press 2009). Welcoming the adoption of this 
act, Dodik tried to argue for its legitimacy by telling the international press that, 
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after all, the OHR has run the country for too long as ‘an undeclared protectorate’ 
thus turning it into an ‘imprisoned state’ (Itano 2009). 
The reaction by the PIC-SB was prompt and resolute. However, also in this 
circumstance the statement issued by the PIC-SB Ambassadors was not adopted 
with unanimous support. The text criticized the RS government, responsible for a 
‘downward spiral in political relations and challenges to the GFAP’ (PIC-SB 
2009b). In spite of the relatively ‘soft’ term of this condemnation, Russia 
nevertheless withdrew its support. As a counter reaction – probably reinvigorated 
by the renewed division in the PIC-SB – on 28 September 2009 Prime Minister 
Dodik published on the RS-based newspaper Glas Srpske a very strong editorial. 
Even if the focus of Dodik’s criticism in this article were Bosniak leaders, in 
particular Tihić, Silajdžić, and Lagumdžija that he depicted as ‘still dreaming 
hysteric dreams about a unitary BiH’ (Dodik 2009b: 2), the attacks from Banja 
Luka also targeted the OHR and ‘some’ members of the PIC-SB.  
Refraining from the adoption of any sort of diplomatic language, Dodik 
reiterated his systematic accusations against the work of the OHR, directly 
responsible, in his opinion, for repeated breaches of the balances created with the 
DPA and for contributing actively to the ‘efforts to build a national state of 
Bosniaks, based on the idea of reis-ul-ulema’ (Dodik 2009b: 1). The 
internationally-sponsored centralization effort were labeled as an attempt ‘to 
convert all to Bosniak terms under the pretext of a civil state, universal rights, 
election by simple majority of votes’ (Dodik 2009b: 2). Finally, the RS premier 
launched an attack on some members of the diplomatic community in Sarajevo, 
reminding them that while RS has developed as an efficient sub-national unit, its 
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leadership has been the object of an unjustified attack by the international 
community for being in breach of the DPA: 
 
Republika Srpska has accomplished that unity in the last couple of 
years with determination to keep on complying with the Dayton 
Agreement. However, that sort of commitment to the Dayton is 
proclaimed as the Anti-Dayton. That Bosniaks’ Goebbels-like parrot 
chorus, assisted by some ambassadors, by which they violate 
diplomatic conventions and international law because they act as if 
the Bosniaks and not the state of BiH, in which do not live only 
Bosniaks, approved their letters of credit (Dodik 2009b: 2). 
 
Only a few days before, another ‘loud’ attack was brought by Dodik on the 
international press. This time, the RS Prime Minister chose the pages of The New 
York Times. On 18 September 2009, Dodik wrote an open letter in response to a 
previous editorial earlier appeared on the same newspaper, in which strong claims 
were made on the concrete chances that ‘Bosnia could well return to violence’, as 
well as on the fear that a rebound of violence in the country can have possible 
destabilizing impact on the entire Western Balkans: ‘Renewed fighting in Bosnia 
may not launch World War III, but it could well spread to other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo’ (Kulish 2009).  
The article on The New York Times followed another worrisome analysis 
made on the British newspaper The Independent, where BiH was defined as a 
country ‘back on the brink of ethnic conflict’ (Morris 2009). More or less in the 
same days, in a more extensive – but equally pessimistic – analysis published on 
Foreign Affairs, BiH was labeled as a state ‘drifting towards chaos’, which was 
close to ‘not remain peaceful for long’ (McMahon and Western 2009: 72, 70). 
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Moreover – as this recent article on Foreign Affairs has warned – it is historically 
proven that the victory of chaos in BiH tends to have negative destabilizing effect 
in the wider Western Balkans region: ‘if twentieth-century history is any guide, 
conflicts that begin in Bosnia rarely remain isolated within its borders’ (McMahon 
and Western 2009: 70). While stressing that BiH is actually a country ‘at peace’, 
Dodik took the chance to make clear that Bosnian Serbs ‘do not support the 
centralized model that some in the international community have sought to impose 
on Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Dodik 2009a: emphasis added). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Academics and observers generally agree that international statebuilding projects 
create an inevitable sovereignty paradox: external actors compromise crucial 
aspects of sovereignty in the interest of granting domestic political authorities the 
full exercise of their legitimate prerogatives. The understanding of sovereignty as 
an internationally-shared responsibility has been identified as the normative basis 
on which statebuilding initiatives can be justified; this vision would hold in nuce 
the pillars that constitute the ‘ethics’ of contemporary peace and statebuilding. 
This claim has rarely been followed by attentive analysis of the interactions 
between international officials involved in statebuilding missions and local elites, 
in order to determine if different actors concretely share the responsibilities of 
stabilizations. Moreover, what has quite been overlooked in the literature is that, 
in cases like BiH, the EU also complicates the sovereignty paradox for structural 
reasons. A post-nation state organization that prepares target states for 
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membership, the EU monitors and facilitates institutional reorganization in view 
of integration; thus, while preventing the dispersion of sovereignty and reining in 
centripetal forces thanks to the prospect of membership, it seeks to prepare 
autochthon institutions to give up sovereign prerogatives when the time to join the 
Union arrives.  
Analyzing political confrontation on constitutional reform, this chapter 
explored the normative approach to sovereignty and the diplomatic choices that 
have characterized EU-driven statebuilding in BiH. Keeping a focus on the 
specific issue of responsibility, the chapter has shown that in the parallel 
implementation of its statebuilding and enlargement agendas, the EU reproduces 
some of the peculiarities of a neo-medieval empire that puts peripheral units on 
the way to full membership. In other words, Brussels considers inclusion and 
participation in its formal and informal networks as definitive indicators of 
stability and rehabilitation. The interference created by EU-driven statebuilding 
cannot be thus justified simply by the goal of establishing the Bosnian authorities’ 
full and legitimate exercise of empirical statehood.  
Thanks to the analysis of official documents and extensive interviews with 
participants and observers to the EU-decision making process, it has been clarified 
that EU interference on the ground can be traced back to the conviction that the 
various internal fractures and wounds of the Bosnian multiethnic experiment will 
be healed only when the country’s sovereignty is diluted, partially dispersed, and 
‘domesticated’ by the greater European integration machine. In comparative 
perspective, the trajectory of sovereignty in what has been referred to as ‘EU-
driven statebuilding’ or ‘EU’s member-statebuilding’ is substantially different 
from that determined by UN-led operations of a similar kind. The EU does not 
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compromise self-governance with the aim of fully restoring the empirical 
statehood of the fragile South-Eastern European states; rather, it approaches its 
mission with a more sophisticated mindset and a self-serving goal that is, as said, 
to train political elites and civil servants from the target states for EU 
membership. 
By studying the specific attitude of the EU vis-à-vis the Bosnian 
constitution-making process, light has been shed on the EU’s peculiar ‘hands-up 
statebuilding’ stance. The ambiguity of raising up one’s hands (a gesture used to 
indicate that ‘it’s not my responsibility’) when called upon to take direct 
responsibility for political reconciliation and constitutional reform is emblematic 
of Brussels’ difficulty in solving two crucial operational dilemmas: the dilemma 
of bottom-up vs. top-down statebuilding, and the conflict between technical 
assistance and complex post-war stabilization. Moreover, this particular stance 
has enabled the EU to escape for quite some time a more open confrontation with 
the residual statebuilding influence of the US in the Bosnian project.  
The next chapter will analyze the ‘troubled life’ of the EU conditionality 
over the Bosnian police reform, with the aim to explain first the ideological nature 
of its conception and, second, its prolonged negative impact on the Bosnian 
political environment, which eventually induced the EU to push such 
conditionality slowly on the margin of the negotiation table. Also the analysis of 
police reform will provide evidence that Brussels has thus far not been able to 
resolve the crucial operational dilemmas that international statebuilding agencies 
are bound to face in their field activities.  
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(Chapter IV) 
 
A Story of Subverted Conditionality?  
The EU-Sponsored Police Reform 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The story of the EU-sponsored police reform in BiH represents an interesting 
case of mismanaged conditionality. The link between police reform and the EU 
accession process was promoted by Lord Paddy Ashdown in 2004, during his 
second year as ‘double-hatted’ HR/EUSR. In 2005, the EU clarified that this 
reform was a priority criteria for the opening of the SAA negotiations with BiH. 
In the early stages of the reform talks, an agreement between the three Bosnian 
ethno-religious groups on the reconfiguration of policing was almost reached. At 
the same time, the Bosnian negotiating team for the SAA was assembled and 
started a successful confrontation with the EU Commission.77 
However, hopes for a fast-track deal on police reform soon faded and the 
initial apparent willingness to cooperate gave way to exasperated logics of 
relative gains. Following the general elections of October 2006, which registered 
the defeat of all the old nationalist parties, the new German HR/EUSR Christian 
Schwarz-Schilling tried to exploit the momentum and negotiate a framework for 
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general constitutional reform, thus marginalizing in most of his diplomatic 
initiatives the talks for the reorganization of the police. As the previous chapter 
has shown, this choice was not supported with sufficient cohesion from Brussels 
and Schwarz-Schilling was thus induced to resign from his post even before the 
scheduled conclusion of his mandate.  
The EU found renewed cohesion in July 2007 with the arrival of the 
Slovak HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčák, who focused again on the reorganization of 
the Bosnian police as to a top priority. Since his first weeks in Sarajevo, Lajčák 
reiterated with unprecedented emphasis the connection between such reform and 
the European destiny of BiH. The link between police reform and progress on 
the SAA actually led the country to experience one of the most severe crises of 
its post-Dayton history. In danger of compromising the credibility of the whole 
European integration project, at the end of 2007 the EU decided to cease 
confrontation with domestic elites and watered down the most critical elements 
of its requests. Brussels thus enabled local politicians to perform a ‘conquest’ of 
the reform agenda. So long as domestic interlocutors demonstrated enough 
activism and goodwill (e.g. by organising a series of meetings among their 
leaders, who signed a plan of action and agreed on a vague timetable for reform) 
the EU turned a blind eye to its conditionality and rewarded them by allowing 
the initialling of the long-awaited SAA in December 2007. Only six months 
later, the green light was also given to the final signature of the SAA.  
The following pages reconstruct the key politico-diplomatic dynamics 
related to the reform of the Bosnian police, from the initial efforts of HR/EUSR 
Paddy Ashdown to the SAA signature in June 2008. The main goal of this 
analysis is to shed light on what can be addressed as the other side of the 
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problematic ‘responsibility coin’ of external statebuilding. The previous 
reconstruction of the EU’s reluctance to undertake concrete initiatives with 
regards to the Bosnian constitutional reform represents only one aspect of the 
‘troubled’ relationship that Brussels has developed vis-à-vis its political 
responsibilities in BiH. The tendency to step back when called upon to take 
direct responsibility for political reconciliation and constitutional reform 
revealed only one critical side of the EU commitment to the stabilization of BiH. 
The way in which the conditionality over the Bosnian police reform was 
launched, sustained, and eventually obfuscated from the negotiation table by the 
EU, reflects the tendency, typical of multilateral institutions operating in crisis 
areas, to defend their ‘no mistake policy’.  
 
 
2. The sovereignty struggle through the police reform 
The statebuilding of BiH has been hinged for almost ten years around the EU 
prospect of membership. BiH was recognized the status of ‘potential candidate 
member’ in November 2000 at the EU Zagreb Summit, together with other four 
countries of the Western Balkans (namely Albania, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Croatia and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).78 
In spite of the decade-long commitment on the part of Brussels, the externally-
facilitated construction of a functional and ‘EU-feasible’ state has reached a 
point of dangerous stalemate. Witnessing a prolonged political stall, the re-
emergence of a nationalist rhetoric, and the lack of any serious institutional 
development, during his last months of tenure the HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčák 
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essentially invited to reconsider the feasibility of the whole Bosnian multi-ethnic 
project. At a press conference in October 2008, the Slovak diplomat laconically 
admitted that ‘the concept of a multi-ethnic BiH state is difficult to achieve, 
although it has not yet failed’ (as quoted in Anon 2007). 
In spite of such skepticism, the EU remains the only possible ‘magnetic 
centre’ for the long term normalization of BiH, a role that cannot be dismissed by 
Brussels, especially after the gradual operational disengagement of the US from 
SEE and the solemn promise made by the EU at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 
2003. The prospect of EU membership remains a powerful tool of indirect 
stabilization, which has registered some clear successes – by pulling, for instance, 
the incredibly rapid economic recovery and democratic stabilization of Croatia – 
and that has been put at work for the whole Western Balkans, Serbia included.  
However, it seems that in BiH the promise of prosperity in a peaceful 
Europe alone does not stimulate a constructive debate among different ethno-
religious political factions on how to put in place the substantial institutional 
ameliorations that would bring Sarajevo closer to Brussels. The EU-dream has 
bridled the most critical centripetal forces of the Bosnian political environment 
but – since it has not been backed by an active strategy for socio-political 
reconciliation – it could not heal all the wounds and sources of friction that 
characterize the ‘multilevel’ sovereignty struggle between Muslim Bosniaks, 
Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs. The confrontation between these three 
ethno-religious groups ranges from the central state to the cantons (in the FBiH), 
and then down to municipal level. 
Commenting on this prolonged stall – amongst many other voices of 
concern that have been raised in the last months – Christopher Patten and Paddy 
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Ashdown have depicted BiH as the less receptive reality among the newly 
independent states from SEE that are standing in line at the EU’s doorstep. In a 
commentary published by European Voice on 26 March 2009 (the day of the 
official handover between Miroslav Lajčák and the new HR/EUSR, the Austrian 
diplomat Valentin Inzko), the former European Commissioner for External 
Relations warned that BiH is still very far from being ready to be promoted from 
its protectorate status. In addition, with unequivocal terms, Patten has called on 
the EU for a renewal of ‘the threat of strong action’. To his eyes, the stick rather 
than the carrot represents the only possible mean to ‘convince’ Bosnian political 
leaders that they must always demonstrate, in their daily activities, a genuine 
commitment to a multiethnic state (Patten 2009).  Only a few months earlier, with 
similar expressions, Lord Paddy Ashdown launched a very strong ‘wake-up call’ 
for the EU from the pages of The Observer. According to the analysis of the most 
active among all the HRs that have served in Sarajevo, ‘Brussels must toughen up 
its conditionality, support its instruments on the ground, resist attempts to 
undermine the Bosnian state, insist on constitutional reform to make Bosnia more 
functional and tackle corruption which is becoming ever more embedded’ 
(Ashdown 2008). 
It is particularly significant that these two European high-profile 
politicians – both very experienced on the political dynamics of BiH – have called 
for a strengthening of European conditionality. Their converging policy proposals 
are even more striking if we take into consideration the recent story of police 
reform: the most critical conditionality thus far imposed from Brussels.  
Apparently closed with the initialing of the SAA in December 2007 
between the Bosnian government and the EU Commission, the stall that affected 
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the negotiations on the reform of the Bosnian police had lasted almost for three 
years. As early as 2005, the Bosnian rapprochement with Brussels was bridled by 
the choice of the EU to incorporate the reform of the police in the pre-SAA 
conditionality package. Brussels made clear that a set of basic conditions had to 
be fulfilled in order to allow BiH moving forward on the SAP: improved co-
operation with the ICTY, reform of public broadcasting, a substantial 
restructuring of the public administration, and a reorganization of police forces.  
The inability of local politicians to agree on the main pillars of this last 
institutional development caused the paralysis of the European integration process 
for BiH. More precisely, the incapacity of domestic actors to agree on a reform 
that would satisfy the EU requests for change became so critical to affect the 
functionality of all multiethnic institutions. As the last section of this chapter will 
demonstrate, this paralysis induced the HR/EUSR to a renewed use of the Bonn 
Powers, which proved again the ineluctable protectorate status of the country. 
However, in spite of three years of sterile negotiations, Brussels ended up 
demonstrating an unprecedented benevolence towards Sarajevo and turned a blind 
eye on all of the most demanding requirements previously attached to the police 
reform. As a proof of such generosity, in June 2008 (only six months after its 
technical initialing) the SAA could thus be finalized. The signing of this crucial 
agreement was granted without a comprehensive reorganization of the police, but 
on the basis of some minor adjustments encompassed in highly technical laws of 
dubious impact. Precisely, two legislative measures on the field of policing were 
adopted by the Bosnian Parliament in April 2008. Several voices of criticism 
righteously argued that these last legislative measures have actually increased 
complexity rather than improved the overall efficiency of policing in the country.  
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Against this articulated backdrop, it is clear that the EU’s conditionality 
management on police reform offers a unique case study. Thus far, the academic 
literature and policy analysis have mostly focused on the very technical and 
security-related aspects of police reform (ICG 2005) and, even more 
predominantly, on the operational challenges faced by EUPM, the ESDP 
Mission installed by the EU in BiH (Nowak 2003; Merlingen 2005a; 2005b; 
Wisler 2005; Penksa 2006; Wisler 2007). Only sporadically (Eralp 2007; 
Muehlmann 2007) attention has been paid to the specific political and diplomatic 
dynamics that have characterized the long showdown – undergone from early 
2005 until summer 2008 – amongst Bosnian politicians from the three ethno-
religious groups, as well as between each of these groups and the HR/EUSR.  
Balancing this trend, the following pages mainly focus on the political 
developments that accompanied the reform of the Bosnian police and the 
signature of the SAA. The analysis emphasizes the difficult confrontation 
between international institutions and local elites. Conflicting agendas 
determined a stall without precedents. Witnessing the failure of its long 
supported conditionality, the EU ended up in an uncomfortable position. 
Brussels saw a possible way out in the emergence of domestic ownership of the 
reform agenda. Stepping back and disowning a mantra that had been repeated for 
over three years (no police reform equal to no more progress of the SAP) the EU 
allowed domestic politicians to, so to speak, ‘conquer’ the primacy of the 
negotiations for reform. The discrete abandoning of conditionality allowed the 
EU avoiding an open and more problematic correction of policies. This subtle 
maneuver hence helped Brussels to defend its ‘no mistake policy’. This 
expression is employed to describe the tendency of external actors in crisis areas 
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to deny objective miscalculations, mistaken politico-diplomatic choices, and 
unproductive reform strategies. This reluctance to take stock of mistakes and 
admit responsibilities represents a commonality in international statebuilding 
missions. In order to consolidate their governance and supervision roles, 
international statebuilding mission tend to present their policies, conditionality, 
and strategic choices as ‘the good and the proper’, whose validity should not be 
questioned, even when clear limitations emerge from implementation processes. 
In their recent seminal work on statebuilding, Ashraf Ghani and Clare 
Lockhart have attentively pointed at the problem of responsibility as to one of 
the crucial variables that affects international intervention in the stabilization and 
reconstruction of failed or failing states. In their opinion, international agencies 
dangerously lack an ‘understanding of shared responsibility, a vision of 
coproduced outcome, or an international role that does not involve, at one 
extreme, imposed solutions that amount to viceregal hubris or, at the other 
extreme, a type of benign neglect that consigns the international community to 
the role of interested observer’ (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 5-6). 
 
3. Police restructuring as technical change: the picture 
presented from Brussels 
The reform process of the Bosnian police was put on the negotiation table with a 
certain determination by HR/EUSR Ashdown only in 2004, and it became a pre-
requisite for the conclusion of the bilateral EU-BiH negotiations on the SAA. 
Inserting the reorganization of the Bosnian police as a key conditionality in the 
pre-SAA package deal allowed the EU to continue covering this reform process 
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under the same original technical cloak that had been determined when police 
restructuring started to be implemented under the auspices of the UN in the late 
1990s. This ‘maquillage’ was attempted in spite new strategic and ideological 
considerations had clearly emerged on the part of the EU and started to influence 
EU policy-makers. This choice aimed to prevent irreconcilable ethnic 
confrontation on the issue. Nonetheless, it soon started to be clear that domestic 
political tensions over the most delicate passages of the reform sponsored by 
Brussels were destined to become overwhelming and difficult to solve in the 
timeframe originally identified. 
At the very beginning of the negotiations, however, the strategic make-up 
of politics with technocratism seemed to be successful. Indeed, an agreement on 
a reconfiguration of policing was almost reached, with Bosnian Serb politicians 
who even accepted the plan to redraw ‘police regions’ across the IEBL (Moore 
2005). All Bosnian parties undersigned an operational agreement in October 
2005, which included a detailed working schedule. Amongst other provisions, 
the entente implied the creation of a Directorate for Police Restructuring 
Implementation that – as expressly agreed by the parties – ‘shall be assigned to 
make a proposal of a plan for implementation of police structures reform in BiH 
per phases, including proposals of police regions’ (OHR 2005b: emphasis 
added).  
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3.1. Ashdown’s centralization strategy and the EC’s technical 
packaging of police reform 
The chances for a smooth deal started to fade when Bosnian politicians felt that 
restructuring the police was the last centralizing effort undertaken by HR/EUSR 
Paddy Ashdown, which could have produced a revolution in the allocation of 
powers and competences within the domestic arena. As a former Head of the 
OHR Legal Department has clarified, Ashdown’s agenda was clearly aiming to 
‘build Bosnia’s central government and undermine the country’s sub-sovereign 
political units: only in this way ... Bosnia could become a normal European state 
and put its violent war behind it’ (Parish 2007: 16). This statement further 
confirms the idea presented in the previous chapter about the EU member-
statebuilding in BiH as a technical institution building exercise to be 
implemented without a formal opening of the constitutional Pandora box and in 
the absence of a structured reconciliation project.  
As Matthew Parish (2007: 16-17) further clarifies, in order to achieve the 
purpose of drastic centralisation, Lord Ashdown ‘became a one-man legislative 
machine, repeatedly using the Bonn powers to enact legislation, creating new 
institutions, and implicit threats to remove officials to push the Entities to agree 
to transfer new powers to central government’. This analysis can be supported 
since it finds clear and objective confirmation in the OHR statistical record. So 
far, Ashdown has been indeed the most active user of the Bonn Powers and a 
staunch promoter of what could be referred to as the centralization-no-matter-
what policy.  
The debut of the British HR/EUSR in the exercise of the Bonn Powers 
dates back to June 2002, when he dismissed Nikola Grabovac from his post as 
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Finance Minister of the FBiH (OHR 2002). From that moment to the end of a 
mandate that lasted almost for four years (from June 2002 until January 2006), 
he adopted 447 decisions. Particularly in the first half of his tenure, decisions 
were focused in the field of judicial reform (almost one hundred already at the 
end of 2004), as well as on state-level matters and constitutional issues (almost 
forty in the same time span). On the contrary, limited direct intervention was 
attempted in the field of economic reform: only 34 decisions were adopted in 
this sphere throughout the Ashdown’s mandate. 
The HR/EUSR also devoted particular attention to the removal of public 
officials – both elected and civil servants. In summer 2004 alone, Ashdown 
issued a ban from public offices for over sixty individuals.79 With the term ‘ban’, 
in the OHR jargon is intended the prohibition of ‘holding any official, elective or 
appointive public office, running in elections and holding office within political 
parties’. The removal from office is accompanied by the suspension of the 
related salary and possible privileges: the standard OHR decision of this type 
usually specifies that ‘any entitlement to receive remuneration or any privileges 
or status arising out of his said position ceases forthwith’. These two formulas 
are recalled in all OHR removals, unless these come in the form of ‘conditional 
bans’. In this other circumstance, the HR might ban an individual from serving 
in a specific policy field or a given public function. Picking amongst many 
examples, the conditional removal of Zoran Djeric, RS Interior Minister, was 
one of the first decisions of such kind adopted by Paddy Ashdown. In this 
specific case, Djeric was banned from ‘holding any law enforcement, or 
executive public office’ as well as from ‘holding any position within a Ministry 
of Interior or equivalent’. However, as it is clear from the letter of the OHR’s 
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decision, Djeric was not banned from serving in other areas of the public 
administration.80 
Reconnecting all the above elements, it might be useful to summarize 
Ashdown’s activism by distinguishing three key centralizing moves – the 
reorganization of the judicial system, the completion of the reunification of the 
army,81 and tax reform (which allowed merging the country’s three separate 
customs administrations and create a single, state-wide VAT system) – as well 
as one clear and ambitious plan to clean up the Bosnian public administration 
and governmental institutions from corrupted and nationalist officials. Reaching 
the verge of this simultaneous ‘piece-by-piece centralization’ and ‘cleaning 
effort’, the HR/EUSR focused on the reform of the police as to the very last 
challenge for the rationalization of the Bosnian state structure. 
The input from the Commission on this specific matter had been more 
prudent. For instance, a reference to the need for police restructuring was made 
in the Commission report ‘on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union’, 
a feasibility study published in November 2003. In this document, the police was 
only one of many other fields where Bosnian authorities were asked to intervene 
with substantial reforms and institutional ameliorations. No differently than 
other items considered in the feasibility study, police was dealt with a highly 
technical understanding and, possibly even more than other issues, it was 
approached with an exclusive focus on the equation between costs and 
performances.  
Back then, the Commission mainly criticized fragmentation and conflicts 
of competences between the different police forces deployed in the country, 
 222 
 
stressing that ‘the complexity of the existing multiple police forces increases 
costs and complicates co-ordination and effectiveness… Costs are high because 
of duplication in areas such as training and equipment. Financial and technical 
constraints limit crime fighting abilities’ (European Commission 2003: 26). The 
emphasis on efficiency and operational aspects was attentively kept by the 
Commission, particularly after the Police Reform Commission (PRC 2004) 
issued a detailed report on how to implement such a challenging reorganization. 
In a letter to the then BiH Prime Minister Adnan Terzić, in his capacity as EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement, Chris Patten emphasized the connection 
between counter-crime measures in BiH and security in Western Europe. 
According to Patten, the direct and pressing involvement of the EU in the police 
reform process would be legitimized by the fact that ‘if BiH is not able to tackle 
crime effectively, this has a bearing on crime elsewhere in Europe, including 
within the EU’ (European Commission 2004b: 1). 
 
3.2. The difficult balance between strategic political objectives 
and technocratism 
The emphasis attached by the Commission to the fight against crime should not 
obfuscate the strategic objectives attached to police reform by the HR/EUSR 
Ashdown. From the mandate of the PRC, it is possible to see that while 
arguments on efficiencies were given priorities, the HR/EUSR was nonetheless 
ready to open a more political confrontation with Bosnian elites. The PRC was 
established thanks to a decision adopted directly by Ashdown (OHR 2004). In 
the very first article of the mandate, the HR/EUSR clarified that the new body 
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was expected to elaborate ‘a single structure of policing for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina under the overall political oversight of a ministry or ministries in 
the Council of Ministers’ (OHR 2004).82  
The ideological and strategic intentions at the basis of police restructuring 
become more obvious if we recall that police restructuring was somehow 
detached from judiciary reform. The reform of the judicial system – which, once 
completed, was presented by Ashdown as one of his most relevant success 
stories – was not proposed as a point of reference for police reform. This link 
was completely absent in the mandate given by the HR/EUSR to the PRC and 
appeared only as a sporadic term of reference in the final report issued by the 
same PRC at the end of its assessment activities. Indeed, in what turned out to be 
a 283-page handbook for reform, the problem of effective cooperation between 
police officers and prosecutors appears only in the section that provides the 
detailed ‘Legal Provisions for the Single Structure of Policing’. In Art. 63, which 
outlines ‘Duties and Responsibilities of the Local Police Commissioner’, it is 
clarified that commissioners, amongst other responsibilities, must ‘ensure proper 
implementation of the guidelines and directives of the Prosecutor concerning the 
activities of police officials in relation to criminal proceedings within his/her 
police area’ (PRC 2004: 139).  
The absence of a clear link between the two reform processes in the PRC 
report is striking, especially since the HR/EUSR originally called for an 
assessment of policing in BiH on the basis of the feasibility study published in 
November 2003 by the Commission, where instead a clearer technical focus on 
the overall law enforcement capabilities of the country was present. The 
Commission enumerated the most critical operational difficulties of the Bosnian 
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police, highlighting what changes would improve the general counter-crime 
capabilities of Bosnian authorities. According to the analysis elaborated in 
Brussels, the following weak points had to be tackled: ‘police forces in one 
Entity have no right of “hot pursuit” into another; there is no central data base, 
different Entity forces use different information systems’ (European 
Commission 2003). 
The decision to maintain the two reform processes separate seems 
particularly strange if we consider that symmetries between judicial districts and 
police areas should be common sense. This is of particular relevance in a 
country like BiH, where internal boundaries of any kind are systematically 
‘exploited’ and turned into insurmountable barriers by politicians that find it 
convenient to feed their constituency with nationalism, as well as by civil 
servants that tend to privilege the relationship with the ethnic group to which 
they belong. Interviewed on this specific matter, an OSCE officer serving in 
Sarajevo as Legal Adviser on Judicial and Legal Reform confirmed the 
impression that, in spite of the rhetoric on efficiency, institutional centralization 
was the primary objective pursued by the EU.   
 
The police reform has been presented by the EU in a very weird 
way. Paradoxically, the EU principles could potentially turn the 
police structures into something more expensive and complicated 
than today. Moreover, it is probable that this reform can even 
produce a less efficient police. A reorganization of the police should 
be indeed structured in parallel with the reform of the judiciary 
system. Without doing so, the potential costs and the series of 
inefficiencies could be detrimental. We alerted EU and OHR 
officials repeatedly on the problem, but so far without success.83 
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The idea that police reform was packaged and linked to the SAA to serve 
more strategic and ambitious institutional objectives has been confirmed by Ms. 
Anna Ibrisagić, a Swedish MEP of Bosnian origin who has served on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the EU Parliament since the 2004/2009 
legislature. When the political crisis erupted in BiH after summer 2007, Ms. 
Ibrisagić met the key actors of the political confrontation over the police reform 
to explore grounds for mediations. In particular, she followed firsthand the 
contacts between Dodik and Silajdžić, which eventually paved the way for the 
Mostar Declaration (the agreement that at the end of 2007 helped to overcome 
the police reform impasse) and that had an initial positive implication in the 
drafting of a protocol on police reform (Protokola o ispunjavanju uvjeta za 
reformu policije koji su potrebni za parafiranje i potpisivanje Sporazuma o 
stabilizaciji i pridruživanju / Draft Protocol on fulfilling the police reform 
requirements necessary for initialling and signing the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement as a basis for police reform in BiH) signed by the two 
leaders on 28 September 2007 (Reuters 2007). Interviewed at the European 
Parliament in the aftermath of the Dodik/Silajdžić compromise, the Swedish 
MEP strongly criticized the scepticism with which the September protocol was 
‘handled’ by the HR/EUSR. According to Ms. Ibrisagić: 
 
The link between police reform, EU principles, and the SAA has 
become exasperation. Did the International Community realize that 
the Dodik/Silajdžić compromise was the first kind of agreement 
between the two sides after years? Why did they make only negative 
comments on that? I believe that all has to do with the divisions 
inside the EU. I have clear evidence that some countries in the PIC 
Steering Board are not satisfied with the developments and want to 
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boycott any result that is far from their expectations. What these 
diplomats and politicians miss is that their work in BiH should be 
about reconciliation instead of being about pushing their own 
specific visions and strategic interests. The story is simple: different 
countries have different visions and they try to dismiss the protocol 
since they see it as an insufficient result.84 
 
This extensive quotation highlights several problematic aspects of the EU 
commitment to BiH, which can be extended more in general, to the experience 
of other multilateral organizations involved in peacebuilding initiatives and post-
conflict stabilization in crisis areas. First of all, the analysis of the Swedish MEP 
raises the problem of conflicting interests among EU member states. As has also 
been pointed out by the literature: ‘International agencies are not simply staunch 
defenders of human rights, but are also organisation with their own institutional 
interests, priorities and objectives resulting from the self-interest of their 
member states’ (Belloni 2007: 175-76).  
Secondly, Ibrisagić offers an interesting assessment when she touches 
upon the specific situation in BiH and the showdown on police reform. In 
particular, the comment on the ‘exasperated’ attitude shown by the HR/EUSR 
and the rest of the international community can be shared. When the 
Dodik/Silajdžić protocol was sent to the attention of the international 
community, the HR/EUSR Miroslav Lajčák offered a moderate but nevertheless 
positive comment on the achievement (OHR 2007i). However, only a few hours 
later a press release clarified that: ‘OHR and EUSR have received the 
Dodik/Silajdžić Protocol which is now under review by the relevant EU 
institutions. We urge everyone to refrain from interpreting the document as only 
the European Commission can give an opinion on whether this agreement is in 
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line with the three principles for police reform’ (OHR 2007v). This statement 
mirrors the choice of the HR/EUSR to emphasize the technical aspects of the 
process and obfuscate the highly political and strategic nuances of the proposed 
reform. 
Only two days later, the importance of this ‘entente cordiale’ was 
completely downplayed, since it became clear that the Bosnian Parliament was 
not in a position to give any concrete and rapid follow up. Hence, already on 1 
October 2007 (which was the deadline for police reform chosen by the 
HR/EUSR back in August) Lajčák commented: ‘on Friday afternoon I received a 
paper reflecting the views of SBiH and SNSD85 ... It is positive that these two 
party leaders have taken the police issue and the future of the country seriously 
and decided to work towards a solution ... The document however leaves some 
key questions unresolved’ (OHR 2007r). 
 
 
4. Police restructuring as an opportunity for ethnic gains: 
the picture seen from Sarajevo (and Banja Luka) 
The prolonged stalemate shows that attempts by the HR/EUSR to maintain an 
aura of technicism over police reform were overwhelmed by domestic political 
tensions. As an EU diplomat admitted ‘through the police reform we were 
dragged down into politics. We wanted this process to be something technical 
that could hold a political point. But Bosnian politicians reminded us that it was 
all about politics’.86 To be more precise, the technical ‘maquillage’ over police 
reform survived until 2006. After the general elections that took place in October 
 228 
 
of that year, the Bosniak leader Haris Silajdžić tried to ‘hijack’ the process and 
used it to question the existence of RS, thus causing resistance in Banja Luka to 
the reform package. When this happened, EU diplomacy stressed the idea that 
police reform was a necessary ‘technical’ step for the adoption of European 
standards and principles (that actually in the field of police do not really exist in 
the EU). According to the EU, Bosnian politicians were expected to agree on a 
reform based upon three ‘European’ principles: place exclusive competence for 
police legislation and budget at the State level; recast regional police areas on 
the basis of functional police criteria; help protect the police from improper 
political interference (OHR 2005c).  
The failure of the technical maquillage over police reform generated a 
negative spiral. Still today, several months after the apparent conclusion of the 
impasse and the signing of the SAA, years of tensions over police reform still 
have a negative impact on the relations between Bosnian domestic elites and the 
international community. An assessment that confirms this impression was 
provided by the ICG in March 2009. Describing the key features of ‘Bosnia’s 
incomplete transition: between Dayton and Europe’, the analysts from the ICG 
have argued that the mismanagement of the conditionality link between police 
reform and SAA (which symbolized a relevant intermediate goal for the overall 
European destiny of BiH) and the tendency of the HR/EUSR to get involved in 
the political showdown by using the Bonn Powers, are at the basis of the current 
stalemate. The ICG report identified the following criticalities:  
 
The roots of the international community’s problems in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina go back many years, but the direct antecedents of the 
current situation lie in the failure of the police reform process in the 
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fall of 2007 and the High Representative’s abortive use of his Bonn 
Powers in response. The international community overreached in its 
demands on police reform, overreacted to its failure and was 
unprepared for the consequences (ICG 2009b). 
 
 
4.1. Conflicting ethnic aspirations over the reconfiguration of 
the Bosnian central state 
When the EU nominated Miroslav Lajčák as the new HR/EUSR reform 
priorities dramatically switched compared with the tenure of Schwarz-Schilling: 
broad constitutional issues were taken out of the negotiation table, so that 
emphasis could again be attached, almost exclusively, to police restructuring as 
key pre-SAA conditionality. Facing the breakdown of the talks on police reform, 
the German HR/EUSR (who held his position from January 2006 until July 
2007) engaged in negotiations for the definition of a constitutional reform 
framework. As has been previously shown, the lack of support from Brussels 
induced Schwarz-Schilling to abandon the project and resign from his post. 
Nevertheless, a few days prior to his departure from Sarajevo, he emphasised the 
importance of constitutional reform as the basis for reconciliation. Published by 
three main local newspapers (Dnevni Avaz, Nezavisne Novine, and Vecernji 
List), Schwarz-Schilling’s pre-departure admonition emphasised that ‘now that 
the peace implementation process and with it the institution of the High 
Representative are gradually coming to an end – and Euro-Atlantic integration is 
the key task – it is time to reform the constitution and develop a stable, self-
sustaining and efficient state structure’ (OHR 2007s). 
 230 
 
In spite of this warning, Lajčák came to BiH with the unwritten mandate to 
specifically break the deadlock on police reform. This policy change paved the 
way for one of the most severe crises experienced in post-Dayton BiH. The 
change of focus resulted from a ‘technical understanding’ of EU driven-
statebuilding, which is based on the idea that Western Balkans countries are like 
those others that have already gone through the enlargement process; therefore, 
they are equally expected to strive to respect all the conditionalities decided in 
Brussels and commit to take on board the acquis communautaire and implement 
it line by line. The critique that can be made against this view is relatively 
simple: BiH has a very different history if compared with the Eastern European 
countries that joined the EU in recent times. While the grand strategy defined in 
Brussels at the time mirrored this simplistic approach to the stabilization of BiH, 
some personnel in the field started to develop a different sensibility. The Head of 
the Political Economic Section at the Commission Delegation in Sarajevo 
admitted: 
 
We were not able to reproduce and walk the same path that has 
characterized the integration of Eastern European countries. This has 
to do with some of our decisions and, obviously, with the fact that 
the post-conflict environment is complicated by the persisting ethno-
religious divisions. Here all our efforts are conditioned by the 
presence of three different interlocutors and three different set of 
political aspirations.87 
 
To some extent, in BiH there is no social contract between the different 
political communities that instigated the civil war in the early 1990s. There is 
still not one political BiH, but a state divided into three political ethno-religious 
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groups that are too suspicious of each other to surrender in the ongoing 
sovereignty struggle. A pre-requisite for the construction of the state is sufficient 
cohesion at the socio-political level. Currently, BiH resembles a mere 
assemblage of ethnic groups amongst which there is no substantial and shared 
commitment to the state but a permanent confrontation. As Roberto Belloni 
(2007: 1) has stressed, the Bosnian peace process, since its inception, has mostly 
resulted in an ‘attenuation of historical ethnic and national rivalries’ rather than 
grassroots reconciliation of a complex multi-ethnic polity. 
This approach is generally justified in Brussels by emphasizing that 
technocratism preserves local ownership of changes. Privileging functionalism 
and gradualism, the EU has thus focused predominantly on ‘technical’ 
conditionalities that – even when they clearly encompass complex political 
changes for the target state – are presented in a technical form. A clear example 
of this tendency can be found in the set of priorities assembled by the 
Commission (2005) and then adopted by the EU Council as the main terms of 
the official ‘European Partnership’ between Brussels and Sarajevo (European 
Council 2006a). 
In the opinion of EU policy makers, presenting technical shopping lists is 
also a way to unblock crucial political and institutional deadlocks that still today 
prevent BiH from developing into a more efficient state structure. However, in 
spite of the externally-facilitated institutional restructuring and the EU 
perspective, there is no agreement among Bosnian elites on how to move beyond 
Dayton. As it was in the immediate aftermath of the peace settlement in 1995, 
the main institutional lines set out in the Dayton agreement still now represent a 
‘ceiling’ for the Serb community, a ‘starting ground’ for more drastic 
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centralization for the Bosniaks, and something in between these two for the 
Croats. 
Clearly, Serbs and Bosniaks have antithetic positions, and the attention of 
the international community has mostly been focused on the confrontation 
between these two groups. However, it should not be disregarded that the Croats   
have never completely abandoned the idea of running their own entity. It is very 
interesting that at the end of 2006 the Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik 
was elected ‘personality of the year’ by a well-known Croatian magazine based 
in the FBiH, the Vecernji list for BiH. This daily paper is produced by the same 
company that distributes the Vecernji list in Croatia. The motivation behind this 
paradoxical decision was the recurring incitation given by Dodik to the Croats 
living in the FBiH, encouraging them to constitute their own entity at the 
expenses of the Bosniaks living in the Federation. Moreover, it is probably even 
more interesting to stress that the readership of Vecernji list for BiH is almost 
purely Croats, and this award was a result of the reader’s voting and not a 
decision taken by the editorial team of the newspaper. Dodik went personally to 
the award ceremony and expressed all his gratitude with the following comment: 
‘I have nothing against BiH, I just want to be in this country, wishing good 
things to happen to all people, as well as to those that are wanting nothing but 
peace for this country and safe life’.88 
Because of these three conflicting views on the general configuration of 
the state, Bosnian elites approach cooperation by relying mostly on logics of 
relative gains. Institutional adjustments that bring potential benefits receive 
hardly any cross-ethnic support when they are perceived as steps that push the 
central state towards the ideal configuration sponsored by one ethno-religious 
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group or another. As clarified by Belloni (2007: 2) ‘Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats 
alike still take the following view: dominate or be dominated, impose one’s will 
or withdraw’. In BiH, Interethnic cooperation has remained sporadic even after 
the last renewal of the Parliament. Despite the defeat of nationalist parties in the 
2006 general elections, the moderate parties that won have thus far confirmed – 
in their strategies, interactions, and modus operandi – that confrontation based 
on ethnicity remains the crucial feature of Bosnian politics. The struggle on the 
terms of the police reform is useful to understand how the three different ethno-
religious factions are reluctant to cooperate when issues concerning the 
configuration of the state are at stake.  
Reporting to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP, HR/EUSR Lajčák 
proposed an analysis that is worth quoting extensively, since it perfectly sums up 
all the above elements on the domestic sovereignty struggle between Bosniaks, 
Serbs and Croats on the organization of Bosnian central institutions: 
 
There are three different concepts of the organization and 
functioning of the country and two out of the three are in clear 
opposition to each other. Serbs’ loyalty to the state is conditional 
upon the others’ acceptance of the RS as a legitimate and permanent 
part of the constitutional architecture. Croats remain fundamentally 
dissatisfied with a two-entity setup that they feel consigns them to 
the status of a minority in all but a few Federation cantons. 
Meanwhile, most Bosniaks want a constitutional order that will do 
away with the entities and provide for an effective central 
government, even if it also devolves many powers to multinational 
regions ... In theory, these separate stances should be possible to 
reconcile.  In practice, each of the political leadership is still not 
looking for the lowest common denominator to find a mutually 
acceptable solution, but clearly wants to impose its own vision of the 
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country. The legacy of war and the logic of nationally based and 
zero-sum politics make any significant compromise profoundly 
difficult if not entirely impossible (OHR 2007u). 
 
4.2. A matter of sovereignty and survival: Milorad Dodik’s 
opposition  
The RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik strenuously defended the autonomy of 
the RS Police as one of the last pillars of his Entity’s ‘sovereignty’ against the 
supposed Bosniak strategy to create a centralized and Muslim dominated BiH. 
Interestingly, from an RS perspective, Dodik’s opposition to police reform has 
been purely, so to speak, ‘anti-economic’. The norms that define the partition of 
budgetary responsibilities between RS and the FBiH for competences attributed 
to the state level of governance leave no ground for doubt: the centralization of 
an issue implies that the related budget is provided for two third by the 
Federation and only for one third by RS. Article VIII of the Bosnian state 
constitution clarifies that for issues dealt with at state level ‘the Federation shall 
provide two-thirds, and the Republika Srpska one-third, of the revenues required 
by the budget, except insofar as revenues are raised as specified by the 
Parliamentary Assembly’ (US Department of State 1995).  
On this basis, the first principle set by the EU as a key term of reference 
for police reform (police legislation and budget must be placed at the State level) 
should have represented a clear economic incentive for Dodik to accept a 
scheme for reform as early as possible, also as a way to contain a possible source 
of social instability. The salaries of police officers in RS are indeed far lower 
than the average in FBiH, and less again than those of the police in the Brčko 
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District. However, the RS Prime Minister preferred to minimize considerations 
exclusively focused on the economic convenience of the centralization plan. 
This choice was ‘financially sustainable’ for Dodik since in the course of his 
first year and a half in office he achieved two important privatization plans, one 
in the oil market and one in the telecommunication sector. Six months after the 
2006 general elections, two international tenders were issued by the RS Entity 
government: the first to sell 65% of Telekom Srpske and a second one to 
privatize a state-owned oil refinery in Brod (which, together with a chain of 
gasoline service stations, was bought by the Russian company Zarubezhneft). 
Particularly with this latter move, the RS Premier managed to channel an 
incredible amount of Russian petrol-dollars in RS.89  
Once the economic arguments for reform had temporarily been contained 
thanks to these two strategic privatizations, police reform became also for Dodik 
a ground of purely political confrontation. To a certain extent, the animosity of 
the debate and repeated crises meant that police reform became the last point of 
contraposition between two different interpretations of the original sovereignty 
trajectory in BiH. Dodik presented himself as the beacon of what can be referred 
to as a ‘confederal’ interpretation of the Dayton agreement and the creation of a 
multiethnic state built on two separate Entities. According to such a view, the 
creation of a unified post-war BiH in 1995 has been possible thanks to the 
compromise between the representatives of the Entities, who ‘permitted’ the 
emergence of a multiethnic state by transferring some powers to central level. 
From this perspective, the original sovereignty trajectory could thus be idealised 
as a bottom-up release of powers, based on the consent of the two Entities. Any 
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centralization move that followed was based on simultaneous concessions of 
both Entities in favour of the state level institutions.  
This understanding is opposed by Croats and, more strongly, by Bosniaks 
as well as by most international observers who are concerned at the Serb 
nationalist rhetoric and therefore seek to contain the institutional drifts that could 
stem from their interpretation of the Bosnian state. Bosniaks, in particular, 
support the idea that centralization of powers has taken place with the state 
assuming competences. The central state, via a top-down exercise of power, can 
deliberately collect competences under its direct responsibility. The legitimacy 
of any centralization move would hence depend on the capacity of the central 
government to concentrate governance, with a view to enhancing efficiency and 
reducing asymmetries between the Entities. On the contrary, the leit motiv in 
Banja Luka has been that, whenever the centralization of an area of governance 
takes place, this is not due to an arbitrary assumption of competences by the 
state, but rather to an implicit, simultaneous, and ‘responsible’ concession from 
the two Entities to the central government. 
The constitutional court has often made reference to this matter, in general 
ruling that the state has the original right to assume competences from the 
entities. Art. 3 of the Dayton constitutional text (Law and Responsibilities of the 
Entities and the Institutions) proceeds as follows: (A) All governmental 
functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities. (B) The 
Entities and any subdivisions thereof shall comply fully with this Constitution, 
which supersedes inconsistent provisions of the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and of the constitutions and law of the Entities, and with the decisions of the 
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institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The general principles of international 
law shall be an integral part of the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Entities (US Department of State 1995). 
 
4.3. A matter of law enforcement capacity: Miroslav Lajčàk’s 
public diplomacy 
Aware of this irreconcilable clash and conscious of the fact that this ideological 
contraposition had inevitably affected also police reform, immediately after the 
arrival of Lajčák in June 2007, the OHR re-launched a public campaign (that had 
been first made in 2005) with the clear aim to dismantle what international 
referred to as all the ‘political myths’ built around the police reform. In 
particular, one of the core messages of this campaign was to stress in the clearest 
terms that ‘[p]olice re-structuring is only about establishing a professional police 
service and will not abolish the Entities’ (OHR 2007a). In the same text there is 
another element that deserves particular attention, what the OHR identified as 
myth five: ‘there are no EU requirements for police reform’. The OHR argued 
against this supposed myth that ‘the EU has said clearly that BiH must adopt 
police restructuring if it is to move forward towards the EU. The three key 
principles must be adhered to and the Police Restructuring Commission report is 
one way to do this’ (OHR 2007a).90  
This point was made in response to comments by Milorad Dodik. The RS 
leader contested the EU rhetoric on the three ‘European’ principles that should 
guide reform. On several occasions, the HR/EUSR and EU officials argued that 
these principles would align the Bosnian police with consolidated European 
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‘standards’ and ‘customs’. Dodik contested this argument on the pages of the 
International Herald Tribune. The RS Premier replied in the following terms:  
 
There is no single European model for the reforms that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina must implement to move toward this European future. 
Instead, the European Union is resplendent in its diversity in models 
of governance. There is significant variety with the European Union 
in taxation, court systems, and law enforcement, among others. Yet 
this potpourri of technique is not an indicator of disunity; it merely 
evidences the imperative of local representation and the diversity 
thus reflected in authentic democracy (Dodik 2007a). 
 
This criticism on the arbitrary nature of the three principles was reiterated 
by Dodik at every possible opportunity, also through the domestic media. For 
instance, in a long conversation with Senad Pećanin – editor of the local BH 
Dani magazine – the RS Prime Minister contested the lack of any technical 
rationale for the reform: 
 
If you would want to seriously and analytically examine all that 
today represents a problem in BiH, you would see that behind these 
problems there are decisions by some internationals, which years 
after, as we see, turn out to be totally ill-intentioned for BiH itself. 
First, the police reform that was made in the way as described by 
Paddy Ashdown in his book, I hope that you’ve read it, believe me, I 
did. And I saw in which way serious things were created (Pećanin 
2007: 9).  
 
In this open attack, Dodik referred to some imprudent confessions made by 
Ashdown in the pages of his recently published memoirs. The British politician 
 239 
 
admitted that the need to propose a centralizing strategy for the police 
represented his very personal conviction, which was ‘as always’ blessed by 
Chris Patten during a quick morning phone-call (Ashdown 2007b: 249).  
Facing repeated accusations that the EU had launched an arbitrary process, 
the HR/EUSR developed a new communication strategy. In the simplest possible 
terms, Lajčák tried to make clear that the absence of a European common model 
of policing should not prevent Brussels from proposing basic principles to be 
respected. The main message from the Slovakian diplomat to Bosnian Serb 
politicians can be summarized by the following idea: it is not important whether 
these principles reflect the average situation in Europe, what matters is that the 
EU has identified them as being appropriate for BiH. 
At the same time, the HR/EUSR kept emphasizing on several occasions 
the equation ‘no police reform = no SAA’ (Supova 2007), which Brussels 
supported with an unprecedented determination. Backed by the then 
Enlargement Commissioner, Finnish politician Olli Rehn, the HR/EUSR sent a 
clear message to domestic elites. Less than two months after he took possession 
of his new offices in Sarajevo, Lajčák announced: ‘the European Union is 
following the police reform negotiations very closely, and their outcome will be 
a clear indication of the political maturity of the country’s leaders and their 
readiness to lead Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the European Union’ (OHR 
2007j). 
In spite of this double-track communication strategy, during summer 2007 
confrontation on police reform was heighted by two manoeuvres, one from 
Silajdžić one from Dodik. The former – leader of SBiH, who could count also on 
important support from the head of SDA Sulejman Tihić91 – opposed the new 
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framework concepts for reform, which had been the first official acts of the new 
HR/EUSR. The counter-reaction from Lajčák proved to be emblematic. The 
Slovak diplomat declared: ‘I am deeply disappointed … By rejecting the draft 
proposal on police reform before all the major political leaders have even 
received it, [Silajdžić and Tihić] have demonstrated a disdain for their colleagues 
and the political process’ (OHR 2007p). 
Possibly, relations with Banja Luka were even tenser. Speaking on the 
Radio Televizija Republike Srpske, Dodik opposed a priori any institutional 
development, claiming that change was mostly being promoted by Bosniak 
interests to challenge the integrity and existence of RS. Similarly in this case, the 
reply from the HR/EUSR was resolute: ‘[Dodik’s] statements questioning the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH are detrimental to the country’s 
ongoing efforts to continue reforms and integrate into Euro-Atlantic institutions’ 
(OHR 2007d). These declarations opened a period of tough confrontation. At the 
end of summer 2007 Lajčák imposed a one-month deadline for police reform; 
however, as stressed above, once the deadline had passed the HR/EUSR could 
just take note of the lack of agreement (OHR 2007q). The HR/EUSR found 
himself dragged into the middle of an unprecedented crossfire between Bosniaks 
and Serbs, while new fears grew amongst the Bosnian population. ‘We are back 
to 1992(!)’ was a widespread warning heard in Sarajevo when average Bosnian 
citizens were asked to comment on domestic politics.  
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5. The compromise and the signature of the SAA 
While clearly placed in an uncomfortable position, Lajčák was constantly 
backed by Brussels, contrary to the experience of his German predecessor on 
constitutional reform, and he could thus keep the promise made to the Bosnian 
people in his inaugural TV address. On that occasion, the Slovak HR/EUSR 
made the following comment: ‘we will not tolerate any activities or statements 
that push BiH back into the atmosphere of tension and hatred’ (OHR 2007h). 
Amongst other protagonists at EU level, Javier Solana, witnessing the 
recalcitrant attitude of Bosnian politicians towards negotiations, blamed them for 
‘gambling with the future of their own country’ (Associated Press 2007a). 
Enjoying such support, Lajčák raised the level of confrontation and in October 
2007 adopted manu sua a reform of the voting procedure of the Council of 
Ministers (CoM). This use of the Bonn Powers was resolutely contested by 
Nikola Špirić, a Bosnian Serb politician, who resigned from his post as Prime 
Minister (BBC News 2007). The HR/EUSR labelled Špirić’s resignation as an 
irresponsible act and argued: ‘It is paradoxical that the Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers should resign over measures that are designed to make the Council 
of Ministers, the body that he Chairs, more efficient … the country needs 
functioning institutions for the reform processes to be re-launched’ (OHR 
2007e). Speaking before the UN Security Council in New York, Lajčák 
reiterated the need for CoM reform and pointed out that political stalemate in 
BiH inevitably required ‘robust and creative’ initiatives (OHR 2007o). 
A key passage in understanding the extent of Lajčàk’s confrontation and 
blame-game with domestic politicians can be found by analyzing the 
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presentation to the press of the reformed CoM voting procedures. The most 
interesting passages of the HR/EUSR statement read as follows: 
 
We cannot consider our mission complete until changes are made in 
the direction of establishing a stable, European, democratic, 
multiethnic society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are several 
ways how this objective can be achieved. The most favorable of 
them is to achieve this goal through European integration. This is a 
road that … has no alternative for a European country such as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina … This is why I have put in so much effort 
to lift the blockage on the European integration process for this 
country, a process which resolves current problems and leads to the 
future at the same time. But, as you know, this is a process for which 
only domestic politicians take responsibility voluntarily (OHR 
2007g).. 
 
The most delicate innovations introduced by the HR/EUSR were those 
updating articles 16 and 18 of the existing Law on the CoM. Lajčák updated, 
first, the rule on the quorum necessary to hold a regular session of the CoM, and 
second, the decision-making process. On the first issue, the HR/EUSR 
introduced the principle for which a session can be held whenever it is possible 
to gather a majority of the members of the CoM, regardless of their ethnicity. 
The previous requirement allowed holding a regular session only at the presence 
of at least two members belonging to each of the three constituent peoples. As 
far as the second point is concerned, Lajčàk’s provisions – which were labeled 
as a revolutionary act by all Bosnian Serb parties – targeted the rule for which a 
provision can be adopted only if supported by a majority of all members of the 
CoM. The previous version of article 18 proceeded as follows: ‘a majority 
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decision will be taken which must include the votes of at least two members of 
each constituent people’. In the updated version of the voting procedure it is 
specified that a decision can be adopted if it is based on the majority of ‘those 
members presenting and voting’ (instead ‘of its whole number’) ‘provided that 
the said majority includes the vote of at least one member of each constituent 
people’ (OHR 2007g). 
Apart from Špirić’s resignation, the move encountered firm opposition 
from Banja Luka. One of Dodik’s advisers claimed that Lajčàk’s decision was a 
source of tension, rather than the origin of solutions and efficiency:  
 
The current political crisis has been triggered because the Decision 
imposed by the High Representative, Miroslav Lajčàk, creates the 
possibility that one constituent people can be outvoted within the 
decision- making institutions of BiH. This is not an artificial crisis 
that the RS government has purposefully created, but justified 
concerns for the safety and future for all the peoples of BiH. 
Agreements in multi-ethnic and decentralized countries should and 
must be made by consensus between the different ethnicities 
(Milosevic 2007). 
 
For his part, the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik addressed a letter of 
complaint to the European Parliament. In this communication he accused 
HR/EUSR Lajčák of having ‘directly shaken the foundations of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement’ and of being the one to blame for the negative political 
climate affecting BiH at that time (Dodik 2007b: 68). 
A few weeks later, the HR/EUSR issued an ‘Authentic Interpretation’ of 
the changes made to the CoM working and voting procedures. Inter alia, Lajčák 
explained that first, the main aim of his decision was ‘to facilitate the operation 
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of the Council of Ministers; second, the changes and amendments apply equally 
to all members of the CoM without any distinction’; third, ‘the changes and 
amendments do not touch upon the overall composition of the CoM, and in 
particular the equal representation of the constituent peoples’; fourth, ‘the 
changes and amendments ensure that none of the members of the CoM can 
obstruct its work simply by an unjustified and illicit absence from sessions and 
the need for the Council of Ministers to be able to take decisions at all times’. 
Lastly and most crucially, the explanatory note stressed that ‘the changes and 
amendments are not to the detriment of any constituent people and any Entities 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. On the specific update of article 16 of the previous 
CoM ruling procedure, the Authentic Interpretation specified that this seeks to 
prevent the ‘possibilities to block the Council of Ministers by the mere 
absenteeism of members of a constituent people’ (OHR 2007g). 
Apart from the ‘Authentic Interpretation’, the HR/EUSR also published a 
list of strategic arguments in support of the imposed reform. This choice 
respected a certain tradition by the HR/EUSR to communicate by issuing 
Decalogues and explanatory notes over the internet as well as in the local press. 
This habit had been inaugurated by Paddy Ashdown in 2005, with a view to 
support the need of police reform. In line with such custom, also Miroslav 
Lajčák published a Decalogue to support the imposed reform of the CoM voting 
procedures. Among the most interesting ‘ten facts on the High Representatives 
Decision Imposing Changes and Amendments to the Law on the Council of 
Ministers’, the HR/EUSR stated that: ‘(2) measures apply equally without 
discrimination to all members of the Council of Ministers; (3) the decision does 
not change the composition of the Council of Ministers, and it especially does 
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not change equal representation of constituent peoples; (10) The Decision does 
alter the Law promulgated by the High Representative on Dec 2, 2002. 
However, the time has shown that these mechanisms were regularly misused 
since the Ministers failed to attend sessions and carry the duties they are elected 
to and very well paid for’ (OHR 2007w). 
In parallel with reform of the CoM voting mechanisms, two other 
procedural improvements were made by Lajčák: a series of amendments to the 
rules of procedure of the House of Representatives and to the House of Peoples 
of the Parliamentary Assembly. These two packages were accepted within a 
relatively short time frame. Only a few weeks after their adoption through the 
use of the Bonn Powers by the HR, these reforms were formally subscribed to by 
Bosnian Parliamentarians. Lajčák welcomed this development pointing that the 
‘agreement opens the door for the BiH institutions to return to the European 
agenda and formally adopt the Action Plan for Police Reform. This would bring 
Bosnia and Herzegovina back to European integration process’ (OHR 2007m). 
However, the confrontation over the CoM reform and the showdown for the 
police reform determined the persistence of diffused tensions. 
 
5.1. The Mostar agreement and the Sarajevo Action plan 
When the impasse seemed unbreakable (also due to the tensions for the 
previously mentioned reform of the CoM) a ceasefire arrived: in December 2007 
the SAA was initialled. The EU granted technical approval to the agreement on 
the basis of a general compromise signed by the main Bosnian party leaders in 
Mostar (OHR 2007f) and the related ‘Action plan’ for reform adopted a few 
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days later in Sarajevo (OHR 2007b). On the website of the Commission it was 
announced that: ‘following Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn’s 
assessment that there is sufficient agreement on reforms among BiH political 
leaders, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is initialled in Sarajevo’ (European Commission 2007). Meeting 
the Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel – who was about to assume the 
Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers – Lajčák emphasized that the 
initialling of the SAA on 4 December 2007 reflected a ‘good atmosphere of 
compromise [which] needs to be used to bring the country closer to the 
European Union. The EU’s support for the European integration of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will only yield results if it is not abstract. Last week’s initialling of 
the SAA showed that the EU is prepared to reward progress’ (OHR 2007n). 
This last remark is representative of the benevolent attitude of the EU 
towards the integration of BiH. However, in the attempt to keep pressure on 
Bosnian elites, the HR/EUSR clarified that the crucial assessment would be 
made on the actual reform that political leaders were able to transform into laws. 
While commending the work that resulted into the Mostar agreement – which he 
recognized as a good basis for police reform – Lajčák clarified that the deal 
needed to be ‘followed-up by concrete steps, primarily the drafting of laws 
[since] EU requirements will not go away, and party leaders must finally meet 
their commitments and deliver results’ (OHR 2007k). 
Highly sceptical comments were made by representatives from the block 
of countries that in the EU Council constitute the ‘conditionality coalition’ (led 
by Belgium, The Netherlands, and the UK). Amongst those criticizing the 
weakness of the compromise achieved by Bosnian politicians, the Dutch 
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delegate to the COWEB (a diplomat of Yugoslav origins) had no hesitation in 
stating that: ‘the signature of the SAA by Olli Rehn is just a manoeuvre of the 
Commission. You cannot reward someone for doing nothing. If you do not pass 
your exams you cannot go to another level of class. However, initialling the 
SAA is just in the mandate of the Commission; we cannot oppose it from the 
Council’.92 
In spite of the scepticism expressed by some EU members in COWEB and 
the vague character of the promises made in Mostar and Sarajevo, the HR/EUSR 
maintained a positive attitude towards the compromise and commented that: ‘the 
political debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is entering a new phase. Politicians 
have shown leadership and a willingness to reach compromise for the benefit of 
all citizens. This is commendable and I am confident that the European Union 
will value this new political dynamic’ (OHR 2007l). On 11 December 2007f, the 
leaders of the six main Bosnian political parties gathered again in Laktasi and 
‘re-installed’ Špirić as chair of the state-level CoM. On that same occasion they 
committed to follow-up the action plan for police reform with concrete 
legislative measures (OHR 2007c). 
Interestingly, interviewed on 5 December 2007 by the Bosnian newspaper 
Dnevni Avaz on the possible future steps that Bosnia had to make, Olli Rehn 
confirmed: ‘first the police reform must be implemented and a functionality of 
state institutions should be restored. After that, there is the reform of BiH 
Constitution. That is a crucial question and its solution represents an obligation 
of people and leaders in BiH’ (Rehn 2007). This position indicates certain 
confusion in the EU approach. By giving the green light to the SAA signature on 
the basis of the Mostar compromise and the subsequent Sarajevo working plan, 
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the Commission accepted an unusual working schedule. The Sarajevo plan for 
the implementation of the police reform – which was signed in the Bosnian 
capital on 22 November 2007 – represented an interesting example of deal on 
procrastination.  
While the Sarajevo plan foresaw the imminent creation of a series of new 
state-level institutions (e.g. ‘a Directorate for coordination of the Police with aim 
to improve efficiency of the work of relevant police bodies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and effectiveness of the communication at the level of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with relevant international institutions; Institute for forensics; 
Institute for education and professional upgrading of personnel; Police Support 
Agency; Independent Board, Citizens Complaint Board; and Police Officials 
Complaint Board’) and recognized ‘relevant issues of relationship between these 
and local police bodies shall be regulated through a new and single police 
structure of BiH, on the basis of the three principles of the European 
Commission’ it nevertheless proposed that these substantial changes would only 
‘be established pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of BiH to be 
elaborated in a constitutional reform process’ (OHR 2007b). 
Following the initialling of the SAA, party leaders gathered again on 26 
January 2008 in Sikori Brijeg to agree on the next steps. At the same time, the 
EU began to intensify pressure on local levels. For instance, a letter from the EU 
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security93 addressed to the Bosnian 
Minister of Security highlighted the connection between progress on police 
reform and EU visa liberalization for Bosnian citizens (European Commission 
2008b). On closer examination, this letter actually demonstrates some interesting 
peculiarities in the Commission’s attitude to conditionality for BiH. The 
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document structure shows the tendency by the Commission to connect highly 
technical and specific requirements with requests of a highly political nature.  
The letter was opened with an introductory statement on the willingness of 
the Commission to open a dialogue on visa liberalization with all the countries 
of the Western Balkans, since the process ‘should ultimately promote people-to-
people contacts’ between the people of the region and EU citizens. The letter 
went on to remind the Bosnian authorities that while such a dialogue had already 
been established with Serbia, Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, Sarajevo 
still remained a step behind. However, being next on the list, Bosnians should 
not arrive unprepared at such an important rendezvous. The police reform is 
referred to as an issue of ‘key importance … for the progress of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the road to EU integration’.  
The text also mentioned the introduction of passports containing bio-
metric identifiers by the Bosnian authorities: this technical reference served the 
purpose of diluting the political link between police reform and visa 
liberalization.  Putting police reform alongside to the improvement of identity 
documents allowed the Commission to stress the technical aspects of the process 
over the political ones. The link between police reform and visa liberalization 
was not new. Back in 2005, the OHR identified ten reasons to support police 
restructuring. This Decalogue noted that ‘without police restructuring, there will 
be no change in European visa requirements for BiH citizens’. Moreover, in 
addition to stressing that ‘police restructuring is a European Union 
requirement’, the Decalogue was closed with the straightforward statement: 
‘police restructuring is common sense’ (OHR 2005a).94 
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5.2. The technical reform of the Police adopted in April 2008 
In spite of the renewed pressure, the supposed ‘fresh political dynamism’ had a 
short lifespan. On 16 April 2008, the Bosnian Parliament adopted two technical 
laws on policing: a ‘Law on Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies and 
on Agencies for Support to Police Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and a 
‘Law on Independent and Supervisory Bodies of Police Structure of Bosnia And 
Herzegovina’.95 At the same time though, the discussion on the police structure 
has deliberately been suspended until an agreement on the constitution is 
reached. The small technical steps were welcome by most EU member states. 
Amongst other leaders, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
provided an example of the benevolent attitude demonstrated elsewhere in 
Western Europe:  
 
I welcome today’s decision by the House of Peoples in Sarajevo. 
The international community has always pushed for decisive 
progress on police reform and the necessary legislation. This 
decision is therefore a success – not just for the political decision-
makers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the mediation efforts 
of the EU’s Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is thus taking a major step closer to the EU. We will 
now take stock of all the spheres where reforms are necessary and I 
am confident we will also be able to sign the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement quickly (Steinmeier 2008). 
 
The international press welcomed the development far more cautiously 
and, in some cases, highlighted how distant was the reform laws from the goals 
previously set by the EU. An editorial note that appeared in the online 
publication EUbusiness clarified that the laws adopted by the Bosnian 
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Parliament were far, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, from the 
conditionality that the EU had maintained for the previous four years: ‘[the 
police] reform laws … barely touch the tip of a massive iceberg of changes 
needed to streamline the way the police service is run, and indeed add new 
layers of agencies to an already complex system’. The same commentary also 
emphasized that ‘the reforms also help entrench the divide between communities 
that the EU has carefully tried to avoid’ (AFP 2008). 
Undoubtedly, it is not entirely fair to condemn a reform before it has been 
fully put into practice and its effect can be tested in more concrete terms by 
looking at what actually happens in the most advanced phases of its 
implementation. In this case, however, a preliminary negative assessment can be 
made, in view of the clear distance that separates the strategic goals set by the 
EU with its conditionality and the limited changes agreed by the main Bosnian 
political parties that were subsequently enacted. Moreover, it is notable that the 
Commission itself eventually acknowledged all the shortcomings of the reform 
that were adopted. In the progress report issued in November 2008, the 
Commission expressed a general disappointment, stressing that ‘cooperation and 
information exchange between law enforcement agencies remain weak’ 
(European Commission 2008a: 56). 
 However, the most interesting observation offered in the evaluation report 
comes when the Commission openly admits that the laws adopted by the 
Bosnian Parliament a few months earlier might on the contrary have increased 
the institutional chaos affecting the Bosnian police. The words employed by the 
Commission leave no ground for doubt: ‘these laws provide for establishment of 
seven new agencies at State level. Given that no agreement was reached on a 
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transfer of policing powers, the new bodies have no coordination role vis-à-vis 
the Entities, cantonal and Brčko District police forces’ (European Commission 
2008a: 56-57). 
Accepting what has been already referred to as an ‘agreement on 
procrastination’, the green light for the signature of the SAA was nevertheless 
granted in June 2008. A EUSR official commented metaphorically: ‘Our 
conditionality bar was three meters high, they made a jump of less than one 
meter and we took it for good’.96 A similar assessment was offered by the Head 
of EUPM. Interviewed in Sarajevo in the same days of the SAA signing 
ceremony, General Vincenzo Coppola reconstructed with tough but effective 
criticism the developments between the Mostar declarations and the laws for 
police reform. 
 
There was no political will or political understanding of what they 
could offer to us. None of the political leaders who signed the 
Mostar agreement had any idea of what technically they were 
signing, nor did they have ideas on how and if they could actually 
offer a useful follow up. Because of this weakness, when the 
agreement landed on the table of the working group that was 
supposed to draft a legislation on the matter, the political and 
strategic problems that, it was clear to all of us, had not been solved 
in Mostar had to be solved on the table of the working group, which 
was impossible. In this situation, what would be the only way out? 
To put in place legislation that is extremely weak. They could not 
put any flesh around the bones. They created seven new institutions, 
fine, but they are empty institutions, because there was no political 
will to create strong and effective institutions. The reform was 
empty, but it was the only way out to allow them signing the SAA. 
Was police reform a true priority for the country? No. Was the SAA 
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a priority? Yes. The SAA was a priority because we said that this 
country has to go to Europe and we had to move forward to bring it 
in.97 
 
Why did Brussels give up on a conditionality that had been so strenuously 
promoted? Turning a blind eye was the only possible way for the EU to literally 
drop a conditionality that had been badly conceptualized. As Muehlmann (2007: 
41) emphasized ‘only when the international community backed away from their 
original requests did they manage to get a face-saving, but not viable, solution’. 
Moreover, the choice was also motivated by a need to defend the emphasis that 
has been attached by the EU to the SAP. The prolonged difficulties of BiH 
respecting the pre-conditions had become ‘embarrassing’ for Brussels, since the 
stalemate began to show that the technical anchorage of the country via the SAP 
was not resolving political tension. As an observer has pointed out, the EU was 
trapped in an uncomfortable situation: ‘[t]he collapse of the SAA process would 
reflect a failure of the key principle that has guided international policy in the 
region over the past years – the notion that the prospect of EU integration will be 
sufficient to put aspirant countries on a reform course’ (Vogel 2007). 
 
5.3. ‘Conquered ownership’ vs. ‘octroyée ownership’ 
The political showdown on police reform in BiH demonstrates that the EU 
allowed domestic politicians to ‘perform a conquest’ of the reform agenda. In 
other words, the failure of conditionality induced external actors to withdraw 
from the main stage of confrontation and to favour the predominance of 
domestic actors on the political scene. According to Christophe Solioz, the 
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patterns of other internationally-sponsored reforms that were previously 
undertaken specifically in BiH also confirm that it was the eventual failure of 
conditionality that paved the way for a greater focus on ownership as an 
alternative option. Building on this argument, Solioz cites the example of the 
state-level Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBB&H) as another case 
in which ‘conditionality led to ownership, but more generally it was the failure 
of “conditionality” that introduced “ownership” as an alternative approach’ 
(Solioz 2007: 35-36).  
Similarly, police reform represents an area where the failure of 
conditionality led to the acceptance of a more flexible and domestically-owned 
reform agenda. Specifically, because of the mismanagement of conditionality – 
both in its conceptual and enforcement phases – the external agent found itself in 
an uncomfortable position. The EU could have promoted at an earlier stage 
different items on the reform agenda, thus indirectly admitting its mistake, or it 
could have publicly removed the link between police reform and the SAA 
agreement. However, a reluctance to give up its ‘no mistake policy’ induced the 
EU to maintain its original conditionality until the project became increasingly 
untenable and confrontation completely unproductive. Only then were EU 
policy-makers forced to give up conditionality and accept a domestically-owned 
reform agenda, which was rewarded in spite of its weaknesses and clear 
unfeasibility. Ownership was thus portrayed as an achievement, despite the fact 
that the eventual reform was not satisfactory.  
Against the backdrop offered in this chapter, it is necessary to conclude by 
making a clear distinction between the debate on the restructuring of the Bosnian 
police (and the related international efforts that date back to the activities of the 
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United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNMIBH) and the 
continuous work of police reform. The latter has been going on since 1995, 
through several different steps; these included: initiatives aiming to improve 
procedures, modus operandi, and administrative capacity of the police. 
Moreover, there have already been two major reforms. One was undertaken in 
1996 and concerned the structure of the FBiH police. The other one came two 
years later and concerned the RS police. This process of constant reform and 
amelioration has allowed substantial and clearly visible improvements. At the 
institutional level, the creation of the State Information and Protection Agency 
(SIPA) and the unified border police can be considered as relevant 
achievements. Such institutional improvements followed a precise logic, and 
they were around a genuine technical need: to improve the effectiveness of 
policing throughout the country. Interviewed on the issue, the Chief of the EU 
Coordination Office at EUPM has admitted that the link between the SAA and 
police reform that was instead pushed by the HR/EUSR was close to hinder the 
previous efforts for police restructuring. The high-ranking EUPM official 
admitted the limitation of the approach sponsored by the EU in 2007: 
 
The logic behind the technical efforts to restructure and rationalize 
the police in BiH has been disturbed by the arbitrary decision of 
installing conditionality for the SAA on the police reform process. 
Moreover, the creation of the three European principles and the 
emphasis that was attached to them was not logical. Rather, this has 
been totally idiotic. Obviously, when I say idiotic, I do not refer to 
the aims of the police reform but to the link with the SAA and to the 
way it was highlighted. Another reason to talk about an idiotic 
choice is that the police reform has been left in total disconnection to 
the effort for the constitutional reform. This conditionality was used 
 256 
 
by the EU as an early-warning, but concretely, it was totally illogical 
to use it as a precondition for the initialization of what is nothing but 
a free trade agreement. The problem with all this is that the EU so far 
has been too agnostic with regards to the reorganization of the 
Bosnian state. The EU is and has tried to remain an apparently non-
invasive actor.98 
 
The idea of the EU as non-invasive statebuilder proposed by the EUPM 
official is a powerful expression that allows drawing some conclusions on the 
analysis thus far developed. Moving from the examination of the EU’s hands-up 
stance presented in the previous chapter, we have highlighted the existence of 
another side of what has been referred to as the ‘responsibility coin’ of external 
statebuilding projects. Moreover, it has been possible to show how dangerous 
can be the swing between politics and technocratism that characterized the EU 
conditionality over the police reform.  
The analysis of police reform is relevant for two aspects. Firstly, it sheds 
light on the disinclination of multilateral institutions to admit mistakes and 
correct policies. Secondly, it represents another confirmation of the EU’s 
inability to solve the two crucial operational dilemmas that international 
statebuilding agencies are bound to face: the dilemma of bottom-up vs. top-
down statebuilding (which has been metaphorically referred to as the ‘vertical’ 
statebuilding dilemma, since it is connected to what type of target international 
policies mainly aim to), and the conflict between technically oriented assistance 
and a complex post-war stabilization focused on grass-root reconciliation and 
the establishment of a definitive socio-political peace (which has been 
characterized as the ‘horizontal’ statebuilding dilemma, since instead it refers to 
what type of instruments are used by international agencies).  
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At the intersections of these two sets of operational choices lays the core 
contraposition between technical institution-building and externally-driven 
nation-building. The need to create a fluid balance between these two trajectories 
represents the main challenge for every statebuilding initiative. When interest in 
the former is predominant, international human and financial resources are 
mostly invested in the creation of structures that guarantee short-term 
achievements. On the contrary, if the latter but more arduous path is privileged, 
international institutions would be expected to tune their efforts to implement 
policies that respect a long-term vision and focus on socio-economic 
development. 
The case of BiH, unfortunately, shows that foreign intervention has 
rarely found a stable balance. The need for success-stories encourages external 
statebuilders to privilege relationships with a selected group of bureaucrats 
(mostly educated in Western countries),99 which permits a deferral of 
confrontation with a turbulent political class. This ‘more comfortable’ way of 
interacting can be traced back to some very basic principles that are a feature of 
international missions pursuing highly-intrusive field activities. The recent 
history of the Western Balkans shows that once a crisis is under control and 
reconstruction has been launched, the prolonged involvement of the international 
community is typically justified by the occurrence of small crises and, equally 
important, periodic and partial successes. Crises allow a mission to be kept in 
place and legitimized in the eyes of the host country population; success stories 
make the field efforts justifiable to taxpayers in contributing countries. 
Moreover, the sustainability of an international mission is based on its capacity 
to perpetuate the above mentioned ‘no mistake policy’. The case of the Bosnian 
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police reform provides an interesting example: EU policy-makers did their best 
to avoid admitting their shortcomings, up to the point of giving up their 
conditionality.  
What could be referred to as ‘conquered ownership’ must be 
distinguished from ‘octroyée ownership’.100 The latter occurs when international 
agencies define the main terms of the reform agenda and genuinely allow 
domestic elites, from the very beginning of the process, to negotiate internally 
and decide in their own way how to implement it. Instead, the ownership of the 
reform agenda is ‘conquered’ when internationals fail to steer a reform process 
towards their pre-defined strategic objectives and national elites, exploiting the 
mismanagement of conditionality, raise internal confrontation to a critical point.  
When the political conflict reaches its apex and domestic instability is of 
increasing concern, internationals begin to fear that a break-up is possible and 
that responsibility for the crisis must be publicly shared with the recalcitrant 
domestic politicians. At this point, external policy-makers are bound to consider 
two alternative options: either they can admit to having supported the 
conditionality that caused the collapse of the national dialogue on reform, and 
negotiate openly a correction of strategy; or, alternatively, they can accept the 
lack of progress and favour a silent transfer of responsibilities to domestic elites, 
who in turn are expected to act as if they are conquering the ownership of the 
reform process with a renewed spirit of cooperation. Needless to say, it is 
convenient for both sides that this change does not take place in the form of a 
clear top-down concession, but rather appears as a bottom-up affirmation of 
domestic ownership over the reform agenda. Once this ideal ‘handover of 
convenience’ takes place, the international statebuilding agency can drop the 
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specific conditionality without compromising the credibility of the wider reform 
project. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Analyzing the developments of the EU-sponsored reform of the Bosnian police, 
this chapter revealed another side of what has metaphorically been defined as ‘the 
responsibility coin’ of international statebuilding projects. The previous pages 
highlighted that, no differently than other international agencies deployed in 
crises areas, also the EU preserves its own ‘no mistake policy’. International 
statebuilding mission try to consolidate their governance and supervision roles by 
presenting their policies, conditionality and strategic choices as ‘the good and the 
proper’, whose validity cannot be dismissed, even when clear limitations emerge 
from implementation processes. 
The showdown on police reform demonstrates that this attitude stems 
from a variety of factors, most of which are inherent in the same physiology of 
international missions, or depend from the multilateral dynamics that take place 
at the headquarter. First of all, the rotation of international personnel, 
particularly at the highest positions, is a crucial element. As the experience of 
Miroslav Lajčák reveals, top-ranking officials with relatively short-termed 
mandates are often sent to the field with limited flexibility and they are induced 
to defend strenuously the policies and conditionalities promoted by the 
organization for which they work, even when these produce negative effects on 
the stability of the domestic political arena. In an ideal parallel, the experience of 
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Schwarz-Schilling instead confirms that when field officials try to marginalize a 
given reform item that is strongly sponsored by the headquarter, they hardly 
manage to win sufficient support for a broad renewal of strategies and a 
substantial update of the main policy objectives. 
Moreover, the lack of time in developing familiarity with a given post-
conflict environment makes leading international officials more vulnerable to the 
attacks and accusation that politicians from the host state might attempt. The 
difficulties experienced by Miroslav Lajčák during the fall and winter of 2007 in 
handling confrontation with the most recalcitrant Bosnian-Serb and Bosniak 
politicians have offered a striking example in this regard.  
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General Conclusions 
 
 
 
1. Implications on theoretical issues 
For the last two decades, statebuilding intervention in post-conflict societies and 
crisis areas has steadily increased, in terms of both the number of missions 
deployed and their intrusiveness in the politico-institutional life of several states 
that became ‘in-the-making’ as a result of intervention by the international 
community. Accordingly, scholars and policy analysts have become increasingly 
interested in two main issues related to the external reconstruction of failing or 
failed. Firstly, how can efforts by the international community to rebuild states be 
legitimized? Secondly, what are the most effective modalities to rebuild states and 
guarantee stable governance by solid domestic institutions?  
Following this thread in the scholarly literature and policy analysis, Chapter 
I introduced the main features of the debates on the normative aspects of 
statebuilding and on the operational challenges of externally-driven 
reconstruction. The first part of the chapter provided an account of the evolution 
of the idea of sovereignty, key ‘rule of the game’ in international relations to 
which theorists have turned in their efforts to identify a plausible ‘ethic’ of 
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statebuilding. The second part of the chapter has instead examined the main 
operational concerns with which statebuilders are confronted in their actual 
policy-making and has identified the existence of three main strategic dilemmas 
of intervention in post-conflict scenarios. 
The recent theoretical interest around the idea of sovereignty as 
responsibility has been an attempt to update the normative pillars on which 
intervention in unstable environments can be justified, and the prolonged external 
regulation of post-conflict societies can find legitimization. Neo-communitarian 
scholars have based their theories on the presupposition that this norm has been 
genuinely informing international policy-makers. At the same time, they have 
identified a paradox of sovereignty and statebuilding, which provides a theoretical 
justification that can be applied to all cases of intervention, and an ethic that can 
support prolonged external control over failing or failed states. In contrast with 
the view, it has been shown that structural weaknesses in the contemporary 
multilateral architecture result in a profound gap between the ambition to 
consolidate an efficient system of collective security based on the idea of 
responsible intervention and the residual features of the Westphalian system of 
sovereign states that have remained the same notwithstanding the exponential 
increase in multilateral cooperation.  
Reference to the sovereignty as responsibility ideal has become a regular 
feature of UN documents – in statements, declarations, and in UNSC resolutions – 
and also appears in documents produced by many relevant regional organizations 
working in the areas of peacebuilding and statebuilding. However, the 
relationship that external policy-makers have with the issue of responsibility 
remains troubled one. The gap between abstract conceptualizations and practice 
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still remains great. In order to narrow it, and assess to what extent this new 
normative proposal is becoming a driving principle that informs practitioners, this 
dissertation has examined a specific statebuilding project. 
Against this backdrop, one principle question has been addressed. What 
normative understanding of sovereignty and what vision of post-conflict 
stabilization have been driving the specific efforts of the EU as a statebuilder? 
Chapter II has highlighted the ‘paradox within the paradox’ of sovereignty and 
statebuilding as practiced by the EU. Since the prospect of EU membership was 
formally extended to BiH, Brussels has pushed this ‘potential candidate country’ 
– to use the jargon of the EU Commission – along a very particular stabilization 
path. The progressive process of EU-driven statebuilding has produced a 
paradoxical situation. A post-nation state organization based on a system of 
pooled sovereignty – the EU – is preparing a state that is still in-the-making to 
relinquish crucial sovereign prerogatives when the time to join the Union arrives.  
Rather than focusing on statebuilding strictu senso and the full restoration 
of domestic authority, the rehabilitation trajectory designed for the specific EU 
member-statebuilding aims to absorb critical aspects of the target state 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, BiH remains an incomplete statebuilding project, a 
weak state that still needs to be strengthened in the full and efficient exercise of 
its domestic sovereignty capabilities. Moreover, stability in the country is still 
threatened by a tense domestic sovereignty struggle between representatives of 
the three main ethno-religious elites previously at war: Muslim Bosniaks, 
Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs. 
EU-driven statebuilding in BiH is presented as a more complex project 
when compared with ‘ordinary’ internationally-led missions for the institutional 
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stabilization of failing or failed states. In today’s BiH, the constraints on self-
governance are imposed not with a view to the full restoration of sovereignty; 
rather, Brussels is preparing this multiethnic polity with the objective of Euro-
Atlantic integration and in the inherent conviction that by dissolving aspects of 
Bosnian sovereignty into a supranational construction, even the most profound 
fracture lines are bound to disappear. In simple terms, the externally driven 
reorganization of the state is directed towards a supranational project, and thus is 
conducive to a future dilution of sovereignty.  
While pursuing this project, the EU has undoubtedly exercised a positive 
influence on the country: European integration represents the only issue on which 
local elites unconditionally agree. Together with NATO membership, the EU has 
offered the only credible perspective that, even if indirectly, has so far 
successfully contained the centripetal forces that characterize the Bosnian 
multiethnic and multi-religious context. Political and institutional stabilization 
remains nevertheless a distant prospect. At all levels, sovereignty is contested 
between the representatives of the three ethno-religious factions formerly at war. 
Ranging from the central state down to cantonal and even municipal level, this 
confrontation has been defined in this dissertation as a ‘multilevel sovereignty 
struggle’. 
Aware of these problems, the EU has relied on the instruments provided 
by the SAP, in an attempt to limit the direct intrusiveness of its powers and to 
minimize as much as possible the risks related to the complex constitutional 
restructuring of the country. Moreover, in the course of almost ten years of EU-
driven statebuilding in BiH, external policy-making has been accompanied by a 
consistent emphasis on the importance of ownership and democratization, in 
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addition to the obvious references to economic development. All of these 
methodological precautions adopted by the EU are based on the inherent 
conviction that the numerous internal fractures of the country will eventually be 
healed once Bosnian sovereignty is pooled – and thus partially diluted – in the 
greater European supranational construction. 
Identifying this fundamental characteristic that differentiates EU member-
statebuilding from other exercises of externally-driven stabilization in crisis areas, 
this thesis has approached the EU commitment to BiH with the overall aim of 
highlighting Brussels’ contradictory stance as a statebuilder and with a view to 
reconstructing not only the most relevant normative aspects, but also the 
operational peculiarities of such a complex undertaking. BiH is an optimal case 
study for understanding the principles that inspire EU stabilization efforts in the 
Western Balkans region as a whole, and the operational limitations which it faces. 
Moreover, this investigation has highlighted the strategic and methodological 
differences between internationally-driven (UN-led) statebuilding, EU member-
statebuilding, and some of the key strategic features that characterize US-led 
initiatives for the external regulation of failing and failed states. In particular, it 
has been shown that while Washington invests in statebuilding enterprises to 
multiply the number of its allies and consolidate its global network, Brussels 
pursues a more sophisticated and idealistic goal. In other words, this thesis argues 
that while Washington consolidates its global influence and promotes 
consolidation through states, Brussels focuses on the consolidation of its regional 
influence on states. 
The investigation into the normative understanding of sovereignty and 
post-conflict stability at the basis of the current EU involvement in the Bosnian 
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political context has shown that direct policies for political reconciliation are only 
marginally on the EU’s agenda for this complex multiethnic polity. In the logic of 
EU policy-makers, BiH can be rescued if it is anchored through the SAP to the 
EU integration process. Specifically, the SAA – with all of its mechanisms, 
negotiations, and deadlines – is perceived as an instrument that can create a 
positive ‘chain reaction’. Once the process is launched, Bosnian political 
representatives are confronted with the inherent contradictions of their 
institutional structure and they are expected to spontaneously reform, readapt, and 
rationalize the Bosnian state. It is thus a widely-held view in Brussels that the 
SAA implementation process should be sufficiently demanding that it forces 
Bosnian elites to undertake reforms.  
Even if it is mainly an economic instrument designed to open up the market 
of the recipient country to European products, the SAA is perceived by policy-
makers in Brussels as an adequate instrument to encourage Bosnian elites to 
pursue substantial reforms in all core policy areas. Specifically, the SAA was 
designed by the EU to be a mechanism aimed at: ‘supporting efforts to strengthen 
democracy and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina; contributing to 
political, economic and institutional stability in BiH and in the wider region; 
providing a framework for political dialogue, allowing for the development of 
close political relations between the EU and BiH’ (European Council 2008b). The 
SAA represents the key instrument of what has been referred to as a ‘statebuilding 
by induction’ process or, put another way, it could be said to reflect a 
‘statebuilding by the backdoor’ methodology. 
Given its structural peculiarities, and a certain institutional predisposition to 
distance itself from political processes, it can be concluded that the EU 
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involvement in BiH and the rest of the Western Balkans remains incomplete. The 
EU modus operandi in BiH continues to be exposed to the residual influence of 
the US. It is not by coincidence that since July 1997 the position of Deputy High 
Representative in BiH has constantly been held by a senior US diplomat, who has 
been in constant open confrontation with local elites. At the same time, EU-driven 
statebuilding in BiH is conditioned by the attitude of European states which, 
while holding a seat in the PIC-SB, do not invest sufficient diplomatic resources 
in Brussels to promote political consensus on BiH at the European Council. 
For instance, the attempts at quiet mediation undertaken in 2007 by 
HR/EUSR Schwarz-Schilling (which were oriented in principle towards political 
reconciliation and in practice towards the creation of a sustainable framework for 
constitutional reform) were not backed up with sufficient political support by the 
Council. It is too early to say whether placing so much confidence in technically-
driven changes is a risky choice or not; however, it seems unlikely that there will 
be any substantial positive institutional change until the Bosnian stabilization 
process is backed up with renewed diplomatic energy and more coordinated 
political action from Brussels. To be sure, the EU integration process helps to 
‘depoliticise’ many sensitive issues (Belloni 2007: 155). However, the continued 
marginalization of politics in the process that leads to integration might eventually 
undermine the final outcome. The prolonged absence of a structured strategy for 
reconciliation – both at political and societal levels – has resulted in an increased 
polarization between the three main ethno-religious groups in the country.  
With a view to demonstrating that the EU follows a very peculiar ‘ethic’ 
and modus operandi when it comes to statebuilding policies in its near abroad, 
particular attention has been paid to the main processes that dominate the reform 
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agenda in BiH and the ways in which Brussels has approached them. The analysis 
demonstrates that the sovereignty issue is often employed as a smoke screen by 
EU policy-makers, in the attempt to mask their inability to agree at the level of 27 
– beyond a general consensus on the need to pursue the enlargement process – on 
coherent specific stabilization policies. Moreover, it has been shown that the EU’s 
particular approach to statebuilding stems from an imperial attitude to the 
enlargement process.  
As argued in Chapter III, the cautiousness with which the EU has 
approached the issue of constitutional reform in BiH – from the early days of its 
field presence in the country up until the present time – demonstrates that the 
conventional understanding of sovereignty is an argument on which EU 
statebuilders rely for strategic reasons. The emphasis that the EU places on the 
need to respect domestic sovereignty reveals a genuine paradox. The promotion of 
a classic sovereign ideal is maintained while, at the same time, domestic 
sovereignty is on the one hand subjected to continued and internationally 
institutionalized violations and, on the other, is projected towards an alternative 
model based on the predominance of formal and informal supranational networks 
over domestic ones.  
This analysis confirms Stephen Krasner’s argument that sovereignty is 
‘organized hypocrisy’ (1999b), as well as his specific conclusions on the gap 
between what statebuilding is said to be and how in reality such projects are 
carried out by external actors in failing or failed state (Krasner 2004). The EU 
experience in BiH confirms that the idea of sovereignty is strategically 
manipulated with a view to presenting external peacebuilding activities as being 
always ‘appropriate’. As an example of this tendency, reference has been made on 
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the EU’s hands-up statebuilding attitude. This metaphor has been employed to 
describe the tendency of EU policy-makers to distance themselves from 
uncomfortable political responsibilities and to ignore deviations from the ideal of 
responsible intervention. The predominance of the hands-up attitude amongst EU 
policy-makers finds confirmation in the experience of HR/EUSR Schwarz-
Schilling. The way in which ‘European’ political support was slowly withdrawn 
from the German HR/EUSR is emblematic.  
Testing the ideal of shared responsibilities on a more operational and 
policy-oriented ground, the analysis in Chapter IV focused on a concrete aspect of 
external policy-making. Two main questions have been addressed in this regard. 
Firstly, do statebuilders take responsibility for all of their actions, including their 
mistakes? Secondly, do statebuilders learn from their mistakes and correct 
ineffective policies in a timely manner? An attempt to answer these two 
interrelated questions has been made by employing another metaphor – ‘hands-off 
statebuilding’. This expression describes the EU’s approach of pursuing the 
reorganization of Bosnia’s incomplete and contested sovereignty via partial and 
apparently technical reforms. In concrete terms, this strategy serves two purposes. 
On the one hand, it facilitates preservation of those ideals of gradualism and 
functionalism that have been features of the EU integration process since the early 
post-WWII period. On the other, the hands-off modus operandi has helped to 
overcome a substantial limitation that has characterized the intra-EU 
multilateralism: the lack of strategic political consensus in the Council and the 
institutional frictions between the Council, the Commission and, to a degree, the 
EP. 
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Reference to the idea of a ‘hands-off’ attitude has also been made with a 
view to showing that the actual sharing of responsibilities is difficult if not 
impossible to reconcile with the structures, customs, and unwritten rules of 
international missions in a post-conflict environment. External actors have 
devoted significant attention to the issue of responsibility. But they do so with the 
aim of off-loading their responsibilities and minimizing risks; in particular, the 
risk of a loss of public legitimacy for their presence on the ground. This 
legitimacy is based on two distinct pillars: the first is determined by the 
relationship between the field presence and headquarters, the second stems from 
the interactions of the field presence with both the political elite and constituent 
people of the host state. It is notable that this tendency can be identified even in 
the case of the EU, which has a more sophisticated objective than other 
multilateral organizations: that of welcoming target states into its supranational 
integration structures.  
The history of EU-sponsored police reform in BiH is an interesting case of 
mismanaged conditionality that has been analyzed precisely in order to identify 
the main features of the EU hands-off statebuilding stance. An examination of this 
reform process reveals the difficult confrontation between internationals (in this 
case, EU officials) and local elites. The police reform shows that the 
mismanagement of external conditionality induced the external agent, the EU, to 
accept a more flexible, weaker, but domestically-owned reform agenda. This 
conditionality sparked one of BiH’s most serious crises in its post-Dayton history. 
With the credibility of the whole European integration project for BiH at risk, the 
EU decided to refrain from further confrontation with domestic elites and dropped 
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its most critical demands, thus allowing local politicians to ‘perform a conquest’ 
of the reform agenda.  
This thesis posits that reluctance to give up on a ‘no mistake policy’ induces 
international agents to defend conditionality to the point that a project becomes 
almost untenable. At this point, internationals prefer to relinquish conditionality 
and accept a domestically-owned reform agenda, which is rewarded in spite of 
inherent weaknesses or clear unfeasibility. Ownership is thus presented as a 
successful outcome in itself, even if the resulting reforms are not in the least 
satisfactory. Much like other international agencies deployed in crises areas, the 
EU demonstrates a tendency to preserve its own ‘no mistake policy’ at all costs.  
 
 
2. Policy implications 
What does it mean to share responsibilities in a project of state reconstruction? 
The concept of shared responsibilities has a twofold dimension when it is applied 
to international intervention. On the one hand, there is a moral imperative to 
launch multilateral efforts in a timely manner when a crisis situation threatens 
lives. As the trend of post-Cold War history has shown, the UN’s ability to 
establish an effective international presence in crisis areas has significantly 
increased. Unfortunately however, there are still cases – such as Somalia – that 
confirm the general reluctance of states to intervene in situations of state collapse 
where the associated risks are high and where strategic interests, other than the 
general ideal of promoting peace, are limited.  On the other hand, the question of 
responsibility comes to the fore once an international mission has been deployed 
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on the ground. The particular ‘degree’ of responsibility relates to both the policies 
promoted by international missions in the areas under their supervision and their 
conduct in the field.  
The analysis of the Bosnian case allows elaborating broad policy 
prescriptions and lessons-learned that could be applied to other cases of 
statebuilding. For instance, amongst others lessons that can be drawn from fifteen 
years of highly-intrusive intervention in BiH, an important conclusion is that 
ethno-religious fractures tend to crystallize in the absence of a systematic attempt 
to promote structured reconciliation policies at both political and societal levels. 
However, since the issue of shared responsibilities represents the red line of this 
dissertation project, a final policy remark is warranted about the proposal to 
institutionalize shared sovereignty agreements. These frameworks for 
statebuilding projects should facilitate the establishment of a clear division of 
labour, duties, and responsibilities among international practitioners and local 
elites. 
Shared sovereignty agreements or the formal establishment of a protectorate 
could enhance the degree of control and accountability of international missions. 
As Krasner (2004: 108) points out, the establishment of clear rules and the 
definition of specific responsibilities ‘would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that 
their behavior would be inconsistent with their principles’. The empirical findings 
that have been presented here demonstrate that even the EU – which pursues 
through its member-statebuilding initiatives a series of sophisticated ideals on 
regional peace and reconciliation – has had a troubled relationship with the issue 
of sharing responsibilities. In common with other multilateral missions committed 
to statebuilding projects, the EU has a tendency to ‘technify’ the relationship with 
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the target state and pursue partial achievements that concern mostly the 
institutional dimension rather than focusing on the stabilization of the society and 
the domestic political environment. 
Shared sovereignty agreements can play an important role in clarifying the 
responsibilities of external policy-makers vis-à-vis local elites. An argument that 
has recently gained ground amongst practitioners is that by increasing the 
capacities of regional organizations, it will be possible to ensure a greater degree 
of local ownership of stabilization processes and peacebuilding efforts. While this 
may appear a ‘noble’ long-term objective, a simple transfer of responsibilities to 
regional organizations is not in itself a solution. Rather than increasing the sense 
of responsibility in multilateral missions engaged in peacebuilding initiatives, this 
approach may simply enable developed countries to off-load their responsibilities 
onto their weaker neighbors.  
The increased use of shared sovereignty agreements could also serve the 
purpose of depriving recalcitrant local elites of an argument that is often 
employed by them in the blame game with the international community: as the 
detailed account of the showdown between the RS leadership and the OHR  
demonstrates, domestic nationalist politicians tend to complain obsessively that 
the international community keeps the host country in a status of de facto 
protectorate that has no legitimization and, for this reason, justifies intransigent 
positions.  
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3. Perspectives on future research 
This analysis of the Bosnian context has opened the way for other comparative 
studies into international statebuilding interventions. Remaining within the sphere 
of EU member-statebuilding in the Western Balkans, for example, Kosovo and 
Macedonia present the most interesting cases for immediate comparison with the 
experience of reconstruction in BiH.  Moreover, this thesis also points to some 
other potentially interesting avenues for exploration. Firstly, the findings show 
that there is scope for more research in this relatively new field, which might be 
referred to as the ‘sociology of international missions’. The process that leads to 
the establishment of an international mission in a crisis area is often overlooked 
by analysts. Observers tend to monitor the activities of an international mission, 
but only limited attention has been paid to the political dynamics that lead to its 
establishment, the negotiation process for the definition or modification of its 
mandate, and issues concerning the selection and management of the human 
resources deployed on the ground.  
Secondly, this dissertation has shown the need for further analysis into the 
issue of ‘policy adaptation’ by international missions. Do international missions 
recognize their mistakes and change their policies accordingly? This is a crucial 
question that is directly linked to the issue of adjustments in external 
conditionalities. Some research in this field has already been undertaken, but 
predominantly on the management of conditionalities by development agencies or 
international financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. Very limited 
attention has thus far been paid to policy development and change by international 
missions dealing with security-related issues and political affairs.  
 275 
 
Thirdly, the specific focus on EU attempts at member-statebuilding and the 
assessment of the difficulties that the EU encounters in its internal policy-
planning represent an interesting basis on which to launch an examination of the 
EU decision-making processes in the post-Lisbon era. The establishment of the 
external action service and a new division of labour between the Commission and 
the Council are imminent. It is to be hoped that the EU will learn to act 
collectively, affirm its geopolitical primauté in its near abroad, and eventually 
overcome its ‘Jacques Poos’ complex101 also in other regions of the world, where 
its stabilizing influence could play an important role in guaranteeing peace and 
stability. The EU is already an example of a successful model for the 
consolidation of regional peace and the promotion of opportunities for economic 
prosperity; it is time that it takes its rightful place as a responsible international 
actor as well. 
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(Appendix A) 
 
Framework Interview Questions 
 
 
 
1. Can you identify the key issues related to the reorganization of sovereignty in 
BiH? 
 
2. Could you briefly list what are the specific responsibilities of ‘international 
statebuilders’ towards BiH today? 
2.1. What is the specific role of the EU in the Bosnian stabilization process? 
2.2. What is the role of the United Nations? 
2.3. What is the role of other states (e.g. the United States, Russia) or relevant 
regional actors? 
 
3. Who is sovereign in BiH today and who should be sovereign? 
3.1. If the people are sovereign, would you consider a referendum on the 
integrity of the Bosnian state or a vote on secession in Republika Srpska as 
a legitimate, suitable, and appropriate exercise of popular sovereignty? 
3.2. If we consider the ‘sovereignty of the people’ as an ideal and sovereignty de 
facto lays in the government (or the constitution), how much work does BiH 
still need to be, so to say, normalized as a functional sovereign state? 
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4. Have you considered the possibility that the Bosnian experiment might fail? 
4.1. If yes, what are the elements that induced such a fear? 
4.2. If not, why do you think this is impossible? 
 
5. What would be the consequences of a failure of the Bosnian experiment? 
5.1. What specific consequences would there be on European security? 
5.2. What specific consequences would there be on the credibility of the EU? 
 
6. If Bosnian political elites show no substantial progress in the reform talks and in the 
constitutional debate, do you think that the whole Bosnian project should be 
reconsidered? 
 
7. Can BiH go to Brussels without leaving Dayton? In other words, do you think that 
the EU could integrate, ‘save’, and interact in efficient ways with BiH without a 
substantial consolidation of power and authority in favor of the central governing 
Bosnian institutions?  
7.1. If yes, what role do you assign to multi-level governance practices and EU 
pooled sovereignty? 
7.2. If not, how much consolidation of power and sovereign prerogatives 
towards Sarajevo are still needed? 
7.3. Do you think this would be ‘fair’ in terms of sovereignty? 
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8. What do you foresee as the outcome of the Bosnian statebuilding experiment? 
8.1. How do you perceive your contribution to achieving such an outcome? 
 
9. Why has the EU in BiH taken all the responsibilities formerly attributed to the UN 
and NATO?  
9.1. How much has the US disengagement from the Balkans influenced the 
increased EU presence? 
9.2. To what extent is this commitment connected to security concerns in 
Western Europe? 
9.3. How much to the consolidation of the EU as a foreign policy actor? 
 
10. How would you define the EU prospect of membership as a tool for indirect 
stabilization and soft power?  
 
11. Could you say that the EU prospect is successfully “bridling” the centripetal forces 
characterizing the Bosnian political environment? 
 
 
12. Why do we keep the double-hat (and therefore the double chain of command) on 
the HR/EUSR?  
12.1. How much was the choice determined by lack of unitary view at the EU? 
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12.2. How much was this is linked to the uncertainties determined by the 
independence of Kosovo? 
13. The EU seems to look at the SAA as to an automatic process that can unhinge the 
most critical Bosnian institutional weaknesses. Do you think this approach is 
correct and it will actually be successful? 
13.1. If yes, don’t you think this technocratic way dangerously excludes or, to say 
the least, marginalizes politics? 
13.2. If not, could you elaborate on your answer? 
 
14. Could you elaborate on the alternative strategies for constitutional reform in BiH 
that the EU has tested while instead the April Package was promoted under strict 
US supervision? 
 
15.  In which respect does the EU approach to member-statebuilding in BiH differ from 
the strategies of the US for the reorganization of the Bosnian state structure? 
 
 
16. What are in your opinion the main differences of approach between the US and the 
EU to making external pressures on the Bosnian elites specifically for the 
constitutional reform? 
 
17. What are the strategic goals of the EU-sponsored police reform in BiH, if any? 
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(Appendix B) 
 
List of Interviewees 
 
 
 Mr. Michael Aldaya, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina Programme Manager and 
Assistance Desk Officer for Bosnia-Herzegovina, DG Enlargement, EU 
Commission (Brussels, September 2007). 
Mr. Tommaso Andria, Deputy Head of Mission at Italian Embassy to BiH 
(Sarajevo, November 2007). 
Ms. Nadine Athanassiadou, Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Greece to the 
EU, participant to the COWEB (Brussels, September 2007).  
Mr. Šukrjia Bakšić, University of Sarajevo (Sarajevo, June 2007). 
Mr. Jan Bayart, Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the EU, 
participant to the COWEB (Brussels, September 2007).  
Mr. Arno Behrens, Sec. Adj. at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the EU, 
participant to the COWEB (Brussels, April 2007).  
Ms. Andrea Berdesinski Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the 
EU, participant to the COWEB (Brussels, April 2007).  
Ms. Arina Beslagic, BiH Ministry of Security (Sarajevo, June 2007). 
Ms. Talija Boati, Democratization - Working Table 1 Stability Pact for South-
eastern Europe (Brussels, May 2007). 
Mr. Detlev Boeing, Principal Administrator, Policy Coordination Unit, DG 
Enlargement, EU Commission (Brussels, July 2007). 
Ms. Giovanna Bono, Administrator, Subcommittee on Security and Defence at EP 
(Brussels, November 2007).  
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Ms. Anica Brooks, Adviser at the EP (Brussels, December 2007). 
Mr. Vincent P. Carver, US Permanent Representation to the EU (Brussels, 
November 2007). 
Mr. Gabriele Cascone, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate, 
NATO (Sarajevo, June 2007).  
Mr. Mauro Conciatori, Counselor at Italian Permanent Mission to the EU, 
participant to the COWEB (Brussels, March 2007).  
Mr. Vincenzo Coppola, Head of Mission at EUPM (Sarajevo, December 2007 and 
June 2008). 
Mr. Aleksandar Damjanac, Delegation of BiH to the EU (Brussels, September 
2007). 
Mr. Renzo Daviddi, Head of the European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo 
(Pristina, December 2007). 
Mr. Emir Demirovic, BiH Council of Ministers (Sarajevo, June 2007). 
Mr. Fabrizio Di Michele, Counselor at Italian Permanent Mission to the EU, 
participant to the COWEB (Brussels, October 2007).  
Ms. Anela Duman, Policy Consultant at CPM Group (Sarajevo, June 2007). 
Mr. Steffen Elgersma, Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate 
(Brussels, September 2007). 
Mr. Alessandro Fallavolita, Head of Mission, Italian Embassy to BiH (Sarajevo, 
December 2007). 
Mr. Mark Fleming, Political-Military Officer at US Embassy to BiH (Sarajevo, 
November 2007). 
Mr. Tobias Flessenkemper, Chief of EU Coordination Office at EUPM (Sarajevo, 
December 2007). 
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Ms. Sabine Freizer, Director of the Europe Program at International Crisis Group 
(Brussels, November 2007). 
Mr. Orlando Fusco, Political Advisor, EUSR (Sarajevo, June and December 2007). 
Mr. Michael Giffoni, Council Secretariat, Policy Unit, Western Balkans Task 
Force, Policy Unit of the EU Council Secretariat (Brussels, June and 
December 2007). 
Mr. Luca Gori, Counselor at the Permanent Mission of Italy to the EU, participant 
to the COWEB (Brussels, March 2007).  
Mr. Drino Galičić, Legal Advisor to the EU Special Representative (Sarajevo, 
December 2007). 
Mr. Damir Gnjidić, Legal Advisor for Public and Administrative Law at OHR 
(Sarajevo, December 2007). 
Mr. Vedran Hadžović, Central Electoral Commission, Bosnian National Parliament 
(Sarajevo, June 2007). 
Mr. Mudzahid Hasanbegovic, Legal Adviser at EUSR (Sarajevo, December 2007). 
Ms. Anna Ibrisagic, Swedish MEP (EPP-ED, DE) member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Sub-Committee for Security and Defence (Brussels, October 
2007). 
Ms. Tatjiana Jancević, Deputy Chief Legal Advisor at EUPM (Sarajevo, December 
2007). 
Ms. Barbara A. Leaf, Head of the Political Section at the US Embassy to Italy 
(Rome, November 2009). 
Mr. Gianni La Ferrara, Policy Consultant at CPM Group (Sarajevo, June 2007). 
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Notes 
 
 
                                                           
1
 The DPA was initialed on 22 November 1995 at the ‘Wright-Patterson’ Air Force Base in Dayton, 
Ohio (USA) after twenty days of formal negotiations. The agreement was then signed in Paris on 14 
December 1995. The DPA is formally titled General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In some scholarly publication, as well as in some official documents, it therefore appears 
with the other acronym ‘GFAP’. See http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=380  
2
 For further details and information, see http://www.crs.state.gov/  
3
 That of ‘international community’ can be a vague and tricky term if it is used without the proper 
clarifications. In this thesis, the concept of international community is employed to summarize the 
complex firmament of intergovernmental organizations and states. When the expression is followed by 
the specification ‘in BiH’, it refers to all the intergovernmental organizations (including military 
organizations and missions) that operate in BiH, as well as to the totality of the diplomatic community 
posted in BiH. 
4
 European Security and Defence Policy. 
5
 For further information on the European External Action Service (EEAS) see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/background/index_en.htm  
6
 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty all Delegations of the Commission abroad have 
become Delegations of the European Union (EUDEL). 
7
 COWEB gathers twice a week in Brussels. On average, twice a month the so-called ‘COWEB 
Capitals’ gathers all the Directors (in most cases for EU Integration) from the national foreign 
ministries. Western Balkans affairs are also covered by the Political and Security Committee (PSC or 
COPS, according to the widely used French acronym) that twice a week gathers diplomats at 
ambassadorial level from each EU member states’ permanent representations in Brussels, as well as 
senior officials from the External Relations DG (Relex) of the Commission. It is now customary at the 
EU Council that, when issues are of particular relevance, the work of COREPER II is prepared 
directly by COPS, at least for the most general guidelines. When this happens on a given issue, 
COWEB is usually asked to develop concrete proposals on the technical and implementation aspects 
of the general policies agreed upon by COREPER II. 
8
 The Permanent Representatives Committee works in two configurations: the so-called Coreper I is 
composed of the deputy permanent representatives and deals with technical dossiers; the Coreper II 
instead gathers all the ambassadors and deals with all political, economic or institutional matters. For 
further details, see http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/coreper_en.htm  
9
 For a juridical analysis of the functional decentralization of the international system, see Ronzitti 
(2004: 5-7). 
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10
 For further elements on the humanitarian intervention debate, see (Chopra 1992; Lyons 1995; 
Bettati 1996) For more recent analyses, see (Ayoob 2002; Bellamy 2003; Holzgrefe 2003; Bastian 
2005) 
11
 The commitment to prevent and responsibility to rebuild are extensively elaborated in the report of 
the ICISS (2001: 19-28, 39-46). Further clarifications on these concepts will be provided in section 
2.2. 
12
 For more detailed elements also see Etzioni (2004). 
13
 In Annex 1-B (Art. V) of the DPA, which is dedicated to the negotiations on a regional arms control 
agreement, there is the famous expression ‘regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia’. 
14
 Interview with Michael Giffoni, EU Council (Brussels, 30 March 2007).  
15
 Interview with Michael Giffoni, EU Council (Brussels, 4 May 2007). 
16
 The PIC gathers fifty-five members, including both states and international organizations. The PIC-
SB includes the following members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and Turkey. The 
latter sits in the PIC-SB also as representing the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At the first 
Peace Implementation Conference – which was hosted by the UK in London on 8-9 December 1995 – 
the PIC-SB was created to act as ‘the executive arm of the PIC’ (OHR 2006). The PIC-SB is convened 
by the HR once every week in Sarajevo at the level of Ambassadors. The PIC-SB gathers at the level 
of Political Directors every three months in average. Most of these meetings take place in Brussels. 
Apart from defining the key role of the PIC-SB, the London 1995 Conference provided an occasion to 
debate four main areas of the upcoming peace implementation process in post-war BiH: coordination 
mechanism, humanitarian assistance, political sector (including vote monitoring), and assistance for 
rehabilitation. 
17
 Interview with José L. Sanchez Alegre, DG Enlargement - EU Commission (Brussels, 4 June 2007). 
18
 Interview with Counselor Lars Schmidt, Swedish Permanent Mission to the EU and member of the 
COWEB (Brussels, 22 May 2007). 
19
 For further details on the handover between NATO and the EU, see Eichberg (2004b: 27-34). 
20
 During the Ottoman Empire, the Viziers were representatives of the Sultan in the provinces of the 
Empire. The ‘Grand Vizier’ was instead serving in Istanbul as sort of Prime Minister.   
21
 The ICTY sentenced Biljana Plavšić to eleven years in prison for war crimes (ICTY 2003).  
22
 Interview with a former OHR official, employed at the OHR legal office in 1998-1999 (Sarajevo, 11 
June 2008). 
23
 Interview with Tobias Flessemkemper, EUPM (Sarajevo, 21 November 2007). 
24
 Interview with Stephen Simosas, DG Enlargement - EU Commission (Brussels, 11 November 
2007). 
25
 For a detailed analysis of the institutions, the procedures and the balances designed at Dayton for the 
Bosnian state, see Ridinò (2001: 125-132). 
26
 For further information, see http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm  
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27
 Interview with Steve Lee, OSCE Mission to BiH and chair of the Ottawa sessions of the ICISS 
(Sarajevo, 22 June 2007). 
28
 For further information, see http://www.ardanw.org/  
29
 For further information, see http://www.nerda.ba/  
30
 For further information, see http://www.redah.ba/  
31
 For further information, see http://www.rez.ba/  
32
 For further information, see http://www.serda.ba/  
33
 Interview with Maja Lolić, Office of the Bosnian EU SAA Negotiator (Protaras - Cyprus, 22 April 
2007). 
34
 Interview with Šukrjia Bakšić, University of Sarajevo - Faculty of Law (Sarajevo, 26 June 2007). 
35
 Formulas like the one above are encompassed in the program and the rhetoric of the RS premier’s 
party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), but are made explicit also by other 
political groups. For instance, the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP, founded by and still run under 
the guidance of Dragan Ivanić) identified the motto “Europe, the house of the future” as first pillar of 
its strategy. Commenting on this choice, a member of the party’s executive board admitted: “The first 
point of our new strategy makes explicit what is actually clear since 1999, which was the beginning of 
our activity. We defined ourselves as an ‘EU-party’, whose main objective is the integration of RS and 
BiH into European networks and the EU”. Interview with Dusko Maslesa, Party of Democratic 
Progress (Sarajevo, 22 June 2007). 
36
 Started in April 1992, the siege of Sarajevo by the Serb militias was ended in February 1996. 
37
 The report, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 62nd plenary session, was drafted by five 
rapporteurs: Mr. J. Helgesen (Member, Norway), Mr. J. Jowell (Member, United Kingdom), Mr. G. 
Malinverni (Member, Switzerland), Mr. J. C. Scholsem (Member, Belgium), and Mr. K. Tuori 
(Member, Finland). 
38
 For further information on the issue, cf. Chapter III  section 4.2. 
39
 These interviews have been conducted in Brussels and in BiH. The list of interviewees includes both 
permanent staff and seconded personnel at the Brussels offices of the EU Commission and Council; 
diplomats from the member states employed at their respective national permanent missions to the EU 
and serving in the COWEB (the committee that prepares the work of the COREPER on the Western 
Balkans); officers employed at the various EU offices in BiH, at the OSCE Mission to BiH, and at the 
OHR/EUSR; members of the European Parliament (MEPs). 
40
 Interview with an Official from the EU Council Policy Unit (Brussels, 22 May 2007). 
41
 Interview with Counselor Lars Schmidt, Swedish Permanent Mission to the EU and member of the 
COWEB (Brussels, 22 May 2007). 
42
 Interview with Stephen Simosas, DG Enlargement - EU Commission (Brussels, 8 June 2007).  
43
 Sepp Kusstatscher (MEP), 9th EP-BiH Inter-parliamentary Meeting (Brussels, 28 June 2007). 
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44
 For further details on the various steps listed in the EU Road Map for BiH, see 
http://www.ceps.be/files/ESF/Monitor11.php 
45
 On the handover between the EU and NATO, see Alic (2004: 28-34), Eichberg and Venneri 
(2004b). 
46
 At present, the EC delegation to BiH involves the work of over 100 officers, and it has thus become 
one of the largest EC missions abroad. For further details, see http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/ 
47
 Some interesting consideration on the OHR/EUSR can be found in Recchia (2007). 
48
  On the methodology employed by The Dayton Project, see Hayden (2006). 
49
 Interview with an Official of the DG Enlargement - EU Commission (Brussels, 8 June 2007). The 
SAP was officially launched in November 2000 at the Zagreb Summit. 
50
 Interview with Luca Gori, Italian Permanent Representation to the EU (Brussels, 26 March 2007). 
51
 Interview with Michael Aldaya, EU Commission – DG Enlargement (Brussels, 24 September 2007). 
52
 According to an Italian diplomat: ‘if the EU has not had yet any role with regards to the 
Constitutional debate in Bosnia this can be understood by looking at the attitude of the Commission. 
At the very beginning, the Commission was particularly reluctant to think that it might have had some 
kind of interference with regards to the Bosnian constitutional debate; even the mere possibility of 
acting to facilitate the talks was seen as a task falling outside the possibility, the powers, and the 
intensions of the Commission. The constitutional restructuring of the Bosnian state is not seen as 
essential per se, what is truly essential for the Commission in particular is that reform for a more 
functional state takes place through the SAP’. Interview with Luca Gori, Italian Permanent Mission to 
the EU (Brussels, 26 March 2007). 
53
 Interview with Doris Pack, MEP (Brussels, 7 July 2007).  
54
 For some interesting information on Lajčàk’s background and nomination as EUSR/HR, see (Alic 
2007) 
55
 Interview with an official from the EUSR legal department (Sarajevo, 26 June 2007). 
56
 The following analysis has been developed by monitoring since early 2007 the work of the EP 
Foreign Affairs Committee, its Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, the Delegation for SEE, as 
well as the preparatory work and final 9th EP-Bosnia and Herzegovina Interparliamentary Meeting. 
57
 Doris Pack (MEP), 9th EP-BiH Inter-parliamentary Meeting, Brussels (June 28, 2007).  
58
 Hannes Swoboda (MEP), 9th EP-BiH Inter-parliamentary Meeting, Brussels (June 28, 2007). 
59
 Ivo Miro Jović (Bosnian MP, member of the HDZ, first vice-president of the Joint Committee for 
European Integration of the Bosnian Parliament), 9th EP-BiH Inter-parliamentary Meeting, Brussels 
(June 28, 2007). 
60
 Interview with a senior US diplomat, serving at the political section of the US Embassy to BiH in 
2005 (Rome, 12 November 2009). 
61
 Amb. Donald S. Hays was Deputy High-Representative for almost four years, precisely between 
July 2001 and March 2005. 
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62
 Interview with a senior US diplomat, serving at the political section of the US Embassy to BiH in 
2005 (Rome, 12 November 2009). 
63
 A more detailed analysis of the content of the April Package has been made by Roberto Belloni 
(2007: 54-58) and, more recently, by Jens Woelk (2008: 241-53). 
64
 Interview with a senior US diplomat, serving at the political section of the US Embassy to BiH in 
2005 (Rome, 12 November 2009). 
65
 Interview with Fabrizio Di Michele, Italian Permanent Mission to the EU (Brussels, 1 October 
2007). 
66
 Reference to this last mediation is provided in section 3.3. 
67
 It is important to stress that, between these two extremes, Tihić launched the proposal to reduce 
entity voting only to the competences shared at state level. 
68
 Dirk Lange is Head of Unit C1 - Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina at the DG Enlargement of the EC. 
69
 Interview with an Official from the EUSR legal department (Sarajevo, 26 June 2007). 
70
 Apart from Sarajevo, Vice-President Biden actually made a broader tour of the Western Balkans on 
May 19-21, and he also visited Belgrade and Pristina. 
71
 The organization of retreats to push Bosnian political leaders to reach consensus on key reform 
processes is not new. This tradition was inaugurated in 2003, in the weeks that preceded the 
EU/Western Balkans Thessaloniki Summit. In April of that year, the representatives of the 
International Community in BiH gathered with local party leaders, governmental officials and MPs in 
the city of Bjelasnica for a two-day retreat (cf. Chapter III, section 2). The main outcome of the 
meeting was a declaration on key reform and a ‘wish list’ sent to the attention of the EU in view of the 
Thessaloniki initiative (OHR 2003b).  
72
 E-mail communication to the author from a EUSR Official (15 September 2009). 
73
 The paragraph dedicated to this issue proceeds as follow: ‘The Court observes that in order to be 
eligible to stand for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one has to declare 
affiliation with a “constituent people”. The applicants, who describe themselves to be of Roma and 
Jewish origin respectively and who do not wish to declare affiliation with a “constituent people”, are, 
as a result, excluded (see paragraph 11 above). The Court notes that this exclusion rule pursued at least 
one aim which is broadly compatible with the general objectives of the Convention, as reflected in the 
Preamble to the Convention, namely the restoration of peace. When the impugned constitutional 
provisions were put in place a very fragile cease-fire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were 
designed to end a brutal conflict marked by genocide and “ethnic cleansing”. The nature of the conflict 
was such that the approval of the “constituent peoples” (namely, the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) was 
necessary to ensure peace. This could explain, without necessarily justifying, the absence of 
representatives of the other communities (such as local Roma and Jewish communities) at the peace 
negotiations and the participants' preoccupation with effective equality between the “constituent 
peoples” in the post-conflict society’ (ECtHR 2009: §45). 
74
 It was not by chance that the exercise was undertaken under the Swedish Presidency of the EU, with 
Carl Bildt, former HR, playing all his diplomatic cards in Brussels to bring BiH among the top 
priorities of the EU agenda. 
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75
 Paul Szasz was a legal expert with a fifty-year experience in several UN institutions, agencies and 
field missions (these include: IAEA, IFAD, UNIDO end the UN Legal Department in New York) and 
the World Bank. Between 1992 and 1995, he served as legal adviser to SoS Cyrus R. Vance and Lord 
Owen and then played a key role in the preparation of the constitutional framework that was attached 
to the DPA. 
76
 In this capacity, Amb. Botsan-Kharchenko was member of the ‘Troika for the negotiations on the 
future of Kosovo’ with the EU envoy the German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger and the US 
representative Amb. Frank Wisner. 
77
 The Bosnian team for the negotiation of the SAA was created at the end of 2005 and put under the 
guidance of Igor Davidovic, former BiH ambassador to Washington (Prienda 2005). 
78
 For further details on the EU enlargement to SEE, see http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-
candidate-countries/bosnia_and_herzegovina/eu_bosnia_and_herzegovina_relations_en.htm 
79
 A complete list of the actions undertaken in this specific field by the HR/EUSR in 2004 is available 
at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-decs/archive.asp?m=&yr=2004  
80
 The details of this decisions are available at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/war-crimes-
decs/default.asp?content_id=32753  
81
 The unification of the Bosnian army and the creation of a defense ministry at state leave are 
considered as one of the most important successes achieved during the tenure of Paddy Ashdown. 
However, it should be noticed that the old armies still exist at regimental level as traditional units. 
82
 Article 2 of Ashdown’s decision listed the auspices of the police reform: ‘The Commission shall 
fulfil its mandate in accordance with the following principles:  1. Ensuring that policing in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is structured in an efficient and effective manner;  2. Ensuring that the Institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are able to carry out fully and effectively their law enforcement 
responsibilities; 3. Ensuring that policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina is cost-effective and financially 
sustainable;  4.  Ensuring that policing staffing levels and conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina are in 
line with European best practice and cognizant of prevailing social factors;  5. Ensuring that policing 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina generally reflects the ethnic structure of the population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina;  6. Ensuring that policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina is adequately protected from 
improper political interference; 7.  Ensuring that policing will be discharged in accordance with 
democratic values, international human rights standards and best European practices;  8. Ensuring that 
policing will be delivered through inclusive partnership with the community and civil society;  9. 
Ensuring that policing will be discharged within a clear framework of accountability to the law and the 
community;  10. Ensuring that the effective capacity to investigate war crimes is guaranteed 
throughout the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina;  11. Ensuring the examinations of 
necessary linkages to broader justice system matters;  12. Ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
state can effectively participate as a partner with other EU states in common actions, planning and 
operations on internal affairs matters’. 
83
 Interview with an Official from the OSCE (Sarajevo, 11 November 2007). 
84
 Interview with Ms. Anna Ibrisagic, MEP (Brussels, 3 October 2007). 
85
 The acronym SBiH indicates the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stranka Za Bosnu i 
Hercegovinu), which is guided by the Bosniak leader Haris Silajdžić. SNSD or Alliance of 
Independent Social Democrats (Savez Nezavisnih Socijaldemokrata) is guided by the Bosnian Serb 
Prime Minister of RS Milorad Dodik.  
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86
 Interview with a diplomat serving in the COWEB, Ms. Nadine Athanassiadou, Permanent 
Representation of Greece to the EU (Brussels, 21 September 2007).  
87
 Interview with Giulio Zanni, Political Adviser and Acting Head Political Economic Section at the 
EC Delegation to Bosnia (Sarajevo, 14 November 2007). 
88
 Unofficial translation from the TV broadcast of the ceremony. 
89
 The Srpski/Bosanski Brod oil refinery had been seriously damaged at wartimes. First re-opened on 
May 2000, the refinery started to produce lead-free gas and euro-diesel in mid-2004. 
90
 The whole text appeared on the OHR website proceeds as follows. ‘Myth One: Police restructuring 
is a step towards abolishing the Entities. Fact: No it isn’t. Police re-structuring is only about 
establishing a professional police service and will not abolish the Entities. There is no plan to abolish 
the Entities. Myth Two: Police restructuring will abolish the RS Ministry of Interior. Fact: No. There 
is nothing being proposed that requires the abolition of the RS Ministry of Interior. Anyone who says 
this is mistaken. Myth Three: The High Representative will impose police restructuring. Fact: No. He 
won’t and can’t. It will be up to BiH’s leaders to decide whether to give their agreement. However, 
police restructuring is an EU requirement: if political leaders say no to it, they will say no to the EU. 
Myth Four: It means centralizing policing in Sarajevo. Fact: No. Police restructuring will have de-
centralized local police services responsible for your local area. To help protect local interests, your 
local area will have its own Community Oversight Council. Also, as with the ITA, there is no reason 
the location of the new local police service must be in Sarajevo. Myth Five: There are no EU 
requirements for police reform. Fact: Not true. The EU has said clearly that BiH must adopt police 
restructuring if it is to move forward towards the EU. The 3 key principles must be adhered to and the 
Police Restructuring Commission report is one way to do this’. 
91
 One of the founders of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), Sulejman Tihić served from October 
2002 until end 2006 as Bosniak representative in the tripartite presidency of the country. 
92
 Interview with Ms. Sladjana Pantelić, Permanent Mission of The Netherlands to the EU, Member of 
the COWEB (Brussels, 17 December 2007). 
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 The Italian politician Franco Frattini was then the EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and 
Security and vice-President of the European Commission. 
94
 The Decalogue proceeds as follows: (1) Police restructuring will make police accountable to the 
citizen first not to politics. (2) Police restructuring will make BiH safer for citizens, tougher for 
criminals. (3) Police restructuring will get rid of the barriers that help criminals and hinder the police. 
(4) Police restructuring will cut bureaucracy and beef up crime fighting. (5) Police restructuring 
will rationalize the use of scarce resources.  (6) Police restructuring will give the police modern 
equipment to fight crime. (7) Police restructuring is a European Union requirement. (8) Without police 
restructuring, there will be no change in European visa requirements for BiH citizens. (9) Police 
restructuring will mean new career opportunities for police officers across BiH. (10) Police 
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BiH. Police restructuring is common sense. 
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99
 For instance, meeting the members of the BiH SAA negotiation team, it was no surprise to find out 
that the majority of them had received advanced university education in western European universities 
(particularly at the EU-funded College of Europe). 
100
 This French adjective is used by constitutional historians to refers to a custom in XVIII and early 
XIX century Europe, whereby self-professed enlightened kings conceded as a favour, in a top-down 
manner, constitutional schemes to the people they ruled.  
101
 In 1991, when confronted by the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, Jacques Poos, foreign minister of 
Luxembourg then holding the EU Presidency, made the unfortunate prediction that ‘the hour of 
Europe’ had eventually come. 
